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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
Seren Kierkegaard (1813-55) is one of the most controversial figures in the history of 
Christian thought. A careful examination of his works illustrates that, not only was he a 
theologian in his own right, but he stood firmly within the Christian tradition. However, 
his works are difficult to read and many misinterpretations of his thought have arisen 
from his use of pseudonyms and irony. Such misinterpretations can be avoided if two 
factors are taken into account: the literary forms of his pseudonymous works, written 
between 1843 and 1848; and, the devout Christian faith expressed in the 
nonpseudonymous, or `signed' works written throughout most of his adult life. 
Kierkegaard offers one of his most important contributions to the reason-revelation 
debate in Philosophical Fragments. In this short classic of philosophical theology, he 
rejects the immanentist theological epistemologies of Enlightenment Rationalism and 
Hegelian Idealism. For Kierkegaard, knowledge of God is dependent upon the 
revelatory and redemptive activity of God in Christ. Yet, it is ironic that the 
pseudonymous author of Fragments, Johannes Climacus, is not a Christian and 
professes not to understand the matter. God is therefore `the unknown' to him, whilst 
Christ is `the Absolute Paradox'. 
The later pseudonymous works attributed to the Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus, 
and Kierkegaard's `signed' works, develop the argument presented in Fragments. In 
these works Kierkegaard illustrates his Christocentric theology of revelation. Christ is 
our `Redeemer and Prototype' and Kierkegaard rejects any natural theology that seeks 
to operate apart from it. Christ is also `the Sign of Contradiction' who, reminiscent of 
Luther's Theology of the Cross, reveals the glory and love of God in lowliness and 
suffering. Theology is therefore an enterprise of `faith seeking understanding' as the 
believer, through grace, struggles to understand the difficulties of a revelation that runs 
counter to the world's perspectives. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is a study of the theology of the Danish philosopher-theologian Soren 
Kierkegaard (1813-55), one of the most controversial figures in the history of Christian 
thought. It was originally begun as an examination of Kierkegaard's treatment of the 
relationship between faith and reason in Philosophical Fragments. However, as 
research progressed, it became increasingly apparent that Kierkegaard had developed 
certain themes from Philosophical Fragments in later works such as The Sickness Unto 
Death and Practice in Christianity. Such works are more overtly theological than 
Philosophical Fragments and they provide great insights into Kierkegaard's more 
mature thought, something that is not always explored by scholars. In particular, I 
became fascinated by the centrality of the Incarnation in any discussion of faith and 
reason in Kierkegaard's writings, and, how this was the basis for his rejection of natural 
theology as it is traditionally understood. The topic (and subtitle) of the thesis therefore 
became `The Incarnation and Natural Theology in Kierkegaard's Religious Thought', as 
the scope of the project was appropriately broadened. I chose the main title `Paradox 
and Revelation' on the grounds that, when the topic of the Incarnation is first introduced 
in Philosophical Fragments, it is referred to as a `paradox' (and at times as `the 
Absolute Paradox'). `Revelation' was chosen because Kierkegaard proclaims a 
Christocentric theology of revelation in opposition to the methods and claims of 
traditional natural theology. ' 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
The first chapter of introduces the `problem' of reading Kierkegaard: why it is that his 
interpreters must often deal with Kierkegaard's rhetorical eccentricities alongside the 
theological content of his works. It explains why he frequently chose to communicate 
his ideas indirectly through pseudonyms and how he employed the tactics of Socratic 
An obvious and notable example of natural theology is Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. By 
natural theology I am referring to the attempt to gain knowledge of God through the exercise of natural 
reason without the appeal to revelation. This is quite distinct from any philosophical theology which seeks to 
engage in the rational and critical evaluation of Christian doctrines from the standpoint of faith. (Cf. Helm 
1997,30). 
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irony. Kierkegaard's thought is then placed in its historical and ideological context, 
explaining: the impact of his failed engagement upon his early writing, his ambiguous 
relationship with Romanticism, his hostile reaction against Hegelian Idealism and, finally, 
his criticism of the established Danish Lutheran Church. Finally, I introduce the diverse 
variety of works attributed to him known as the authorship' and show that 
Kierkegaard's later `religious' works offer the clearest insight into his theology. 
Chapter two is a theological introduction to Kierkegaard's thoughts on faith and reason. 
Beginning with his first detailed treatment of this topic, presented in Philosophical 
Fragments, it is shown that Kierkegaard holds the existence of human sin to be the 
major preventative factor in the search for knowledge of God. It shows that the alleged 
rebuttal of Socratic recollection in Fragments is actually a penetrating criticism of the 
immanentist theological epistemologies found in the rationalism and Idealism of 
Kierkegaard's contemporaries. In their place he proclaims a Christological 
epistemology, stating that humanity in need of God's activity both as teacher and as 
saviour. 
In the light of this, I move on to discuss the complexities of Kierkegaard's Christology 
in chapters three and four. Chapter three examines Kierkegaard's Christological meta- 
concept `the Absolute Paradox'. Traditionally this has been interpreted as a formal 
contradiction, either between the concepts of humanity and deity, or time and eternity. 
Rejecting these interpretations, I argue that `The Absolute Paradox' of the Incarnation is 
not an irrationality, but a mystery. Drawing on evidence from some patristic 
Christologies and the Chalcedonian Definition, I show that there has always been an 
indispensable element of mystery in this aspect of classical two natures Christology. On 
this point Kierkegaard can therefore be seen to be operating within the mainstream of 
Christian theology. 
Chapter four is entitled `The Sign of Contradiction'. Beginning with Kierkegaard's 
`Parable of the King and the Maiden' in Fragments, it shows that Christ comes to us 
`like unto the lowliest'. 2 The nature of Christ's lowliness is explored in Practice in 
PF 32 
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Christianity, where Kierkegaard discusses why humanity is so often offended at its 
saviour. I then explain why Kierkegaard was careful to stress that Christ is both 
Redeemer and Prototype. The final two sections consider the relationship between 
Kierkegaard's Christology, Kenotic Christology and then Luther's Theology of the 
Cross. Linking Kierkegaard to the latter, it is seen that Christ is `the Sign of 
Contradiction' who reveals God sub contrariis. 
This leads on to the twofold subject of chapter five: Kierkegaard's doctrine of God, and, 
his treatment of the quest for knowledge of God as carried out independent of faith in 
God through Christ. I begin by defending Kierkegaard against the charge that his theism 
is a product of pagan Greek philosophy. I claim instead that this is a trait of one of his 
non-Christian pseudonyms and that Kierkegaard himself adhered to traditional Christian 
theism. This then leads on to a rejection of the anti-realist interpretations of his 
theology put forward by Don Cupitt and D. Z. Phillips. Following this, I examine 
Kierkegaard's criticism of the pantheist conceptions of God found in nineteenth century 
Idealism and his resultant affirmation of God's transcendence and omnipotence. The 
discussion of Kierkegaard's theism ends with the subject of God's love. It shows that, 
working from `the thesis of Christianity' that `God loves - and wants to be loved' 31 
3 he 
argues that our knowledge of God derives from, and is motivated by, our love for him. 
This leads to the subject of natural theology and the knowledge of God. I examine 
Kierkegaard's verdict upon the validity of proofs and demonstrations for Christian faith 
before focusing on his treatment of the ontological argument and the argument from 
design. His rejection of natural theology has led some to claim that Kierkegaard may be 
classed as a negative ('apophatic') theologian. Against this I argue that Kierkegaard's 
criticism of natural theology stems instead from his Lutheran heritage, which, as clarified 
in chapter four, focuses on God's self-revelation in Christ. 
The final chapter examines the nature of faith in Kierkegaard's theology and whether 
this really does lead him into irrationalism or fideism as is commonly supposed. I begin 
by discussing the nature of his `anti-rationalism' and discuss his relationship with three 
other figures in the history of ideas who have developed similar theologies: Luther, 
3J&P 1446, XI 2A 99 n. d., 1854 
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Pascal and Hamann. Following this, the chapter considers the importance of whether 
Kierkegaard saw faith as being above, or against, `reason' or `understanding'. In order 
to do this I place his thought in the context of Kantian, Hegelian and Coleridgean 
philosophies. I then discuss the significance given by Kierkegaard to knowledge, 
volition and subjectivity in his doctrine of faith. 
The thesis ends with a `Concluding Fragment' which gathers up the conclusions made 
during the course of the thesis. This conclusion shows that, although Kierkegaard was 
to react with great hostility to certain strands of theological reasoning, much of his 
theology is in accord with orthodox Protestantism. He was not an irrationalist who 
rejected reason in theological matters, but an `anti-rationalist' who challenges us to be 




ON READING KIERKEGAARD 
Kierkegaard's works are never easy to read, but maybe that was his intention. He wrote 
in an obscure, highly rhetorical style. At the same time he frequently adopted 
pseudonyms in order to distance himself from publications that are often full of irony 
and satire. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a framework for a 
correct interpretation of Kierkegaard's writings. It will be shown that, to a certain 
extent, how he presented his arguments in a text can be more important than the 
outward content of what it says literally. 
Kierkegaard's writings can be divided into three distinct groups. ' Most speculation, not 
to mention controversy, centres around the first group, his pseudonymous works, 
sometimes also referred to as the `indirect communication'. From Either/Or in 1843 to 
Practice in Christianity in 1850, these books present us with a variety of different 
authors, editors, life-views and puzzles. 2 In these pseudonymous works we are always 
left wondering just where Kierkegaard stands in relation to what is written on their 
pages. Kierkegaard also published numerous works under his own name, and so we 
may refer to this second group as the signed works, or `direct communication'. Within 
this particular category we may include Kierkegaard's MA thesis The Concept of Irony, 
'I am here largely following the classification suggested by Julia Watkin. (cf. Watkin 1997,46-49). 
However, I am of course aware that there have been several different methods used in recent studies to 
clarify the types of literature within Kierkegaard's literary corpus. For instance, Mark C. Taylor 
identifies four categories: the pseudonymous works (here he lists from Either/Or to Practice in 
Christianity); the various types of discourses; the articles written against the state church; and the 
Journals. (Taylor 1975,11-13). Alastair Hannay further subdivides Kierkegaard's works into four 
main categories: the `aesthetic' works, by which he means the pseudonymous works from Either/Or 
onwards, excluding those attributed to Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus; the `dialectical' works 
`by' Johannes Climacus, but `edited' by Kierkegaard; the psychological works (The Concept ofAnxiety 
and The Sickness Unto Death); finally, the non-pseudonymous discourses. For some reason Hannay 
does not consider the Journals and various later, `religious' works worth mentioning. (Hannay 1991, 
16-17). 
2 Watkin does list earlier works within this category: the articles by A and B written from 1834-36, and 
From the Papers of One Still Living which Kierkegaard wrote in 1838. However, Kierkegaard himself 
did not regard these as being important for his later authorship (cf. POV 10) and it is therefore 
customary to cite his first major work Either/Or as the first pseudonymous work of the authorship 
proper. (cf. Watkin 1997,471). 
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the numerous Upbuilding Discourses, plus the polemical articles and discourses written 
in the early 1850s till his death in 1855. The Upbuilding Discourses are a collection of 
Christian essays, almost homilies, which he published parallel to the early pseudonymous 
works. Unlike the pseudonymous works they more obviously bear clear witness to his 
own Christian faith. Finally, forming the third group of Kierkegaard's works, there are 
his multi-volume Journals and other unpublished material. These cover a diverse range 
of topics and help to give us an insight into his most personal thoughts and beliefs from 
adolescence till the last days of his life. 
In order to tackle the problem of how we may approach this vast and varied authorship, 
the first task is to evaluate some of the methods of interpretation offered by scholars. It 
will then be appropriate to explain my reasons for adopting what may be termed the 
literary-philosophical approach as a solution. I then wish to discuss the most significant 
motives behind Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole: his relationship with his former 
fiancee Regine Olsen, his dissatisfaction with aspects of Romanticism, his rejection of 
Hegelian Idealism, and lastly, his `direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous 
illusion we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours all are 
Christians of a sort'. 3 Following this background information, I will offer some 
explanation of Kierkegaard's use of irony and pseudonymity, literary tactics employed 
throughout the `indirect communication' as a means of creating a certain distance 
between himself and the views expressed within the works themselves. This point will 
then be illustrated with reference to his famous `stages of existence', or life-views, as 
portrayed by some of his pseudonymous authors within the early works of the `indirect 
communication'. There then follows a section in which I briefly introduce what I 
believe to be the most theologically insightful of his writings. I have therefore entitled 
these `the religious works'. Some of these texts are pseudonymous, whilst others were 
published quite openly as Kierkegaard's own works. Within this section I will also 
include some discussion of his Journals and papers, showing their theological 
importance within the authorship. 
3POV6 
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1. The Authorship and a Matter of Interpretation 
There are several different approaches to Kierkegaard's works (normally referred to as 
`the authorship' in studies) currently circulating in English-language scholarship. Rather 
than referring to each theory specifically, I have chosen to summarize the most 
influential methods under three general headings. I am of course aware that some 
people will wish to disagree with such a generalization (in one article it is stated that 
there could be nine ways of reading Philosophical Fragments alonel4), especially with 
the current trend of offering a variety of post-modernist or post-structuralist readings of 
any one text. However, my intention is to clarify the position to be employed 
throughout the thesis without digressing too far into the detailed field of literary theory 
at this stage. The finer details of this position will be illustrated as they are applied 
within the context of each chapter. So, in the rest of this section I have chosen to adopt 
the quite broad definitions offered by C. Stephen Evans in order to clarify the most 
significant methods of interpretation. 
The 'Philosophical'Method 
The first method may be referred to as the `philosophical method'. This particular 
method seeks to appreciate Kierkegaard's texts as being primarily philosophical. Little, 
or no significance is given to the pseudonyms under which he wrote various works. 
Hence each one is interpreted as representing Kierkegaard's viewpoint. This is done 
despite the extreme contrasts between the pseudonyms, and regardless of the marked 
differences between them and the signed works. It is deemed possible to construct a 
general picture of what Kierkegaard thought by quoting material directly from any texts 
within his entire authorship, something which proponents of this method would consider 
to be a continuous, long term project. We could list within this category Kierkegaard's 
earliest translators Walter Lowrie and David Swenson. Contemporary figures in this 
area include John Elrod, Stephen Dunning, Louis Pojman, and the earlier writings of 
Mark C. Taylor. 5 
4 Glebe-Moller 1991,55 
5 Evans 1992,2. See Lowrie A Short Life of Kierkegaard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) 
and Swenson Something About Kierkegaard (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1983). Regarding the 
more recent scholars in this category, Evans lists the following texts as examples: Elrod, Being and 
Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); 
Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages 
12 
In a similar vein, there are those who seek to adopt the same method, albeit from a more 
theological viewpoint, such as David Law. " According to Law, `although Kierkegaard 
may not personally occupy the positions advocated in his works, they nevertheless form 
an integral part of his thought. In this sense we can ascribe them to him even if he 
himself has rejected them as possibilities for his own existence. '? However, it is a 
mistake to form too close a link between ideas delivered through the mouths of the 
pseudonyms and those of Kierkegaard himself. As I intend to show later in this chapter, 
the pseudonyms were used as caricatures of views Kierkegaard criticized. The 
weaknesses of each pseudonym represent a corresponding weakness in the view under 
attack, indirectly giving support to Kierkegaard's own, frequently quite different views. 
The 'Literary' Method 
On the other hand, it is possible to take the literary forms of Kierkegaard's texts very 
seriously indeed, even up to the point where they dominate all else. This `literary 
method' represents a diverse body of scholars who see Kierkegaard as primarily a 
literary artist, or poet. One of the first to do this was Louis Mac 1q in his book 
Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet. 8 However more recent authors have moved beyond 
Mackay's original thesis and attempt to relate Kierkegaard to contemporary 
developments in deconstructionism, post- structuralism and other literary movements .9 
Taken to its logical conclusion this method ultimately serves to deny any definitive 
reading of Kierkegaard's texts and Evans therefore entitles it the `ironic method'. For 
instance, Roger Poole, referring to the various rhetorical devices employed in the 
aesthetic authorship, claims 'Kierkegaard's writing has made all solutions impossible', 
because, `trained in the school of Romantic irony, Kierkegaard was an adept at 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's 
Philosophy of Religion (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1984); Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard's 
Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
6 Law, Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). On this point he 
is largely following Taylor. (Cf. Law 1993,5). 
Ibid. 
$ According to Mackay, `In a word Kierkegaard is not a philosopher and theologian who puts up poetic 
advertisements to recommend his product. More Dante than Thomas Aquinas, he is a poet whose 
orientation is primarily philosophical and theological. ' (Mackay 1971,259). 
9 Cf. Evans 1992,2. Some good examples of work in this category are Christopher Norris, `De Man 
Unfair to Kierkegaard? An Allegory of (non)-reading', in Kierkegaard Conferences I, (ed. ) Brigit 
Bertung (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1989), and Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect 
Communication (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 1993). 
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displacing and "deferring" meaning. Indeed, it is Kierkegaard, a century before Derrida, 
who demonstrates that a meaning can be so long deferred that it would finally be merely 
naive to ask for it. "° Poole therefore states: `a new reading of Kierkegaard should 
discover that the aesthetic texts do not mean but are. '" 
There is evidence from the authorship to support some aspects of this position. For 
instance, on some occasions Kierkegaard did describe himself as `merely a poet'. 12 
Also, when, if at all, is it safe to take him literally? In the posthumously published The 
Point Of View For My Work as an Author he allegedly explains the nature and purpose 
of his authorship, doing so without a pseudonym and (apparently) without irony. 
Kierkegaard also admits his responsibility for the pseudonymous authorship and appears 
to explain his writings in a note entitled `A First and Last Explanation', which he 
appended to the pseudonymous Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Yet, as 
Christopher Norris argues, `irony is not so easily laid to rest, especially when 
Kierkegaard has himself provided such a range of sophisticated ruses, alibis and 
narrative pretexts for not taking him at his word. ' 13 On such an interpretation of the 
authorship, 
One could treat all of Kierkegaard's texts (including the ethical, religious and 
`edifying' discourses) as belonging to the order of aesthetic production, as 
written - and who is to prove otherwise? - from some pseudonymous, ironic, or 
noncommital standpoint, and therefore as open to postmodern reading, 
indifferent to questions of ultimate truth. '4 
The `Literary-Philosophical' Method 
To a certain extent I would agree with the literary method, namely, in that it is very 
important to do proper justice to the literary forms of the texts. However, the tendency 
of some scholars within that category to reject the possibility of one definitive reading of 
Kierkegaard's texts does seem to miss the whole point of the exercise. Additionally, the 
`literary' method frequently attempts to avoid treating the theological material with any 
10 Poole 1993,2 
'1 Ibid. 5 
12J&P2301, X4A247n. d., 1851 
13 Norris 1989,92 
14 Ibid. 91 
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seriousness. '5 Yet I indicated earlier that the philosophical method has its weaknesses 
too. Therefore I agree with Evans that a `literary-philosophical' method, combining the 
best aspects of both approaches, offers a valid solution to the problem. Here allowance 
is made for the literary forms of the texts under consideration, being especially mindful 
of the role and extent of irony where appropriate, and the significance of any 
pseudonyms used. At the same time it is also recognized that Kierkegaard had a 
theological purpose in writing what he did and when he did. 
This point may best be illustrated by considering the composite nature of Kierkegaard's 
literary output as a whole. Alongside the aesthetic works stand his Upbuilding 
Discourses, his unpublished Journals and various published works on specific Christian 
themes such as Christian Discourses, For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourself/16 
The style, content and nature of these works differs very much from that of the 
pseudonymous works. For instance, each group of the sermon-like Upbuilding 
Discourses was published under Kierkegaard's own name, and, more importantly, the 
time of publication was practically parallel with a pseudonymous aesthetic text. He 
therefore seems to have presented his readership with a clear indication of his beliefs 
from the outset, regardless of the statements made by each pseudonym to the contrary. 
Added to this is the fact that his two later pseudonymous works, both attributed to Anti- 
Climacus, are overtly Christian in theme, clarifying and developing topics introduced by 
some of the earlier pseudonyms. When taken together these two facts give weight to his 
claim, expressed in The Point of View For My Work as an Author, that he had always 
written from a primarily theological concern. " We can read his works with a view to 
finding out what his ideas really were. Yet, this can only be done if care is taken to 
understand what Kierkegaard's motivations were for adopting this means of 
communication, and in this way discern what the various pseudonyms represent. 
15 Cf. for instance Poole's cautionary statement `we, as modem skeptics', which he voices when 
discussing the Incarnation in Kierkegaard's writings. (Poole 1993,252) 
16 We could also add to this category some of the less well known items from the last phase of 
Kierkegaard's literary output such as What Christ's Judgement is About Official Christianity, 
Kierkegaard's various articles in The Fatherland, etc. These are normally refereed to as the `Attack 
Literature' and they form the final and most vitriolic component of Kierkegaard's direct polemic 
against the state of Christianity in Denmark at the time. 
11POV10ff 
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2. The Critical Purpose of the Authorship 
The situation that led to Kierkegaard embarking upon his writings was complex indeed. 
There were several significant causes behind his decision to write in such an extravagant 
and sometimes heavily polemical manner. The first was a personal motive, namely his 
failed relationship with Regine Olsen. It was this that had largely propelled him into 
composing some of the earliest pseudonymous works, such as: Either/Or, Fear and 
Trembling and Repetition (all of which were published in 1843). The second motive, 
which was both personal and ideological, was Kierkegaard's wish to deliver a 
theological critique of contemporary thought and values. As is explained retrospectively 
in The Point of View, he sought to address `the problem "of becoming a Christian", with 
a direct or indirect polemic against the monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or 
against the illusion that in such a land as ours we are all Christians of a sort. s18 This led 
him into conflict with two distinguished opponents: speculative Idealist philosophy, 
primarily as represented by Hegelianism, but also by various forms of Romanticism, and, 
later in life, the established Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark. Pseudonymous 
works that are of particular relevance to this category are Philosophical Fragments 
(1844), Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1846) and 
Practice in Christianity (1850). 
Regine Olsen 
The first meeting between Kierkegaard and Regine occurred in 1837. She was only 
fourteen years old and he was ten years her senior, yet despite this age gap he was 
captivated by her from the start. He courted her and their engagement was announced 
on September 10,1840, but any hope of marriage was soon ruled out. Kierkegaard had 
always been of a melancholy temperament, something he inherited from his father, and 
very swiftly he realized that he could not go on with the engagement. '9 Instead he 
believed that his life should be spent as a solitary writer, detached from the world. 
Nevertheless, it was not until October 11 the following year that he was able to break 
the engagement. In so doing he devastated his young fiancee and caused a scandal so 
18 Ibid. 6 
19 J&P 6472, X5A 149 n. d, 1849 
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great that he alienated himself from most of society. However, as it was considered to 
be a gross insult to the honour of any woman to be treated in this way, Kierkegaard 
attempted to do his best to ensure that the blame lay squarely on his shoulders. He 
acted the part of a scoundrel, in order to do this and so turn opinion against him, though 
of course this hurt her even more. 2° 
The guilt of this episode haunted him till the end of his life. He never really stopped 
loving her and for many years he held some hope of a reconciliation, until she finally 
married a childhood sweetheart `Fritz' Schlegel. Prevented from speaking to her 
directly by social custom and, no doubt severe embarrassment, he sought an alternative 
way to explain his conduct. Kierkegaard was in many respects an eccentric character 
and his solution to the problem was in keeping with this description. Possessing an 
exceptional literary ability and a vivid imagination, he embarked on the aesthetic works. 
He therefore wrote some of his works for Regine, cryptically conveying personal 
information through the illusions of Romantic fiction. 
Hegelianism 
In order to placate his father Kierkegaard had originally begun his years at Copenhagen 
University as a theology student. It soon became apparent that his interests were in fact 
much broader than this and his attention shifted to a range of other subjects, notably 
philosophy and literature, with him remaining a student for ten years. Denmark was 
culturally very much influenced by Germany. In both countries Enlightenment 
Rationalism had largely been superseded by the philosophies of two great German 
thinkers: Kant and Hegel. In fact Hegel's thought was being warmly received by several 
academics in Copenhagen whilst the young Kierkegaard studied there. The most central 
figure to make Hegelianism the prominent school of thought in Denmark at this time 
was Kierkegaard's tutor, Hans Martensen. 21 As a young student Kierkegaard had lost 
20 Ibid. 'The Seducer's Diary', part of Either/Or vol. 1 (1: 301-445) was written for this purpose. 
Through it Kierkegaard indirectly attempted to portray himself as a callous seducer (Johannes) and 
Regine as his innocent victim (Cordelia). Although he may well have upset Regine by it, Kierkegaard 
despairingly relates in the journal how he then went up in the public's imagination because of this 
particular publication! (J&P 6472 § 19, X5A 159 n. d., 1849). 
21 Watkin 1997,15-16 
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faith in Christianity, and for a brief time he too embraced Hegelianism as he turned to 
philosophy for solace instead. 
This enthusiasm was short-lived. Criticism of Hegelian philosophy (often referred to by 
him as `the system') occurs throughout Kierkegaard's Journals and the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript in particular, although to a lesser extent it permeates the entire 
authorship. His main criticism of Hegel was that he had presented a distorted idea of 
reality in order to attempt to describe everything systematically. In a journal entry of 
1844 he wrote, `If Hegel had written his whole Logic and written in the preface that it 
was only a thought-experiment, in which at many points he still avoided some things, he 
undoubtedly would have been the greatest thinker who has ever lived. As it is he is 
comic. 'n As Kierkegaard saw it, Hegel and his followers were lost in empty speculation 
regarding the objective universe, instead of addressing the problems of human existence 
in the world as it really is. 23Within this philosophy he claimed Christianity was reduced 
to but an intellectual exercise, a minor component of an elitist metaphysical system. Yet 
the Christianity embraced by Kierkegaard may be defined as a relationship with God, 
one that demands total commitment in opposition to secular standards of rationality and 
ethics, and because of this it cannot be defined purely intellectually. As will be shown 
throughout this thesis, Kierkegaard proclaimed a Christian faith that could never be rid 
of mystery. Through taking this stance he constantly found himself at odds with Hegel's 
paradox-free rendition of religion. However, although there are numerous references to 
Hegel and Hegelianism throughout the authorship, Kierkegaard's attack upon `the 
system' was primarily directed against Hegel's Danish followers with whom 
Kierkegaard frequently came into contact both during, and after, his university days. 
24 
He had little interest in critiquing German thought in Germany, rather his interests were 
far closer to home as he sought to stem the influence of Absolute Idealism in his own 
country. 
22 J&. P 1605, VA 73 n. d., 1844 
23 Watkin 1997,16 
24 Poole 1993,2 
is 
Romanticism 
Contemporary with Hegel was the development of German Romanticism. Just as Hegel 
set himself against the aridity of Enlightenment philosophy, so too did the Romantics 
attempt to breathe new life and vitality into the arts and humanities in the early 
nineteenth century. Theologically the movement was best represented by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher in his two most significant works On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers and The Christian Faith. However, Idealism soon became its dominant 
philosophical framework, developed largely by Fichte and Schelling. 2S Hegel cannot 
really be classed as a Romantic, but aspects of his own Idealist philosophy swiftly passed 
into the mainstream of German Romanticism. This served to influence the development 
of Danish thought in the early nineteenth century, which, a 
CIS 
mentioned earlier, is often 
the main butt of Kierkegaard's critique rather than Hegel himself. 
However, there were times when German Romanticism did become the direct object of 
Kierkegaard's attack. When this occurred his thoughts were focused upon what was 
called the Romantic Ironists, a group of scholars, writers and poets that included 
Novalis, Tieck, Solger and the brothers A. W. and Friedrich Schlegel. This group had 
come together in the University of Jena during the 1790s, drawing much of their 
inspiration from Shakespeare's works. 26 Schlegel and his associates challenged 
Enlightenment values and traditions through works such as his revolutionary novel 
Lucinde. In this work Schlegel used the characters to break with traditional role 
models, developing in their place life-views that owe their inspiration to desires and 
feelings, giving free reign to the imagination. However, even for a Romantic author, 
Schlegel was extreme. According to Kierkegaard, who found much to inspire him in the 
movement at its more general level, the Romantic Ironists had gone so far in their ironic 
subversion of traditional values and truth claims that they verged upon moral nihilism. 
Their rejection of rationalist claims to objectivity and systematic knowledge led them to 
posit notions of incomprehensibility and paradox far too freely. 27 In so doing, he 
u Cf. Thulstrup 1984,43 
26 Behler 1986,14ff; Wheeler 1993,27 
27 Cf. Wheeler 1993,29 
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believed that their attempts to reach freedom beyond restraint had loosened their grasp 
of reality. 
'Christendom' 
Kierkegaard's final object of polemic was something he referred to as `Christendom'. 
The official state religion of Denmark since 1536 hes been Lutheranism. In 
Kierkegaard's time it was a requirement that all Danish citizens be baptized and 
confirmed into the Evangelical Lutheran Church. 28 To Kierkegaard the church had 
become just a facet of the royal administration, instead of the community of believers, 
and entry to it was a compulsion under civil law (although certain limited freedoms were 
given to other religious groups). As Kierkegaard developed his theology he had serious 
difficulties in accepting this as being a valid manifestation of the church. Christianity is 
chosen by an individual through faith, not something to be born into, 29 nor should it be 
imposed on others by force of state. This idea of the state church, or Christian nation, 
was Kierkegaard's `Christendom' and although he levels some indirect attacks against it 
in the 1840s, it was to become the recipient of his harshest, most scathing attacks 
towards the end of his life. 
3. The Aesthetic Works and Indirect Communication 
So, it can be seen that on one level the authorship arose out of Kierkegaard's eccentric, 
yet covert attempts to enable Regine to understand his position. Besides this, he also 
wanted to criticize the main religious and intellectual establishments of his society. On 
one hand Hegel was attacked for his claim to have presented an all-embracing 
philosophical system, free from contradictions, where everything formed a coherent 
whole. On the other hand, the Romantic Ironists seemed to have fled to the opposite 
end of the spectrum. Their ironic subversion of accepted values approached nihilism, 
whilst their rejection of systematic philosophies left them submerged beneath a 
philosophy of paradox and uncertainty. As for the state church, it denied the freedom of 
28 Watkin 1997,13 
29 Cf. J&P 3966, XI 1A 219 n. d., 1854 
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an individual to come to faith through personal conversion, requiring instead that all 
who lived in the country ought to be Lutheran by law. 
This was Kierkegaard's background and reasons for writing, yet what can be said about 
the singular manner in which he delivered the pseudonymous works? Did he intend for 
his works to be taken seriously? Or, did he really wish to prevent his readers from 
making actual conclusions from what is said? In his Philosophical Rhetoric Jeff Mason 
warns against taking Kierkegaard too literally: 
Kierkegaard is extremely devious in his use of rhetorical strategies and tropes. 
He makes great use of circumlocution. We are never given formulas or recipes 
we can just accept and use. Everything must be questioned, nothing taken for 
granted ... He 
is not above using invective, satire, irony, jokes, parables, and all 
the rest to lead us back to ourselves by -a circuitous route that only we can 
follow. 30 
For those who are used to a far more straight forward approach this may certainly give 
rise to concern. Before attempting to grasp what might be said in or through a text, we 
are required to examine the matter of how it is said. Is there a pseudonym, if so, who is 
this pseudonym and what is he alleged to represent? From what position is he coming? 
To what extent, if any, does irony subvert the apparent content of the argument? Such 
questions continue, 
4ithout 
them any correct appraisal of one of Kierkegaard's works 10 
(especially the pseudonymous texts) would not be possible. 
Pseudonymity 
A pseudonym permits the author a certain amount of freedom. For example, if I were to 
present this text to a friend for her to read it, she would proceed to take into account 
any knowledge of me as an important factor. There would exist a definite bias in her 
interpretation, either for or against me. She would have some knowledge of my views 
and beliefs. She would perhaps recognize my preconceptions and style, possibly even 
go some way to predict my conclusions. Yet if I offered this same text to the same 
friend under the pretence that the author was anonymous, my friend would not have the 
30 Mason 1989,29 
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same privileged position. This approach would allow her to take the text entirely on its 
own merits and so interpret what is said (hopefully) without bias. 
Kierkegaard's employment of pseudonymity was rather on the subtle side. In a sense he 
was already known to be the author of his works, having been required to notify the 
Stationer's Register in Copenhagen of his true identity as a legal formality. 31 Certain 
secrets of his authorship were also made known to his secretaries and a few close 
friends. Although The Point of View forMy Work as an Author explained his intentions, 
he felt unable to publish it during his lifetime (although this was published by his brother 
after his death); but he did provide `A First and Last Explanation' in the Postscript in 
1846 when he felt his aesthetic authorship to be at an end. However, to the resident of 
Copenhagen glancing along the shelves of the book shops, no immediate indication of 
his responsibility for the works would be visible. Instead the title pages would exhibit 
various bizarre names in his place: Victor Eremita, Johannes de Silentio, Virgilius 
Haufniensis, Johannes Climacus, Anti-Climacus, etc. These were never intended to 
masquerade as real names, but instead to hold a symbolic function. The precise details 
of some of these pseudonyms will be discussed with reference to the works to which 
they were attached in the remaining sections of this chapter. For the present it is 
sufficient to say that each one of them personifies a life-view wholly different from that 
held by Kierkegaard at the time of writing. He did not want to be associated directly 
with the contents of the views themselves. As he explained, `one will perceive the 
significance of the pseudonyms and why I must be pseudonymous in relation to all 
aesthetic productions, because I led my life in entirely different categories and 
understood from the beginning that this productivity was of an interim nature, a deceit, a 
necessary process of elimination. ' 32 
Each text is used to set forth a critical argument. To read the entire pseudonymous 
output in chronological order, and then claim that it faithfully represents Kierkegaard's 
own philosophy or theology would be a serious mistake. Anyone who claims that he 
adhered to all that is expressed in these works would have to view him as, at best 
inconsistent, or at worst as one who suffered from some form of multiple personality 
31 Mackay 1971,249 
32 POV 85-6 
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disorder. What Kierkegaard really did was to offer his readership caricatures of the life- 
views he wished to review. For this purpose, each pseudonym is in fact a rhetorical 
exaggeration through which he allowed the effects of metaphor and hyperbole to play 
upon the reader. 33 This tactic was intended to give Kierkegaard greater authorial 
freedom. As he explains, each pseudonym `has his definitive life-view, and the lines, 
which understood in this way could possibly be meaningful, witty, stimulating, would 
perhaps sound strange, ludicrous, disgusting in the mouth of a particular factual 
person. '34 
In absolving himself from personal responsibility for their views, he allowed the 
pseudonyms to illustrate points that were designed to shock, even offend a readership 
that may have existed within the life-views he derided. In case of complaint, 
Kierkegaard could argue in his defence that he was merely engaging in a rhetorical 
experiment and so meant no harm. He declared, 
What has been written then, is mine, but only insofar as I, by means of audible 
lines, have placed in the life-view of the creating, poetically actual individuality in 
his mouth, for my relation is even more remote than that of a poet, who 
poeticizes characters and yet in the preface is himself the author. That is, I am 
impersonally or personally in the third person a souffleur [prompter] who has 
poetically produced the authors, whose prefaces in turn are their productions, as 
their names are also. Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word 
by me. 35 
In the same passage from which this is taken (in which he openly acknowledges his 
responsibility for the pseudonymous works to that date), he asks that, 
If it should occur to anyone to want to quote a particular passage from the 
books, it is my wish, my prayer, that he will do me the kindness of citing the 
respective pseudonymous author's name, not mine - that is, of separating us in 
such a way that the passage femininely belongs to the pseudonymous author, the 
responsibility civily to me. 36 
33 Mullen 1995,39 
34 CUP 1: 627f 
35 Ibid. 1: 626 
36 1bid 1: 627 
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The failure to appreciate this is widespread and illustrated by the secondary sources 
listed within the `philosophical' tradition of reading Kierkegaard. 37 Those in this 
category have quoted from the pseudonymous works supposedly offering 
'Kierkegaard's philosophy of x' when in fact they are only relating what is said by, for 
instance, Johannes the Seducer. To find the real content of Kierkegaard's thought we 
have to look beyond the text. We also have to compare what is said by him in his 
nonpseudonymous writings - like his Journals, the Upbuilding Discourses, etc. 
However, pseudonymity is only one factor of Kierkegaard's indirect communication. 
The greater importance is reserved for his use of irony 
Irony 
Josiah Thompson entitles Kierkegaard `the Master of Irony'. 39 In fact Kierkegaard had 
displayed a biting, ironic wit from an early age, allowing him to engage in dialogue with 
others at their frequent expense. 39 The youngest member of a large family, Kierkegaard 
frequently resorted to teasing in this manner both at home and at school. This had 
earned him the nickname `the fork'. Even at university he carried on employing a 
devastating irony against his teachers and other public figures. 40 In Kierkegaard's 
writings `irony' swiftly begins to take on a far more profound meaning than is normally 
encountered in everyday English. I will show how and why this arises and, in the 
process, illustrate the nature of Kierkegaard's ambiguous relationship with some of the 
streams within German Romanticism that he had come across during his studies. 
(a) Classical Irony 
Kierkegaard was able to develop his concept of irony through acquainting himself with 
authors both classical and Romantic. For instance, in The Art of Rhetoric Aristotle talks 
of irony (Eipoveta) as being a rhetorical device, a form of jest possessing an almost 
aristocratic air. He states: 
" See 3f above 
38 Thompson 1974,138ff 
39 Cf. Hartshorne 1990,6 
40 Kirmmse 1998,24 
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As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful in debates, the advice of 
Georgias was good - to confound the opponents' earnestness with jest and their 
jest with earnestness. We have stated in the Poetics how many kinds of jest 
there are, some of them becoming a gentleman, others not. You should 
therefore choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more gentlemanly than 
buffoonery; for the first is employed on one's account, the second on that of 
another. 4' 
Amongst Latin authors, it can be observed that Cicero limited irony to dissimulation, but 
Quintillian kept closer to the Greek understanding and thereby allowed for a broader 
concept. 42 He put irony into the category of a figure of speech, whilst Cicero saw it as a 
trope. However, what is of far greater significance here is that Quintillian's definition 
does not require irony to remain within the bounds of rhetoric, but, it may be seen 
instead to refer to the nature of a person's character. In this sense that person can be 
said to embody irony through his attitude to life. Quintillian discusses this in his 
Oratorical Education, presenting Socrates as an example of irony in the latter sense. He 
states that: 
In the trope the conflict is purely verbal, while in the figure the meaning, and 
sometimes the whole aspect of our case, conflicts with the language and the tone 
of the voice adopted; nay, a man's whole life may be coloured with irony, as was 
the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of 
an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others. 43 
(b) Socratic Irony 
Of course it was to Socrates that both the Romantics and Kierkegaard had turned to as 
being the greatest of all ironists. Plato and Xenophenon have handed down to us the 
picture of Socrates as confounding his opponents in an unusual manner of debate. This 
may be referred to as Socrates' maieutic method, though some also call it dialectic, or 
eristic. Socrates would not begin a debate in the straightforward manner by first 
al Aristotle 1926,447 
42 Alford 1984,20 
43 Quintillian 1920,401 
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marking his position, and then defending it. Instead, he would begin by allowing his 
opponent to outline his position on a topic or issue. Socrates would then focus on his 
opponent's claims, and then proceed to demolish them by questioning his opponent in 
such a way that, through their answers he would force them to reveal the inconsistencies 
of their position. In this manner the opponent is compelled to retract his former 
argument, and then to begin the search for a new answer. 
Philosophically this may appear somewhat open-ended, as one scholar has stated: `The 
Socratic Method cannot terminate in the establishing of a definition, in the 
demonstration of a thesis or in the resolution of an aporia. Its achievements are the 
exposure of inconsistencies. '" Socrates' irony lay in the fact that he always began a 
debate as if he were the one ignorant of the matter in question, yet the end result always 
served to illustrate that he had a better grasp of the subject than any others who were 
present. 
Kierkegaard greatly admired this method in that it forced the reader to follow the 
process of questioning the matter himself, as opposed to repeating mindlessly a tailor- 
made formula or solution: 
The fact that many of Plato's dialogues end without a result has a far deeper 
reason than I had thought earlier. They are a reproduction of Socrates' maieutic 
skill which makes the reader or hearer himself active, and therefore they do not 
end in a result but in a sting. This is an excellent parody of the modern rote- 
method which says everything the sooner the better and all at one time, which 
awakens no self-action but only leads the reader to rattle it off like a parrot. 43 
So, instead of proclaiming himself to be an expert in complex matters, Socrates 
ironically questioned even the most basic of truths. Hence, whilst many of his 
interlocutors believed themselves to be knowledgeable in everyday facts, Socrates' 
seemingly innocent questioning was able to show up numerous gaps in their knowledge. 
Apparently `lost in wonder at the wisdom of others', he subverted the very `wisdom' 
they held so dear. Turning again to Kierkegaard's Journals we find the following 
paragraph on the subject: 
44 Ryle 1966,17-18 
45 J&P 4266, VII 1A 74 n. d., 1846 
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In what did Socrates' irony really lie? In expressions and turns of speech, etc.? 
No, such trivialities, even his virtuosity in talking ironically, such things do not 
make a Socrates. No, his whole existence is and was irony; whereas the entire 
contemporary population of farmhands and business men and so on, all those 
thousands, were perfectly sure of being human and of knowing what it meant to 
be a human being, Socrates was beneath them (ironically) and occupied himself 
with the problem - what does it mean to be a human being? He thereby 
expressed that actually all the Treiben [bustle] of those thousands was an 
hallucination, tomfoolery, a ruckus, a hubbub, busyness, etc., worth a zero in 
the eyes of the ideal, or less than zero, inasmuch as these man could have used 
their lives to concentrate upon the ideality. 46 
Kierkegaard's fascination with Socratic irony was so great that he decided to choose it 
as the subject for his MA thesis (the equivalent to a modem Ph. D. ), choosing as his title 
The Concept of Irony, with continual reference to Socrates. This was submitted in 
1841, but was probably written in 1838-9. He did not consider it to be very significant 
alongside his later literary output and rarely referred back to it in his Journals. 
However, an examination of its manner and contents serves to shed much light on his 
future tactics and anticipates several later projects. For instance, comments regarding 
Romanticism are echoed in the aesthetic life-view in Either/Or, and the comparison he 
makes between Socrates and Christ hints at the topic of Philosophical Fragments. The 
dissertation is composed of two main sections. The first discusses the position of 
Socrates as irony, whilst the second tackles the subject of Romantic irony. 
In his discussion of Socratic irony Kierkegaard draws upon the writings of Plato, 
Xenophenon, Aristophanes and Aristotle. Irony is described by Kierkegaard as the 
`infinite absolute negativity' which provides a certain freedom from reality. 47 `The 
concept of irony makes its entry into the world through Socrates', who embodied the 
concept in that `he walked through life continually between a caricature and the ideal'. 48 
Just as he was to use the pseudonyms to embody various life-views in later works, so in 
his thesis Kierkegaard uses Socrates as the personification of irony. 
46 Ibid 1767, X12 A 189 December 3,1854 
47 COI 259 
43 Ibid 13 
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(c) Romantic Irony 
As Kierkegaard explains the role of irony and the `negative freedom' which it brings to 
its user, he provides a clarification of his own literary tactics: 
When I am aware as I speak that what I am saying is what I mean and that what 
I have said adequately expresses my meaning, and I assume that the person to 
whom I am talking grasps my meaning completely, then I am bound in what has 
been said - that is, I am positively free therein. Here the old verse is appropriate: 
semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum. I am also bound with respect to 
myself any time I wish. If, however, what is said is not my meaning or the 
opposite of my meaning, then I am free in relation to others and to myself 49 
We must be mindful that the thesis is not only about irony but is also itself ironic. At 
one point he eulogizes irony for giving him the ability to distance himself from what has 
been written. At another point he is seen to be ironically deriding ironists. Consider the 
following example: `Just as kings and princes speak French, the higher circles (this, of 
course, must be understood according to an intellectual ordering of rank) speak 
ironically so that lay people will not be able to understand them, and to that extent irony 
is in the process of isolating itself; it does not wish to be understood. 'S0 In the past regal 
circles had spoken French as an indication of rank and in order to preserve a certain 
aloofness from their subjects. The `higher circles' who speak ironically refers to elitist 
intellectuals, principally those holding posts at Copenhagen University, whom 
Kierkegaard felt to have been so caught up in the details and terminology of (primarily 
Hegelian) academic philosophy that they had created a gulf between themselves and 
most of reality. This was perhaps a little bold, if not indeed rash, when one realizes that 
Kierkegaard was only too aware that these were the academics who would be marking 
the thesis on its completion. Ironically enough, it was his favourite target, Hans 
Martensen, who was to be given the final say over whether the thesis would pass. 5' 
Returning to the text, Kierkegaard's criticism of contemporary trends broadens, when, 
in a footnote, he admits `throughout this whole discussion I use the terms "irony" and 
49 Ibid. 247-8 
so Ibid. 248-9 
51 cf. Poole 1993,38 
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"ironist' ; but I would just as well say "Romanticism" and "Romanticist". 'S2 He then 
clarifies the specific objects of his critique by presenting sections on the Romantic 
Ironists Friedrich Schlegel, Tieck, Fichte and Solger. Most of his attention is directed 
towards Schlegel and his novel Lucinde. To Kierkegaard this work served to capture 
the very essence of Romantic irony, turning it into a life-view that moved far beyond the 
Socratic manifestation of the concept. Through Lucinde, an allegorical novel 
representing his love affair with Dorotheia Veit, Schlegel sought to deliver a near 
utopian vision of Romanticism that would supersede all previous life-views. 53 For 
Kierkegaard the novel is a failure. Rather than achieving its aim he found it to be 
`immoral', `unpoetic' and even `irreligious'. 34 Schlegel's attempts to portray a higher, 
more liberated morality had resulted in his being ensnared by the carnal forces he wished 
to transcend. For Kierkegaard this typified Schlegel's extremist strain within 
Romanticism: `the oddity about Lucinde and the whole trend associated with it is that, 
by starting from the freedom and the constitutive authority of the I, one does not arrive 
at a still higher spirituality but comes only to sensuousness and consequently to its 
opposite. '55 
(d) 'Mastered' Irony and Fragments of Truth 
By the time of his writing the thesis Kierkegaard was gradually returning to Christianity. 
Due to this he increasingly sought to ground any intellectual or moral reasoning in the 
reality of God. Yet Schlegel, and with him the rest of the Romantic Ironists, had no 
such sense of grounding (although Schlegel was, like many Romantics, to embrace 
Roman Catholicism later in life). The Romantic Ironists advocated a relativism that 
denied absolute, objective standards of truth or knowledge. 56 In place of systematic 
philosophy they offered what they called `Symphilosophy'. Rejecting formal doctrines 
and abstract ideas they argued that philosophy was a matter more of living and 
experiences, an art form rather than a sciences? Within this they extolled the importance 
of what was termed the `fragment' form, something similar to the aphorism or the 
52 COI 275 
53 Behler 1986,290; 297 
54 COI 301 
55 Ibid 
Wheeler 1993,27 
S' Ibid. 33 
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pensee. They used this short, staccato formulation of thought as an ironic subversion of 
the truth-claims of more traditional philosophy. 
The fragment form expressed the nature of language and communication as 
indirect, imperfect and rhetorical. Indeed, incomprehensibility became a way of 
parodying the literal language and immediate comprehension (demanded by some 
readers) as a delusion and as utterly unproductive of thought. Like Socrates, 
ironists sought to stimulate readers to think for themselves, not to seek solutions 
from the author. Like such philosophers as Plato, Berkeley, Kierkegaard and 
Coleridge, who used the method of art, that is overtly indirect communication, 
the Romantic ironists embraced carefully designed models of incomprehension as 
a way of stimulating readers, by means of fragmentary and oracular utterances, 
to grapple with thinking itself, and with words and language as both the 
substance and vehicle of thought. 58 
The ambiguity of Kierkegaard's relationship with Romanticism now begins to become 
apparent. He might have rejected the general Romantic views on reality, but he did 
employ some of the tactics of the Romantic Ironists (this will become clearer when I 
discuss the aesthetic life-view in the next section). Of notable interest is the fact that 
Schlegel used the concept of paradox in order to express `the non-absolute, incomplete 
nature of truth, the absurdity and incomprehensibility of notions of transcendent reality 
or being, and especially for expressing the extent to which human beings have not yet 
comprehended or cultivated themselves'. 59 He declared in his Critical Fragments in 
1797 that, `irony is the form of paradox. Paradox is everything simultaneously good and 
great. 3,60 The important thing was not to comprehend a set of truths, but to exercise the 
imagination and put some effort into the process. Objective certainty could not be 
attained, so self-knowledge and self-development became the focus of attention. 
This was where Kierkegaard was to part company with the Romantic Ironists. It 
seemed that they were striving for striving's sake without any genuine direction. Their 
development from Socratic irony took them nowhere, as, `to know that one is ignorant 
is the beginning of coming to know, but if one does not know more, it is merely a 
58 Ibid 31 
59 Ibid. 32 
60 Schlegel, in Simpson (ed) 1988,189 
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beginning. '61 According to Terry Eagleton, `Socratic irony raises the subject out of its 
mindless communion with the world, critically unhinging it from the real; but since it 
yields no positive alternative truth it leaves the subject giddily suspended between actual 
and ideal, in and out of the world simultaneously. '62 In the conclusion of his thesis 
Kierkegaard stresses the importance of the fact that irony must have its limits; it must be 
controlled, `a mastered moment'. Only if this criterion is to be respected may irony be 
employed and nihilism avoided. The failure to appreciate irony as `a mastered moment' 
has led to the extremes within the `literary approach' to Kierkegaard that I mentioned 
earlier, with its adherents missing the theological significance of his writings. 
The pseudonymous and `signed' literary output up to 1848 received an evaluation in 
Kierkegaard's apologetic The Point of View for My Work as an Author (written in 
1848, but published by his brother posthumously in 1859), and in 1851 he wrote About 
My Activity as a Writer for similar purposes. Both form part of his `direct 
communication' and represent his attempts to educate his readers on the true nature of 
his authorship. He was sure that he had been misunderstood and that people were 
divided as to how to interpret what he had written (although this is just as relevant in 
contemporary circles as then! ). 63 Although it is debated today whether Kierkegaard 
may be taken seriously, even in these works, I believe that they represent a clear 
defence of his position and are therefore vital for forming a correct interpretation of his 
works. Whereas the Concept of Irony illustrates that he wished to criticize the 
Romantic Ironists and the intellectual elite of Copenhagen, these other two show his 
theological premises for writing, and are closely supported by journal entries from the 
late 1840s onwards. It is declared in his journal that his task was that of `trying to 
introduce Christianity into Christendom, albeit poetically and without authority (that is, 
not making myself into a missionary)' . 
64 I have already explained the details of why he 
felt this to be necessary, yet instead of confronting his readers directly he used his irony 
and pseudonyms to shatter the illusion of Christendom through an ironic deception. 
The aesthetic work is a deception ... One can deceive a person for the truth's 
sake, and (to recall old Socrates) one can deceive a person into the truth. 
61 COI 269 
62 Eagleton 1991,174 
63 Watkin 1997,51 
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Indeed, it is only by this means, i. e., by deceiving him, that it is possible to bring 
into the truth one who is under an illusion ... 
What does it mean, `to deceive? ' 
It means that one does not begin directly with the matter one wants to 
communicate, but begins by accepting the other man's illusion as good money. 
So 
... one 
does not begin thus: I am a Christian; you are not a Christian. Nor 
does one begin thus: It is Christianity I am proclaiming; and you are living in 
purely aesthetic categories. No, one begins thus: Let us talk about aesthetics. 65 
The irony lies in the fact that, whilst a pseudonym might be a vociferous champion of the 
aesthetic life-view, Kierkegaard is destroying the credibility of that very view through 
the same pseudonym. A reader would follow the text, possibly agreeing with its 
contents as he recognizes his views portrayed on the page. Then suspicion would begin 
to gradually build up as deliberate flaws were perceived in the view of the pseudonym, 
showing that what had at first appeared certain, was now lacking in credibility. 
Kierkegaard hoped that this would lead to the reader abandoning such views and instead 
turn his attention towards the Christian faith, something implicit within the body of the 
text. To this end he added a less subtle signpost, his later pseudonymous works were 
penned by Anti-Climacus who presented Christianity in its most Idealistic and 
challenging form; " thereby confronting the reader with what Kierkegaard felt to be the 
best option, but in such a way that he was able to make the choice himself. Kierkegaard 
is not the preacher in this process, but, like Socrates' maieutic method, he attempts to 
allow the reader to find out the truth himself, even if he indirectly guides him to the 
place where the choice is to be made. 
The maieutic attitude lies in the relationship between aesthetic works as a 
beginning and religion as ct%oq. The point of departure was the aesthetic, 
wherein possibly the majority have their being; and then the religious is 
introduced so unexpectedly that they who were moved to follow along the 
attraction of aesthetics suddenly find themselves in the midst of the most decisive 
definitions of Christianity and are obliged at least to take notice. 7 
65 POV 40-1 
66 Cf. J&P 6432, XIA 513 n. d., 1849 
67 POV 148-9 
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That this was his intention from the start, and not a later religious gloss over the whole 
pseudonymous enterprise, can be seen from a similar passage written five years earlier in 
the Journals, the year he published Either/Or: 
My destiny seems to be to discourse on truth as far as I can discover it but in 
such a way as at the same time to demolish all possible authority on my part. 
Since I then become incompetent and to the highest degree unreliable in men's 
eyes, I speak the truth and thus place them in the contradiction from which they 
can be rescued only by appropriating the truth themselves. "' 
The Stages of Existence 
Within Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works published between 1843-6 we encounter the 
three stages of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Quite 
understandably the latter stage is of the most concern for a thesis about his theology, but 
a brief synopsis of the theory of the stages will serve to support my interpretation of 
Kierkegaard's works used in the process, in addition to placing the religious stage in its 
context. Care must be taken not to read too much into the theory of the stages. Some 
have argued that Kierkegaard saw these as progressive levels in a person's development. 
Others see them as portraying stages in the development of his own life. Yet in both 
cases this would be to confuse the views of the pseudonyms with those of Kierkegaard 
himself As far as he was concerned, there were only really two alternatives in life: 
either the religious stage in its highest manifestation, and by this he meant Christianity; 
or not, in which case we are faced with numerous possibilities. He shows this in The 
Point of View when he states that most people exist in aesthetic categories as opposed 
to the `ethical-religious', or Christianity. 69 
(a) The Aesthetic Stage 
The best exposition of the aesthetic stage of existence can be found in the first volume 
of Either/Or, Kierkegaard's first `official' pseudonymous publication, which came off 
the press in 1843. This volume contains several sections, as I explained earlier one of 
68 J&P 5646, NA 87 n. d., 1843 
69 Watkin 1997,53 
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these, `The Seducer's Diary', supposedly composed by Johannes the Seducer, was 
designed to repel Regine. It relates the details of a tragic love-affair in which Johannes 
treats his young lover very badly, and bears some similarities with the Kierkegaard- 
Regine episode. Another section, the `Diapsalmata' is reminiscent of Friedrich 
Schlegel's various collections of fragments, with the ironic stance taken to nihilism in the 
character of the pseudonymous author, a certain Mr A. For example, he declares, `My 
life is utterly meaningless. When I consider its various epochs, my life is like the word 
Schnur in the dictionary, which first of all means a string, and second a daughter-in-law. 
All that is lacking is that in the third place the word Schnur means a camel, in the fourth 
a whisk broom. '70 Cynicism and scepticism fill his words, he is unable to recognize the 
objective status of values and denies their reality. 7' Mr A cannot offer any hope of 
clarity or purpose, his only aim in life is to achieve pleasure without getting bored. 72 
The aesthetic stage, or life-view, is a passive phenomenon. Those within it feel 
themselves caught up in life's processes, incapable of taking the initiative. At best they 
escape into the theoretical, the realm of possibility, guided by fancies and desires. In this 
way they hope to avoid life's duties and responsibilities. 73 The only real values for the 
aesthete are those temporally adhered to in order to keep the boredom away. Yet there 
is no substance to this stage, life becomes merely a chain of unconnected possibilities, 
fragments that are neither linked nor form a coherent whole. 
(b) The Ethical Stage 
The ethical stage forms a stark contrast to the aesthetic, as can be seen in the second 
volume of Either/Or and its pseudonymous author Judge William. Life in this stage can 
only be a well ordered, carefully planned-out whole. There must be no irregularities, no 
contradictions. This philosophy of life is explained in the tortuous `The Balance 
between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality', a letter of 
quite considerable length addressed to Mr A, which constitutes a substantial part of the 
volume. Its long, deliberately ponderous style contrasts with the short, sharp, witty 
70 DO 1: 36 
" Cf. Hartshorne 1990,17 
'2 Cf. the section entitled 'Rotation of Crops', DO 1: 281-301 
" Ibid. 1: 295ff; cf. Taylor 1975,128 
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comments of the `Diapsalmata', and part of the irony lies in the fact that Mr A would 
probably get bored before reaching the end of even the first of its pages and give up. 
The Judge seeks to affirm all that the aesthete would deny and Kierkegaard uses the 
Judge to mimic the over-confident stance of Enlightenment (German Aufklärung) 
rationalism and Hegelian philosophy. Judge William talks of responsibility, marriage, 
duty, loyalty to the establishment, all in an effort to become what he calls `the 
universal'. 74 One simply is aesthetic, but one must become ethical, become `the 
universal' by force of human character. " Yet the Danish word used for `the universal' 
is del Almene, which implies something that is ordinary, common, banal. 76 Kierkegaard 
was critical of the over-confidence in human reason that had been exhibited by 
Enlightenment thinkers and Hegelian philosophy, and he rejected any claims to complete 
autonomy that they made. Also, his attack is directed against the small-mindedness that 
refuses to look beyond the surface of local convention. In the end, Judge William is 
found largely to be following the dictates of his environment and we are left wondering 
how `universal' his standards really are. So, despite its apparent confidence in itself, the 
ethical stage is seen to be little better than the aesthetic, and Kierkegaard used the 
religious stage to bring its preconceptions crashing down. 
(c) Religiousness A- Immanent Religion 
We first encounter the religious stage in the notorious Fear and Trembling, which was 
published in 1843. The pseudonymous author Johannes de Silentio (John of Silence) 
examines the story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22: 1-19. Johannes' concern is with 
the paradox that, once God finally blesses Abraham and Sarah with their only son, Isaac, 
he then demands him as a sacrifice. This seems to run counter to all God's promises of 
Abraham being the father of many nations through countless descendants. However, 
Abraham retains his faith in God despite the risk involved, and this Johannes cannot 
fathom - but that is where the irony lies. Consider this from the preface: 
1aFJO2: 255 
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The present author is no philosopher, he has not understood the System, nor 
does he know if there really is one, or if it really has been completed. As far as 
his own weak head is concerned the thought of what huge heads everyone must 
have in order to have such huge thoughts is already enough. Even if one were 
able to render the whole content of faith into conceptual form, it would not 
follow that one had grasped faith, grasped how one came to it, or how it came to 
one. The present author is ... a 
freelancer 
... He writes 
because for doing so is 
a luxury. '? 
Johannes does not claim to have faith, therefore he describes something outside of his 
own experience and personal knowledge. From the start he points out that he is largely 
ignorant of this particular topic. He writes merely out of entertainment value, treating 
the subject as a logical puzzle, not something of any great importance. It is therefore 
quite ironic that he chooses to write about faith at all, and hardly surprising that he 
reaches a negative verdict: `What I intend now is to extract from the story of Abraham 
its dialectical element, in the form of problemata, in order to see how monstrous a 
paradox faith is, a paradox capable of making a murder into a holy act well pleasing to 
God, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, which no thought can grasp 
because faith begins exactly where thinking leaves off 09 
Johannes is unable to conceive of anything higher than the ethical stage, so the faith of 
Abraham, as part of the religious stage, is totally beyond his comprehension and 
therefore a `paradox' which reduces him to silence (hence the pseudonym). Kierkegaard 
uses him to illustrate that religious faith could well make demands upon its adherents 
that are beyond those recognized by respectable society. Active discipleship will not 
only lead the believer beyond recognized conventions, but sometimes even against them, 
if that is the will of God. This Johannes terms the `teleological suspension of the 
ethical'' by which Kierkegaard implies that it is the ethical stage as exemplified by 
Johannes, with its purely secular loyalties, that is to be superseded by the religious stage 
with its absolute loyalty to God. There was a significant message for Regine too, 
namely that he had broken their engagement because of his divine vocation, not because 
" F&T42f 
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of her. What he was not advocating was the rejection of ethics, such would have placed 
him on a par with the worst moral nihilism in the aesthetic stage. 
The religious stage, as exemplified by Abraham, is not intended to represent Christianity 
(not even the pseudonyms would confuse the Old and New Testaments). It was later to 
be entitled religiousness A in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in 1846. 
Religiousness A represented religion without divine, transcendent revelation and may 
also be referred to as `immanent religion'. 80 It is a sort of natural religiosity, and 
therefore, `religiousness A can be present in paganism, and in Christianity it can be the 
religiousness of everyone who is not decisively Christian, whether baptized or not. '81 
(d) Religiousness B- Transcendent Religion and Christianity 
Above this is religiousness B, the `transcendent' or `paradox religiousness'. 82 This 
actually turns out to be Christianity, and it is first introduced, albeit indirectly, in 
Philosophical Fragments (published in 1844) by the pseudonym Johannes Climacus 
(John the Climber), a representative of stage A, who also `wrote' the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript. 83 Climacus' seemingly carefree attitude is similar to Johannes 
de Silentio, and he regards religiousness B as only a hypothesis, invented as an 
improvement upon a form of immanent religion (hypothesis A, or the `Socratic'). He 
pretends to have invented it, which is Kierkegaard's satirical comment on the claims of 
philosophers who would degrade Christianity as being inferior to their schools of 
thought. 84 John the Climber is ironic in that he is one who attempts to climb to heaven 
by his own intellectual efforts alone. 
The titles, and sizes, of the works further serve to exhibit Kierkegaard's irony. 
Philosophical Fragments, as a title, is reminiscent of the fragment form of the 
Romantics' `Symphilosophy', although the Danish word used here for fragments 
(smuler) is better translated ` crumbs', or even `titbits'. 85 In this sense it stands in 
80 Evans 1983,45; Gouwens 1996,110 
81 CUP 1: 557 
82 Evans 1983,13 
83 Cr CUP 1: 557 
84J&P 5827, VIA 84 n. d., 1845 
85 Hannay 1991,95 
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contrast to the claims of many thinkers in intellectual history who claim to offer a truly 
comprehensive systematic treatment of existence (for which Hegel's Encyclopedia, or 
Phenomenology of Mind could count as relevant examples). The Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript is five times larger than Fragments, so can hardly be a mere 
postscript. Also, the Danish word used, uvidenskabelig, would be better understood to 
mean `unscholarly' instead of `unscientific', thereby denoting something of an 
amateurish composition. 86 
Climacus, although he seems to know many of the fine details, cannot comprehend the 
real significance of Christian doctrines such as the Incarnation or the Atonement, so, just 
like Silentio when confronted with the facts of faith, he stands back and declares them to 
be paradoxes. 87 Hence Christianity is therefore perceived as the `paradox religious'. 
These works differ from the earlier pseudonymous texts in that Kierkegaard's name 
appears on the title pages as their `editor'. Kierkegaard wished to indicate a closer 
relation to the views expressed in the two Climacus texts, yet he still maintains a 
distance from what is said within them. Climacus remains a `fantastic figure' who does 
actually exist, claiming to know all about Christianity without any faith. 
88 
5. The Religious Works and Direct Communication 
The stages of existence, irony and pseudonymity are all primarily related to 
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous, or aesthetic texts. It is these works alone which all too 
frequently form the subject matter of the philosophical, theological and (especially) the 
literary discussions of Kierkegaard. However, I have also referred to other, 
pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous texts within Kierkegaard's authorship which do 
not fall into the aesthetic category. It is within the non-aesthetic works in particular that 
it is possible to find a wealth of material that can serve to illuminate and explain 
Kierkegaard's own theological position. It is therefore appropriate to use the final 
section of this chapter to offer a brief explanation of the significance of this component 
86 Hartshorne 1990,35 
87 E. g. PF 58 
88 Rae 1998,4 
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of the authorship. I will begin by briefly discussing the works by Anti-Climacus, then I 
will discuss the nature and purpose of the various Discourses and other signed works, 
before concluding with some treatment of the Journals and papers. 
Anti-Climacus 
The two writings attributed to Anti-Climacus are The Sickness Unto Death (1848) and 
Practice in Christianity (1850). Within these two works Kierkegaard allows his 
pseudonym to develop and elaborate upon the main theological ideas introduced in the 
Climacus texts. The `Anti-', does not mean that Anti-Climacus is against Climacus, 
rather it denotes `prior to' (like the English `ante-') or `before' in the context of rank, 
thereby denoting that Anti-Climacus is higher than Climacus. Unlike Climacus, 
Kierkegaard describes Anti-Climacus as being `a Christian to an extraordinary degree'. 89 
He chose to use Anti-Climacus to present Christianity in its ideal form, 90 something 
Kierkegaard's humility and Christian self-confidence prevented him from doing at this 
point in his life. Whether it is safe to interpret Anti-Climacus' theology as being a 
faithful representation of Kierkegaard's theology is a topic of debate. However, like the 
Climacus texts, the title pages of both the works by Anti-Climacus also carried 
Kierkegaard's name as their editor, so they too are closer to his views than the earlier 
pseudonymous works. In his Journals Kierkegaard claimed that he felt himself to be 
`higher than Johannes Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus' 91 He did at first consider 
publishing the Anti-Climacus texts directly under his own name, yet he rejected this on 
the grounds that his readership would take him less seriously if he attempted to claim 
that he was worthy of being such a Christian. By keeping the texts pseudonymous, 
however thinly veiled that pseudonymity might be, he was able to maintain a certain 
distance in the hope that the texts would still be considered on their own merits. 92 It is 
therefore safe to interpret Anti-Climacus as saying what Kierkegaard would like to say 
himself if he had had the confidence, yet he felt it inappropriate to do so directly due to 
the seriousness of the subject and the nature of his own life. 
89 J&P 6431, X1A 510 n. d, 1849; cf. the comments regarding `Anti-' in Howard and Edna Hongs' 
introduction to The Sickness Unto Death, xxii. 
90 PC 7. Cf. also J&P 6439, X1A 530 n. d., 1849 
91 J&P 6433, X1A 517 n. d, 1849 
92 Ibid. 6527, X2A 183 n. d, 1849; 6464, X1A 615 n. d, 1849 
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Discourses and Signed Works 
Alongside all 9f the various d eent pseudonymous texts discussed above stand the 
groups of discourses and other signed works. These differ from the pseudonymous 
works in that they were written for those of his readers, however few they might be, 
who had begun to take notice of the issues he sought to address. 93 This is a large and 
diverse body of writings and I will now briefly describe some of those which I have 
chosen to use in the following chapters. From 1843-44 Kierkegaard published a total of 
eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. These are fascinating in that they present us with his 
Christian beliefs from the start of his authorship. They were published in groups at the 
same time as certain aesthetic texts were also published and each discourse tackles a 
subject to be treated by one of the various pseudonyms, yet the discourses do so from 
Kierkegaard's own Christian position. In this way he was able to illustrate the 
differences in life view between him and the pseudonyms in question. In 1848 he 
published his Christian Discourses, an important collection of homilies that he intended 
to accompany the Anti-Climacus writings. Also in this category are the two theological 
works For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourse fl In these two, often neglected 
books, Kierkegaard presents some of his most penetrating and insightful Christology and 
teaching on the nature of faith, whilst clearly illustrating his theological debt to Luther. 
The Journals and Papers 
The final group of writings to be discussed are the Journals and papers. These offer 
scholars an enormous wealth of information. Kierkegaard religiously kept his Journals 
throughout his late teens and adult life, recording in them numerous personal details and 
theological reflections. Whilst some entries present Kierkegaard's thoughts, there are 
times when he used the Journals to make drafts for his various publications. Because of 
this it is possible to discover similar, or even identical, passages in the Journals and 
other works. Interpreters of Kierkegaard's thought therefore need to be careful of this 
and so distinguish between these passages and Kierkegaard's own thoughts and 
beliefs. 94 
93 Mullen 1995,39 
94 Cf. Vardy 1997,39 
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5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we can see that the task of interpreting Kierkegaard's writings leads us 
into theology, philosophy and literary theory. Most importantly for this thesis is the fact 
that he was motivated by theological and philosophical concerns, wishing to deliver his 
critique upon the philosophical and intellectual trends of his time, and on the nature of 
the established Evangelical Lutheran Church in Denmark. He sought to defend a 
personal, Christian faith in the face of, as he saw them, these competing errors within 
society. To a lesser extent Kierkegaard also wanted to communicate with his ex fiancee, 
Regine Olsen (although this concerns Either/Or and Fear and Trembling rather than 
other works mentioned in this chapter). For all these purposes he published a variety of 
ironical works under pseudonyms, in doing so he ironically employed the literary tactics 
of the Romantic Ironists. Some details within his earlier texts would be perceived by 
Regine as pertaining to their relationship. On another level, yet often within the same 
text, the general reader would be able to discern the critical, polemical nature of the 
texts. Unsure whether all his readers would understand what he published, he wrote 
some explanatory works such as `A First and Last Declaration', and The Point of View 
as a means of rectifying the situation. 
In order to examine Kierkegaard's critique of natural theology, and the Christological 
basis on which his thesis rests, I have chosen to use the following works. First, the 
pseudonymous Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
through which Kierkegaard ironically introduces Christianity, under the guise of 
religiousness B. This is where he begins to deal with the problem of religious 
knowledge, and the nature and purpose of the Incarnation. Yet, although some attribute 
the views found therein to Kierkegaard, they are only those of his pseudonym, Johannes 
Climacus, through whom Kierkegaard introduces particular themes. Therefore, I will 
use material from the Climacus texts to form a starting-point for discussing 
Kierkegaard's theology. I will then proceed to develop my interpretation of 
Kierkegaard's own theology by developing the argument with material taken from Anti- 
Climacus' texts, the Journals, and some of the signed works and discourses which were 
also published under his own name. In this way I hope to be able to delve beneath the 
41 
rhetorical devices of the authorship and illustrate how Kierkegaard's religious thought 
continues to make an important and constructive contribution to theology. 
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2 
REASON AND REVELATION: 
CAN THE TRUTH BE LEARNED? 
Kierkegaard stands out as a radical critic of the theological mood of his time. John 
Macquarrie describes him as `a lone protester' swimming against the stream of the 
nineteenth century. ' As explained in the previous chapter, during Kierkegaard's lifetime 
Denmark was largely in intellectual and cultural debt to its German neighbours. So, it is 
hardly surprising that we -frequently find Kierkegaard's writings set against a 
background of German thought. Although he may have embraced a broadly Lutheran 
theology, he wholeheartedly rejected the philosophical approaches to religion then in 
circulation within that tradition. This was largely on the grounds that they were the 
product of Idealism, whether of the Romantic, Hegelian, or other variants of that strand 
of philosophical thought. We have to allow for this important factor if we are to 
appraise Kierkegaard's response to such approaches with any clarity. 
The Rationalist philosophers of the German Enlightenment (Aufklärung) in the previous 
century had stressed either the authority of the unaided human reason or of sense 
experience. In theological matters this had set them against allowing for divine or 
supernatural revelation. Traditional sources of revealed theology therefore tended to be 
disregarded, as faith was subordinated to knowledge in order to promote the alleged 
validity of what was deemed to be truly `objective' and `rational'. Echoes of such 
theological rationalism were heard in the early nineteenth century with the development 
of Hegel's Absolute Idealism. Largely through the work of Kierkegaard's 
undergraduate tutor, the pastor and theologian Hans Martensen, Hegelian Idealism had 
become, by the time of Kierkegaard's undergraduate studies, the dominant philosophy in 
Denmark. 2 As explained in the first chapter, Danish Hegelianism was to find itself the 
principal target of Kierkegaard's polemic in his early pseudonymous writings. Yet at 
times his critical eye also turned to certain aspects of the Romanticist theology of 
Schleiermacher. Kierkegaard had been introduced to Schleiermacher's The Christian 
Macquarrie 1990,236 
2 Watkin 1997,16 
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Faith by Martensen during his studies in 1834.3 By seeming to reduce religion to an 
affective, subjective experience, Schleiermacher had failed to do justice to its nature or 
significance. ' However, through the impact of Romanticism, the dry intellectualism of 
the previous generation had begun to give way to a wider conception of religious truth 
that embraced the head and the heart. This theological step forward was appreciated by 
Kierkegaard just as much as any of the Romantics. 
Like Kant before him, Kierkegaard recognized the necessity of setting a limit to the 
ambitions of the `pure', or speculative reason in theological matters. In a sense he 
sought to continue Kant's critique further, making a radical departure from the 
rationalist agenda of the Aufklärung whilst devoutly adhering to a more traditional 
Lutheran theology. Unfortunately, the nature and level of his criticism have led some to 
categorize him as an `irrationalist' who denigrated the use of reason in theological 
matters. 5 Others, in supposed defence of his position, choose to define him as an `anti- 
intellectualist'. 6 Unfortunately this term is just as problematic, with its connotations 
lending themselves to the hostile interpretations that one had hoped to avoid. Although 
less familiar, the term `anti-rationalist' could also be applied, mindful that this must be 
done in the context that Kierkegaard self-consciously set himself against theological 
`rationalism' in its various manifestations. So, clearly care must be taken in order to 
refute these charges of irrationalism and anti-intellectualism successfully. In this chapter 
it will be shown that Kierkegaard's intention was to define the limitations of reason 
precisely in an area that involves more than just the intellectual acceptance of 
metaphysical propositions. Therefore, it is perhaps more fitting to refer to him as a 
3 Collins 1983,101 
4 Consider for instance Schleiermacher's famous discussion of 'the feeling of absolute dependence' in 
The Christian Faith, 131ff. 
S See for instance the recent article by Christopher Hamilton `Kierkegaard on Truth as Subjectivity: 
Christianity, ethics and asceticism', Religious Studies. Vol. 34,1998,61. The irrationalist 
interpretation is also put forward by Isaiah Berlin in Against the Current, Essays in the History of 
Ideas, although this is done in the context of a discussion of Hamann and his influence on 'German 
irrationalism'. (Berlin 1981,19). However, Kierkegaard's harshest critic has probably been the 
American Idealist philosopher Brand Blandshard. (Cf., e. g., Blandshard 1974,241) 
6 This term is adopted by one of Kierkegaard's earliest interpreters David Swenson. However, Swenson 
does so with the reservation that it is only employed in order to enable modem readers new to 
Kierkegaard's ideas to understand him more in the context of more contemporary movements. 
(Swenson 1983,135ü). Cf. David Gouwens Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker for a careful description 
of the nature of Kierkegaard's 'anti-intellectualism' in the face of some common misunderstandings 
that have arisen amongst his interpreters over the years. (Gouwens 1996,53) 
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`suprarationalist', as he held the workings of both faith and revelation to redeem reason 
by transforming its canons. ' 
Within this chapter I will begin to show how Kierkegaard, both directly and 
pseudonymously, offers his own contribution to the classic reason-revelation debate. A 
considerable amount of attention will be devoted to Philosophical Fragments ('by' 
Johannes Climacus), as this work does present us with a fascinating, though oblique, 
insight into his views on the matter. Supporting material will be taken from such texts 
as the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, The Sickness 
Unto Death ('by' Anti-Climacus) and from Kierkegaard's Journals. The first section 
will relate how Kierkegaard uses his pseudonym to raise the problem of how we might 
acquire religious knowledge in Philosophical Fragments. In the second section I will 
discuss how he posits the existence of human sin as being the decisive factor in 
preventing our knowledge of God. Then, in the third and final section, I will examine 
how he posits `the moment in time', by which he means the Incarnation, as the decisive 
revelatory event. I will also examine why he links this intrinsically to his soteriology. 
1. On Learning the Truth 
`Can the truth be learned? With this question we shall begin. ' So reads the opening 
sentence of the first chapter of Philosophical Fragments. Climacus informs the reader 
that, `It was a Socratic question or became that by way of the Socratic question whether 
virtue can be taught - for virtue in turn was defined as insight. "' In keeping with his 
penchant for indirection, Kierkegaard uses his pseudonym to refer to more than just the 
niceties of Socratic-Platonic philosophy. Although Climacus' direct references may be 
to antiquity, his allusions do in fact go way beyond this. I wish to begin by doing him 
the courtesy of enquiring into the nature of his `Socratic question' by means of a brief 
excursion into two of Plato's Socratic dialogues: Protagoras and the Meno. Once this 
has been done, I wish to delve deeper into the matter and discern the real question 
implied within the text, namely, Kierkegaard's contribution towards solving `the 
A term adopted by Stephen M. Emmanuel in his Kierkegaard & the Concept of Revelation. (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1996). (Cf. Emmanuel 1996,44) 
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problem of the status and acquisition of religious truth'. 9 Yet this truth to which 
Climacus refers is of more than just theoretical, or intellectual interest, he refers to it as 
can eternal happiness'. 10 It would instead be more appropriate to understand it to mean 
a person's salvation. " Considering this understanding, Fragments seems not so much a 
work of philosophy, but of evangelism. As Kierkegaard explains through the same 
pseudonym three years later in the Postscript, `the issue in Fragments [is] an 
introductory issue, not to Christianity but to becoming a Christian. ' 12 
A Socratic Question 
In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates begins by claiming that virtue cannot be taught. Yet he 
follows this by professing his uncertainty and so invites his companion Protagoras to 
enlighten him. 13 This initiates a debate on the matter, at the end of which Socrates 
concludes, 
It seems to me that the present outcome of our talk is pointing at us, like a 
human adversary, the finger of accusation and scorn. If it had a voice it would 
say: `What an absurd pair you are, Socrates and Protagoras. One of you, having 
said at the beginning that virtue is not teachable, now is bent upon contradicting 
himself by trying to demonstrate that everything is knowledge - justice, 
temperance and courage alike - which is the best way to prove that virtue is 
teachable. If virtue were something other than knowledge, as Protagoras tried to 
prove, obviously it could not be taught. But if it turns out to be, as a single 
whole, knowledge (which is what you are urging, Socrates), then it will be most 
surprising if it cannot be taught. Protagoras on the other hand, who at the 
beginning supposed it to be teachable, now on the contrary seems to be bent on 
showing that it is almost anything rather than knowledge; and this would make it 
least likely to be teachable. ' 14 
In the Meno, relating an episode some thirty years later, the same topic arises and 
Socrates is asked, `Is virtue something that can be taught? Or does it come by practice? 
9 Gardiner 1988,68 
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13 Plato 1968,51 
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Or is it neither teaching nor practice that gives it to a man but natural aptitude or 
something else? " At this point his uncertainty covers not only whether virtue is 
teachable, but even how virtue may be defined in itself. The dialogue ends, however, 
with Socrates' somewhat incomplete conclusion, `On our present reasoning then, 
whoever has virtue gets it by divine dispensation. But we shall not understand the truth 
of the matter until, before asking how men get virtue, we try to discover what virtue is 
in and by itself. ' 16 
This profession of ignorance, customarily occurring as it does in various forms at the 
end of most of Plato's Socratic dialogues, is not an admission of defeat. Instead, it is an 
important part of Socrates' maieutic method, a literary tactic Kierkegaard admired and 
emulated throughout his aesthetic authorship. He explains something about this in his 
Journals, 
The fact that several of Plato's dialogues end without a result has a far deeper 
basis than I had thought earlier. They are a reproduction of Socrates' maieutic 
skill which makes the reader or hearer himself active, and therefore they do not 
end in a result but in a sting. This is an excellent parody of the modern rote- 
method which says everything the sooner the better and all at one time, which 
awakens no self-action but only leads the reader to rattle it off like a parrot. 17 
The significance is that the reader, like the speakers in the dialogue, is compelled to 
examine the matter at hand in order to find an answer himself. In so doing he might be 
led to question whether his own life meets the standards implied. 
The maieutic method used by Socrates attempts to draw out the answer to any given 
question by means of the principle of `recollection'. Climacus refers to this principle as 
the `Socratic', or A, hypothesis and later posits as an alternative to it, aB hypothesis, 
something that just happens to bear an uncanny resemblance to the Incarnation. The 
`Socratic' hypothesis holds, `That all learning and seeking are but recollecting. Thus the 
ignorant person merely needs to be reminded in order, by himself, to call to mind what 
he knows. The truth is not introduced into him but was in him. "8 The implications of 
'5 Ibid. 115 
16 Ibid. 157 
17 J&P 4266, VII 1A 74 n. d, 1846 
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this are used by Socrates in attempting to demonstrate the pre-existence and immortality 
of the soul. In the Meno he states: 
Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen all 
things both here and in the other world, has learned everything that is. So we 
need not be surprised if it can recall the knowledge of virtue or anything else 
which, as we see, it once possessed. All nature is akin, and the soul has learned 
everything, so that when a man has recalled a single piece of knowledge - 
learned it, in ordinary language - there is no reason why he should not find out 
all the rest, if he keeps a stout heart and does not grow weary of the search, for 
seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection. '9 
The examples of truth recollected in this manner which occur in Plato's dialogues are 
normally such timeless, universal truths as those of mathematics and geometry. 20 
Socratic-Platonic thought also places religious truth within this `timeless' category. 
Against this position would be the thesis that religious truth could be particular, and/or 
dependent upon a single, historical, revelatory event such as the Incarnation. 21 
Within the Socratic-Platonic framework the whole process of acquiring knowledge is 
not reliant upon any specific person to act as a teacher, instead, there is what Socrates 
calls the `midwife'(µatcu ctKoS). The role of this midwife is to question the learner in 
such a manner that he may, after careful recollection and introspection, `recover' all that 
is needed to be known by himself. 22 By Socrates' own admission there is no actual 
authority in this role, it is purely that of a catalyst. Returning to Fragments, Climacus 
comments on this: `Viewed Socratically, any point of departure in time is eo ipso 
something accidental, a vanishing point, an occasion. Nor is the teacher anything more, 
19 Plato 1968,129-30 
20 See for instance the example of the slaveboy's geometry lesson in the Meno. (Ibid. 130ff). 
21 This distinction is by no means confined to Platonism and its influence has permeated much of 
Western philosophical thought. Plato distinguished between two kinds of truth claim, those derived 
solely from reason and those derived from sense-experience. The former are deemed to be universal 
and necessary, the latter contingent (although not necessarily particular). Such epistemological dualism 
comes to the fore in Lessing's well-known saying, 'Accidental truths of history can never become the 
proof of necessary truths of reason... That ... is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot cross, however 
often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap. ' Lessing's concern was over how vitally 
important moral and religious beliefs could be derived from historical events that are in principle 
uncertain. (Gunton 1983,139f). I offer a fuller explanation of this topic in chapter III within the 
context of Kierkegaard's Christology, where it comes to the fore. There I discuss his treatment of 
Lessing's philosophy in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and show its relevance to the concept of 
'the Absolute Paradox' of the Incarnation in the Climacus writings. 
22 Plato 1968,138 
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and if he gives of himself and his erudition in any other way, he does not give but takes 
away. '23 If anybody is capable of acting as a midwife in this context, with the principal 
requirement being that they do not actually attempt to teach the other anything, then the 
method begins to appear quite `accidental' indeed. The importance lies not with how or 
when or why knowledge is recollected, but with the fact that it has been recollected at 
all. Climacus objects to this theory on the grounds that, `If this is the case with regard 
to learning the truth, then the fact that I have learned from Socrates or from Prodicus or 
from a maidservant can concern me only historically'; and also, `Neither can the fact that 
the teaching of Socrates or Prodicus was this or that have anything but historical interest 
for me, because the truth in which I rest was in me and emerged from me. '24 The 
accidental role of the midwife fails to provide any certain authority for the resulting 
information. In addition to this one wonders to what extent the midwife can remain 
truly impartial in the process. It is often the case that questions are asked with 
something of the answer already being implied or presupposed. This can arise whether 
it is done by the phrasing of such a question, the context in which it occurs, or even the 
manner in which it is asked by another person. To a certain extent these and other 
factors can all serve to influence the outcome. 
For Climacus then, the Socratic hypothesis appears at best ambiguous. 
With half-thoughts, with higgling and haggling, with claiming and disclaiming, as 
if the individual to a certain degree owed something to another person but then 
again to a certain degree did not, with vague words that explain anything except 
what is meant by this `to a certain degree'- with all such things one does not go 
beyond Socrates or reach the concept of revelation, either, but simply remains in 
empty talk. In the Socratic view, every human being is himself the midpoint, and 
the whole world focuses only on him because this self-knowledge is God- 
knowledge. 25 
It is apparent that the personal subject holds the central role in acquiring knowledge and 
hence I am the most important item in the process (as `the truth in which I rest was in 
23 PF11 
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me and emerged from me'). No ultimate significance can be given to the means 
whereby I became aware of anything, nor any to the occasion or even the purpose for it. 
This also applies to the question of religious knowledge, something Climacus sees fit to 
refer to as `eternal happiness'. He states that, `My relation to Socrates or Prodicus 
cannot concern me with regard to my eternal happiness, for this is given retrogressively 
in the possession of the truth that I had from the beginning without knowing it. '26 If the 
Socratic theory is to be held forth as being viable, then there will be definite implications 
for any concepts of revelation as the Socratic theory fails to allow for need of any 
external authority. The immortal, pre-existent soul knows all there is to know, only it 
cannot remember the occasion in which this first happened and is thereby lost in a 
timeless mist of imprecision. 
The temporal point of departure is a nothing, because in the same moment I 
discover that I have known the truth from eternity without knowing it, in the 
same instant that moment is hidden in the eternal, assimilated into it in such a 
way that I, so to speak, still cannot find it even if I were to look for it, because 
there is no Here and no There, but only an ubique et nusquam. 27 
So there can be no value in the events of the present. Likewise, there can be no 
revelation from an external source. Because of this, the exact origin of the matter 
recalled remains a mystery to the person who recalled it. 
As I stated earlier, Kierkegaard's concerns were not confined to details of classical 
philosophy. From the material quoted from the text of Fragments so far it will be 
possible to discern the real subject of his interest. However, before moving on to 
detailing what that is, I ought first to clear up one potential misunderstanding that may 
have arisen from what has been written so far. I have just outlined some of the 
weaknesses inherent in the `Socratic' hypothesis which I then interpreted to be referring 
directly to Socrates' maieutic method. Yet, it will have been noted that this method was 
described in far more positive terms in my first chapter when discussing Kierkegaard's 
tactics for indirect communication. It would have been entirely contradictory for 
Kierkegaard to have used that very method himself as his most positive literary weapon, 
26 Ibid 12 




and yet allow it to be subjected to the harsh criticism of his pseudonyms at the same 
time. Although a definite amount of irony pervades the authorship at this stage, it 
cannot be claimed that it extended to this level of self-contradiction. What is actually 
being done is very different. On the one hand, the use of Socrates' maieutic method as a 
literary device was intended to provoke his readers into reflecting upon what it means to 
be a Christian. Addressing the educated upper and middle classes of Danish society, he 
would have been aware that by far the majority of his readers would have received the 
sacraments of baptism and confirmation into the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Yet for 
many this was simply a component part of good citizenship. In general he would not 
have been teaching them something entirely new, but was trying to present it in such a 
way that its truth would strike them with a renewed depth and sense of urgency. He 
was the Socratic `midwife' attempting to breathe new life into a Christian faith that he 
believed many had forgotten or turned away from, or, to put it in his own words, `to 
reintroduce Christianity ... 
into Christendom. X29 
A Theological Question 
On the other hand, the real theological target, or targets, behind the rhetorical facade of 
the `Socratic' hypothesis now remain to be unmasked. According to Alastair Hannay 
there exist under this heading, 
Both an ostensible and a covert theme. Ostensibly it sketches (in the form of a 
`thought project', i. e., no more than an interesting hypothesis) a possible 
alternative to Platonic Idealism, an alternative which preserves a Socratic 
element but dispenses with the Idealistic one. The Socratic element is the 
method of refutation, the so-called elenctic [or maieutic] method, which 
proceeds not by establishing any thesis constructively but by destroying initial 
assumptions. The Idealist element is the principle that the process of eliminating 
falsity is tantamount to laying bare the truth, as if falsehood and illogicality were 
merely impediments to a pre-established capacity to grasp the ultimate nature of 
things. The latter element is archetypal immanentism and as such is 
Kierkegaard's most general target. More or less implicitly, however, the subject 
28 POV23 
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of the Fragments is the relation of philosophy to Christianity, and its immediate 
target the specifically Hegelian understanding of this relation. 29 
That is not to claim that Hegel himself is the target, but, as I mentioned earlier, it implies 
those Danish academics and churchmen who had embraced his philosophy and 
contributed to its popularity in that country. Most obviously, it applies to Hans 
Martensen. Not only was he at one time Kierkegaard's tutor at Copenhagen University, 
but he later rose to become Bishop Primate of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Denmark and a theologian of international reputation. 30 
C. Stephen Evans agrees that philosophical Idealism provides the most obvious object of 
criticism in this context. Along with Hegelian Idealism, Evans would include that of the 
German Romanticist philosopher Schelling. 31 Kierkegaard would have been very 
familiar with his ideas. He had studied Schelling's philosophy under Martensen in 1838- 
9, and in addition to this, he attended a course of Schelling's lectures entitled 
`Philosophy of Revelation' at the University of Berlin in 1841-2. Originally Kierkegaard 
had welcomed the opportunity to learn from an individual who had been hailed as 
Hegel's greatest critic, being hired by the university for the specific purpose of `rooting 
up the dragon's teeth' of Hegelianism. 
32 Unfortunately, as the series of lectures 
progressed, Kierkegaard became increasingly disillusioned with their philosophical 
content. Kierkegaard soon found himself complaining in a letter to a friend back in 
Copenhagen that `Schelling talks endless nonsense' 33 
However, the `Socratic' hypothesis need not be confined to just these two views. Evans 
broadens the list to include another near contemporary, Schleiermacher. With his 
emphasis placed so heavily upon the believer's personal experience, Schleiermacher 
`considered that no man need look beyond his own self-consciousness for living contact 
with the divine'. 34 Evans' interpretation is based on the premiss that Kierkegaard was 
referring to a trait widely present within European religious thought, and therefore it is 
possible to understand several developments falling within this category. If the logic of 
29 Hannay 1991,93 
30 Ibid. 94 
31 Evans 1992,29 
32 Reardon 1989,112 
33 J&P 5552, Letters, no. 69 February 27,1842 
34 Reardon 1989,56. Cf. Schleiermacher 1989,12f 
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this interpretation is to be followed, then, in order to understand the wider implications 
of his thought, it is possible to extend the list to include movements and ideologies 
outside of Kierkegaard's own awareness and nearer our own time. In this case Evans 
suggests a diverse variety of possible subjects: Marx, Bultmann, the process theology of 
John Cobb, and even Hinduism and Buddhism] As he explains, 
However, if it is an extension of his concept, it is only a small extension. What 
all these views - Platonism, Hegelianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, some versions of 
Christianity, and secular humanism - have in common is a conviction that the 
capacity for achieving truly human existence is possessed by human beings and 
does not need to be brought to humans by a teacher who is a divine creator of 
the individual. 35 
Such a broad interpretation of the `Socratic' hypothesis does indeed seem to be 
warranted as being within the spirit of Kierkegaard. In fact, to limit Kierkegaard's 
polemic to one which deals almost exclusively with (Hegelian) Idealism is to fail to 
appreciate the breadth of his theological awareness and acumen. It also facilitates an 
awareness of the contemporary relevance of his thought. His prime concern was with 
refuting the theory of human existential autonomy in whatever form it was manifested in 
the philosophical and theological trends around him. 
Alongside the contemporary enthusiasm for various Idealist philosophies, were the 
rationalism and empiricism that had developed during the Enlightenment. Neither of 
these two movements had by any means died out by the 1840s when Kierkegaard was 
writing. In fact the most significant Danish rationalist theologian of the time was Henrik 
Georg Clausen who died in 1840. His son, Henrik Nicola] Clausen, was a Professor of 
Theology at Copenhagen University. His thought, which was less rationalistic than his 
father's, had been influenced by Kant and Schleiermacher and Kierkegaard had attended 
his lectures on historical theology from 1833-34.36 In some cases, an over-confidence in 
the capacity of human reason had lent itself to the development of Deism. Although this 
creed had largely died out by this time, there was still the influence of various `natural' 
theologies in which the very concept of revelation had either been considerably 
modified, or even rejected out of hand. Two prime examples of this tendency were 
15 Evans 1992,31 
36 Watkin 1997,14 and Barrett 1985,49 
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Hume's sceptical Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Kant's Deistic Religion 
Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Bringing this Kierkegaardian critique up to date, I 
would wish to add the `modern autonomous kind of faith' proposed by Cupitt, for 
whom `religion is wholly of this world, wholly human, wholly our own responsibility'. 37 
He does, somewhat ironically, cite Kierkegaard as one of his predecessors in support of 
such autonomy. 
2. The Problem of Sin 
Now that the objects of Kierkegaard's criticism have been identified, it is appropriate to 
discover what he proposed in their stead. It has just been discussed how the `Socratic' 
hypothesis attributes no significance to the temporal occasion, or `moment' of 
recollection. This holds that truth, including religious truth, is timeless and already 
within the learner. Yet for the (as yet) unnamed B hypothesis the situation is different. 
It commences with a contrasting presupposition: `If the situation is to be different, then 
the moment in time must have such decisive significance that for no moment will I be 
able to forget it, neither in time nor in eternity, because the eternal, previously non- 
existent, came into existence in that moment. '38 In this context `existence' is used by 
Climacus in a technical sense, solely with reference to that which falls within the 
limitations of historical and empirical reality. 39 According to this specific terminology, a 
transcendent God who is believed to be outside of the limits of space and time does not 
actually `exist' in this sense. Hence we read in the Postscript that `God does not exist, 
He is eternal'. 40 It can be seen now that, through the concept of the `eternal' coming 
, into existence'. Kierkegaard is gradually introducing the Incarnation into the argument 
in Fragments, although under the guise of Climacus' allegedly tentative `hypothesis'. 
The question still remains the same, `Can the truth be learned? ' Climacus now attempts 
to lead us in search of an answer that will avoid the numerous pitfalls of the `Socratic' 
hypothesis. He chooses to begin his theorizing by considering the state of the learner 
prior to his receiving the truth. 
37 Cupitt 1984,272-3 
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Sin as Ignorance 
According to the `Socratic' hypothesis, the problem of acquiring and understanding the 
truth is purely epistemic, not existential. It is also maintained that nobody is totally 
without the truth, hence nothing is excused on grounds of ignorance. This leads to the 
dilemma within the hypothesis, that, if truth is akin to knowledge, then either it is 
known, or it isn't - ignorance or knowledge, two logical alternatives. However, if we 
are to adhere to the theory of recollection, then it is to be held that the truth, as 
knowledge, is to be recollected from the hazy mists of an eternal memory and therefore 
is to a certain degree already known and so is within the learner. 
With the B hypothesis the position is different and crucial importance is attributed to the 
temporal event, or `the moment', at which the truth is discovered. It states that `if the 
moment is. to acquire decisive significance, then the seeker up until that moment must 
not have possessed the truth, not even in the form of ignorance, for in that case the 
moment becomes merely the moment of occasion'. 
41 If this is the case, and truth is 
absent from the learner, they may not be described as ignorant, as ignorance is too weak 
a term. From this the learner's position begins to appear more complicated than was at 
first assumed, 
Indeed, he must not even be a seeker. This is the way we have to state the 
difficulty if we do not want to explain it Socratically. Consequently, he has to be 
defined as being outside the truth (not coming towards it like a proselyte, but 
going away from it) or as untruth. He is, then, untruth. But how, then, is he to 
be reminded, or what would be the use of reminding him of what he has not 
known and consequently cannot call to mind? 42 
So the learner is not really a learner after all, and hence, is not in search of the truth in 
this context. If Climacus is to be believed the learner cannot therefore be merely 
without the truth, but even be in opposition to it. This thereby suggests an involvement 
of, not only the intellect, but of the will and through that to one of the whole person. 
This state, he admits, is that of sin. 
43 
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Sin as a Position 
In order to clarify this point I now wish to turn to the later pseudonym, Anti-Climacus. 
His position is contrasted to that of Climacus, `who said he was not a Christian. Anti- 
Climacus is the opposite extreme: a Christian on an extraordinary level. s, 44 In 7he 
Sickness Unto Death, the use of a more obviously Christian terminology betrays the real 
identity of the B hypothesis. Within this text Anti-Climacus discusses the Socratic view 
that `sin is ignorance', but it is evident that what is here referred to as `sin' is in fact 
similar to Climacus' concept of'untruth'. 4S Anti-Climacus is unable to rest content with 
this `Socratic' definition, quickly finding fault with its inability to clarify the origin and 
extent of this `ignorance'. 
The defect in the Socratic definition is its ambiguity as to how the ignorance 
itself is to be more definitely understood, its origin, etc. In other words, even if 
sin is ignorance (or what Christianity would rather call stupidity), which in one 
sense certainly cannot be denied - is this an original ignorance, is it therefore the 
state of someone who has not known and up until now has been capable of 
knowing anything about truth, or is it a resultant, a later ignorance? "' 
What is at issue here is whether ignorance is due to lack of ability, and therefore perhaps 
an innocent result of personality or circumstances, or, is it in any way deliberate? Anti- 
Climacus decides to opt for the latter, presupposing what he calls `the dogma of 
hereditary sin', 47 or `original sin' in more familiar language. In this case sin cannot be 
confined to ignorance alone and so he argues instead that, `it must lodge in a person's 
efforts to obscure his knowing. -P48 
In failing to see the will as contributing to sin, the `Socratic' hypothesis posits `an 
intellectual categorical imperative'. 49 By this Anti-Climacus is saying that the `Socratic' 
hypothesis `does not have the courage to declare that a person knowingly does wrong, 
knows what is right and does wrong; so it manages by saying: If a person does what is 
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wrong, he has not understood what is right. '50 The claim that we are responsible for our 
own sin is an unpleasant doctrine to the ears, especially if the listener is existing in an 
aesthetic or ethical life-view. Commenting on The Sickness Unto Death in his journal, 
Kierkegaard claims that the existence of sin has permeated human nature to such a 
degree that it has become `hidden': `Not merely that the one who has it, or that one who 
has it, may wish to hide it. No, the dreadfulness that it is so hidden that one may have it 
without knowing it. '51 It is not difficult to understand why the `Socratic' view is all the 
more appealing to the vast majority of people. 
Absolutely right. And no human being can come further than that; no man of 
himself and by himself can declare what sin is, precisely because he is in sin; all 
his talk about sin is basically a glossing over of sin, an excuse, a sinful watering 
down. That is why Christianity begins in another way: man has to learn what sin 
is by a revelation from God; sin is not a matter of a person's not having 
understood what is right but of his being unwilling to understand it, of his not 
willing what is right. 52 
Anti-Climacus' argument is that the `Socratic', in any of its varieties, fails to identify the 
real issue. When such `Socratic' beliefs occur within Christianity, `sin is made out to be 
something merely negative - weakness, sensuousness, finitude, ignorance, etc. '; and as a 
result `Christianity is flabby and spineless'. 
53 At this point Kierkegaard seems to be 
levelling his criticism against the Liberal Protestant teaching, largely derived from ; 
Schleiermacher, in which sin is really a product of our finitude and the lack of `God 
consciousness' within us. On a more Platonic note, he may also have had in mind the 
doctrine that evil is non-being. Advocated by some Platonic and Neoplatonic thinkers 
this was the teaching that evil is in itself merely the absence of the good, a belief that 
found its way into Hegelian Idealism. Sin, for both Schleiermacher and Hegel, is 
therefore a form of ignorance. By allowing for the fallen state of humanity, Anti- 
Climacus is clearly less ready to ascribe greatness and potential to a human reason that is 
contained within this fallenness. In itself reason is capable of grasping much of the truth, 
50Ibid. 95 
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but it is bound by the will, which itself is affected by sin, and there lies its most 
significant drawback. 
Under the effects of sin we exist in a state of `despair' (the `sickness unto death' itself) 
that prevents us from achieving our true nature. 54 The specific form of `despair' varies 
considerably, whether it becomes manifest as desperation, hopelessness or just plain 
apathy. Indeed, knowing Kierkegaard's opinion on the state of the average churchgoer 
in `Christendom', it comes as no surprise to read Anti-Climacus lament that: `Most men 
are characterized by a dialectic of indifference and live a life so far from the good (faith) 
that it is almost too spiritless to be called sin - indeed, almost too spiritless to be called 
despair. '55 Because of this and similar assertions, some scholars have tended to see in 
Anti-Climacus nothing but `a dry, humorless [sic], severe moralist'. 16 However this is 
certainly not the case as he cheerfully tells us that salvation is `humanly speaking, utterly 
impossible'. 57 Kierkegaard's Christian pseudonym was not one to lapse into strict 
moralism, nor was he to advocate salvation by works. Sin is not something to be 
overcome by human effort, and on this point Anti-Climacus stands within the 
Augustinian-Lutheran tradition. SB Sin's severity lies in the fact that it is `before God'. s9 
Sin is a `position' that refers to the existence of humanity, 60 it creates the barrier 
between humanity and God and only God can remove it. Through Anti-Climacus, 
Kierkegaard introduces the doctrine of the Atonement, and in so doing, raises the 
subject of a `paradox': 
The paradox is the implicit consequence of the doctrine of the Atonement. First 
of all, Christianity proceeds to establish sin so firmly as a position that the human 
understanding can never comprehend it; and then it is this same Christian 
teaching that undertakes to eliminate this position in such a way that the human 
understanding can never comprehend it. Speculation, which talks itself out of 
the paradoxes, snips off a little bit from both sides and thereby gets along more 
easily - it does not make sin quite so positive - but nevertheless cannot get it 
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through its head that sin is to be completely forgotten. But Christianity, which 
was the first to discover the paradoxes, is as paradoxical on this point as 
possible; it seems to be working against itself by establishing sin so firmly as a 
position that now it seems to be utterly impossible to eliminate it again - and then 
it is this very Christianity that by means of the Atonement wants to eliminate sin 
as completely as if it were drowned in the sea. 61 
The reasoning behind Kierkegaard's decision to refer to the Atonement, alongside other 
Christian doctrines, as a `paradox' will be examined in some detail in the next chapter. 
For the moment, however, let us return to Climacus in order to see how he introduces 
the Incarnation into his B hypothesis. 
3. The Moment in Time 
Returning again to Fragments, Climacus continues to develop the B hypothesis into the 
form of an Incarnational theology of revelation. It is to be maintained that this 
Christocentric approach is, not only the basis, but the defining factor for Kierkegaard's 
theological position as a whole. To fail to give enough significance to the Incarnation as 
the decisive Christian revelation is to omit the central tenet of Kierkegaard's faith. 
In keeping with his style, Kierkegaard is careful to omit any traditional Christological 
terminology in the texts attributed to Climacus. Instead, he permits his pseudonym 
casually to introduce the notion of `the teacher' to solve the various inadequacies of the 
`Socratic' view. 
Now if the learner is to obtain the truth, the teacher must bring it to him, but not 
only that. Along with it, he must provide him with the condition for 
understanding it, for if the learner were himself the condition for understanding 
the truth, then he merely needs to recollect, because the condition for 
understanding the truth is like being able to ask about it - the condition and the 
question contain the conditioned and the answer. 62 
Within this context the teacher is capable, not only of bringing truth to the learner, but 
also making him aware of his own untruth (or even his need for the truth). In addition 
61 Ibid 
62 PF 14 
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he enables the learner to understand it by means of a `condition' not already possessed. 
This process of communication is far more extensive than mere teaching, otherwise we 
remain within the `Socratic' hypothesis 63 
The B hypothesis begins to take on a greater resemblance of Christianity as Climacus 
clarifies the nature and role of the teacher: 
But the one who not only gives the learner the truth but provides the condition is 
not a teacher. Ultimately, all instruction depends upon the presence of the 
condition; if it is lacking, then a teacher is capable of nothing, because in the 
second case, the teacher, before beginning to teach, must transform, not reform 
the learner. But no human being is capable of doing this; if it is to take place, it 
must be done by the god himself. 64 
This reliance upon divine transformation and the centrality of the Incarnation was 
something Kierkegaard sought to emphasize at great length throughout his authorship, 
both indirectly (through the Climacus and the Anti-Climacus texts) and directly. Due to 
this it is possible to see that the problem of the possibility of natural theology is not so 
much philosophical as existential. By that I would mean that Kierkegaard takes the 
issue of the fallen learner as a whole, not that of reason viewed in isolation. This is 
supported by the fact that the learner's original state is one of sin, not just ignorance. 
There is therefore an intrinsic link between this subject and Kierkegaard's soteriology, 
and it is impossible to separate these two topics in his thought. Hence, `the teacher, 
then, is the god himself, who, acting as the occasion, prompts the learner to be reminded 
that he is untruth and is that through his own fault. But this state - to be untruth and to 
be that through one's own fault - what can we call it? Let us call it sin. '65 The power of 
sin is such that only the god as teacher can set the learner free from it. Climacus 
continues, 
What, then, should we call such a teacher who gives him the condition again and 
along with it the truth? Let us call him a savior, for he does indeed save the 
learner from unfreedom, saves him from himself. Let us call him a deliverer, for 
he does indeed deliver the person who had imprisoned himself, and no one is so 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid. 14-15 
65 Ibid. 15 
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dreadfully imprisoned, and no captivity is so impossible to break out of as that in 
which the individual holds himself captive! And yet, even this does not say 
enough, for by his unfreedom he had indeed become guilty of something, and if 
the teacher gives him the condition and the truth, then he is, of course, a 
reconciler who takes away the wrath that lay over the incurred guilt. " 
Climacus' hypothesizing has now moved on to include soteriology along with 
Christology. Through the transforming presence of Christ, the learner is able to 
recognize his sin and begin a new life of repentance. As Murray Rae points out, in the 
New Testament such a transition is µsti&vota, referring to the transformation of our 
minds in addition as our consciences. 67 Rae continues, stating that, `In this moment of 
revelation and confession [the learner] is transformed. He experiences metanoia, which 
is to say that his understanding of Jesus is no longer to be shaped by his prior categories 
nor constrained by a prior paradigm. Rather, his understanding of everything else is 
now to be shaped by this Jesus who is also his Lord. '68 Commenting on Climacus's 
argument, Evans observes, that, if any reader was in doubt as to the implicit Christianity 
behind the text, by now `it is fair to say that the ironical character of the whole 
enterprise of "inventing" the B hypothesis begins to show through rather clearly' 69 
The vital point at which this B hypothesis, or rather Christianity, differs radically from 
any `Socratic' view is that the historical actuality of Christ cannot in any way be 
`accidental'. Kierkegaard's Incarnational Christianity stands in sharp contrast to any 
claim that there should be a humanistic `religion of Jesus' in which the person of Christ 
is seen to be of passing interest in favour of the `eternal' value of his moral teaching. 
Several years later Kierkegaard was to clarify this through Anti-Climacus in Practice in 
Christianity. 
66 Ibid. 17 
61 Rae 1997,142. cf. Romans 12: 2. Rae likens the transformation brought about through µET&vota to 
that of a scientific paradigm shift in that: 
Human sinfulness is radical and renders the individual utterly dependent upon God. An 
inadequate paradigm in science may well be construed as a kind of bondage just as sin is 
described as bondage in Philosophical Fragments, but not least among the emphasis in [the] 
account of the structure of scientific revolutions is that scientists have the capacity to overcome 
such bondage. .. Such capacity is denied in the Kierkegaardian account of Christian 
conversion for which the condition is a gift given by God. (Ibid. 143). 
68 Ibid. 149 
69 Evans 1992,37 
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The teacher ... is inseparable from and more essential than the teaching ... But 
in our day everything is made abstract and everything personal is abolished: we 
take Christ's teaching - and abolish Christ. This is to abolish Christianity, for 
Christ is a person and is the teacher who is more important than the teaching. - 
Just as Christ's life, the fact that he has lived, is vastly more important than all 
the results of his life ..., so also is Christ infinitely more important than his 
teaching. It is true only of a human being that his teaching is more important 
than he himself, to apply this to Christ is a blasphemy, inasmuch as it makes him 
into only a human being. 70 
The historically real event of Christ's existence cannot be swept aside in order to retain 
only a few tenets of His teaching. Kierkegaard vigorously upholds a religion of the 
Incarnation in which the personal, active God takes the initiative with humanity. Clearly 
this passage refers to Christology as well as having fundamental significance for 
Kierkegaard's verdict upon natural theology. These are, for Kierkegaard, one and the 
same thing. However, it is my intention to tackle the subject of his actual Christology 
per se in later chapters. I wish to confine the present discussion to the implications of 
this Incarnational basis of Kierkegaard's critique of natural theology. 
If it is the case that it is primarily through God Incarnate that religious truth is revealed 
and comprehended (by means of this as yet unnamed `condition'), then is Kierkegaard 
criticizing the very possibility of natural theology? It is generally agreed amongst 
Kierkegaard scholars that the divinely-given `condition' for receiving and understanding 
religious truth is faith. According to Niels Thulstrupp in his commentary on Fragments, 
`Here Kierkegaard clearly gives allegiance to the Evangelical-Reformed doctrine of 
testimonium Spriritus Sancti internem, the inner witness of the Holy Spirit. '7' This 
therefore posits a definite divine initiative. An emphasis upon God as the subject of 
revelation suggests a reversal of the process of human research and enquiry. In this 
situation God ceases to be an object anticipating our discovery and is instead both the 
origin and end of that search. To remove the active role of God is to prohibit the very 
process of enquiry itself - as without faith the learner would not begin. This would 
suggest a composite nature of faith as the condition: through faith we are led to seek 
7° PC 123-4 
71 PF 1962,190 
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God, enabled to recognize him as the source of truth, and, to recognize that truth when 
revealed by him to us. Yet faith is given before we ask, as the very act of asking 
requires the presence of faith in the first place and so cannot be attributed to human 
agency. I do not wish to claim that Kierkegaard is implying that the learner is entirely 
passive, as will be shown later he suggests quite the reverse. Instead he constantly 
argues for a divine initiative, without which the reason is powerless. His concern is to 
dispel the myth of human autonomy and to assert the indispensability of a real faith in a 
God who acts for our salvation. However, a reliance upon faith in this context has led 
some to argue that for Kierkegaard faith is blind and hence it `requires us to put logic 
aside'. n At first glance an examination of the text could appear to give support to this 
assertion as Climacus gently introduces the term `paradox' into the discussion. 
If a human being is to come truly to know something about the unknown (the 
god), he must first come to know that it is different from him, absolutely 
different from him. The understanding cannot come to know this by itself... if 
it is going to know this, it must come to know this from the god, and if it does 
come to know this, it cannot understand this and consequently cannot come to 
know this, for how could it understand the absolutely different? If this is not 
immediately clear, then it will become more clear from the corollary, for if the 
god is absolutely different from a human being, then a human being is absolutely 
different from the god - but how is the understanding to grasp this? At this point 
we seem to stand at a paradox. Just to come to know that the god is the 
different, man needs the god and then comes to know that the god is absolutely 
different from him. But if the god is to be absolutely different from a human 
being, this can have its basis not in that which man owes to the god ... 
but in 
that which he owes to himself or in that which he himself has committed. What, 
then, is the difference? Indeed, what else but sin, since the difference, the 
absolute difference, must have been caused by the individual himself 7' 
However, it can be seen that there is no claim here that either the content or the 
revelation of religious knowledge is irrational. Instead what is asserted is that 
knowledge of God must be revealed by God. As Murray Rae puts it, Kierkegaard is 
showing the importance of `a relational epistemology ... an epistemology, 
in other 
72 Blandshard 1974,241 
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words, which finds the condition for learning the Truth, not within the self, but in that 
which is given by God'. 74 This is not a metaphysical dilemma resulting from a difference 
where the natural has no access to the supernatural. Kierkegaard has not alleged that 
humanity and the transcendent God are so far apart as to prohibit communication. 
Instead, `we will not rightly interpret [Climacus'] account of reason and the paradox in 
the Fragments if we overlook that sin, and not finitude, lies at the crux of the issue. '" 
The acceptance of the noetic effects of sin forms the focal-point of Kierkegaard's 
critique of natural theology. As I intend to show in the next chapter, it provides pivotal 
information about one of his reasons for describing the Incarnation as, not only a 
paradox, but `the Absolute Paradox'. 
74 Rae 1997,147 
75 Westphal 1991,111; cf. also Mullen 1995,146 
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KIERKEGAARD'S CHRISTOLOGY 1: 
THE ABSOLUTE PARADOX 
It is now appropriate to investigate what is undeniably the most problematic term to be 
found in Kierkegaard's theology. At the centre of Kierkegaard's religious thought 
stands the reality of the Incarnation of the Gpd-man, `the Absolute Paradox' of Jesus 
Christ. ' I have already outlined how Kierkegaard denies the possibility of obtaining a 
real knowledge of God without the revelation of God incarnate. Following on from this, 
I have also argued that we cannot speak fully of Kierkegaard's Christology without 
incorporating his soteriology. However, his decision to adopt the `meta-concept' of `the 
Absolute Paradox' for the Incarnation has frequently presented difficulties for his would 
be interpreters. It is sometimes said that the classical Chalcedonian doctrine of the 
Incarnation is a paradoxical attempt to link logical opposites together, such as time and 
eternity, or humanity and deity. 2 When Kierkegaard is heard to refer to Christ as `the 
Absolute Paradox', he is usually interpreted as claiming that such opposites as these 
cannot be linked. We therefore appear to be faced with two clear alternatives: either, 
we are being invited to reject the classical doctrine of the Incarnation on the grounds of 
its alleged irrationality; or, we are being asked to embrace it whilst uttering the 
notorious Tertullianesque dictum 'credo quia absurdum' in our defence. 
I must admit that neither of these two options is in any way appealing. It is my intention 
to show that both are wholly against the spirit of what Kierkegaard himself wrote and 
believed in, so within this chapter I intend to offer a detailed examination of his reasons 
for referring to Christ as `the Absolute Paradox'. In so doing, I will show how, contrary 
to the views of some of his more hostile critics, `he both described an ancient tradition 
and set theology upon a new and promising path. '3 First, I will discuss some 
philosophical uses of the term `paradox', in particular those as put forward by A. J. Ayer 
and Bertrand Russell. This will serve to explain the presuppositions of British and 
1 J&P 3074, IV C 84 n. d., 1842-43; Ibid 3077, IV A 116 n. d., 1843 
2 Cf. Macquarie 1990,164f 
3 McKinnon 1988,181 
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American scholars who approach Kierkegaard's writings from the philosophical 
background of the Analytic tradition. In the second section I will illustrate the context 
of Kierkegaard's own uses of `paradox' with particular reference to the influence of 
Gotthold Lessing, in addition to that of German Idealism. The third section will present 
some treatment of the nature and level of the term `mystery' as is found in some 
classical, patristic Christologies. Examples will be taken from Tertullian, Hilary of 
Poitiers, Athanasius and the Chalcedonian Definition of Faith formulated in AD 451. 
The fourth section will conclude the chapter by considering how Kierkegaard's use of 
`paradox' is related to `mystery' in the context of such early Christologies, and from this 
whether he remains within the framework of Chalcedonian orthodoxy on this point. 
1. Paradoxes and Contradictions 
The Oxford English Reference Dictionary, defines `paradox' as: `1 aa seemingly absurd 
or contradictory statement, even if actually well-founded. ba self-contradictory or 
essentially absurd statement. 2a person or thing conflicting with a preconceived notion 
of what is reasonable or possible. 3a paradoxical quality or character. ' Very often we 
find that `paradox' is interpreted in the first of the above senses, thereby equating it with 
a logical (or formal) contradiction, or a self-contradiction. It is therefore taken to be a 
negative term, being in this sense something that is contrary to reason. If this is the 
case, a paradox, or contradiction, `is by definition untrue; it differs from other 
falsehoods only in that it is something which never was, never will be, and never could 
be true. '4 An example of something in this category would be a square circle, as the 
properties of a circle are totally incompatible with those of a square. It is therefore by 
definition necessarily self-contradictory and so is logically incoherent. 
Formal Contradictions and Meaningless Statements 
A famous example of a paradox in the sense of a formal contradiction is `the 
Epimenides', also known as `the Liar Paradox'. Bertrand Russell discusses this paradox 
in his essay `Mathematical Logic as Based on The Theory of Types'. He described it as 
follows: `Epimenides the Cretan said that all Cretans were liars, and all other statements 
4 Sturch 1991,17-18 
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made by Cretans were certainly lies. Was this a lie? The simplest form of this 
contradiction is afforded by the man who says "I am lying"; if he is lying, he is speaking 
the truth, and vice versa. 's This is a self-contradiction because it is self-referential. 
Russell goes on to clarify the nature of this particular paradox in more detail: 
When a man says `I am lying', we may interpret his statement as: `There is a 
proposition which I am affirming and which is false'. All statements that `there 
is so-and-so' may be regarded as denying that the opposite is always true; thus `I 
am lying' becomes: `It is not true of all propositions that either I am not 
affirming them or they are true'; in other words, `It is not true for all 
propositions p that if I affirm p, p is true'. The paradox results from regarding 
the statement as affirming a proposition, which must therefore come within the 
scope of the statement. This, however, makes it evident that the notion of `all 
propositions' is illegitimate; for otherwise, there must be propositions (such as 
above) which are about all propositions, and yet can not, without contradiction, 
be included among the propositions they are about. Whatever we suppose to be 
the totality of propositions, statements about this totality generates new 
propositions which, on pain of contradiction, must lie outside the totality. It is 
useless to enlarge the totality, for that equally enlarges the scope of statements 
about the totality. Hence there must be no totality of propositions, and `all 
propositions' must be a meaningless phrase .6 
So, with a linguistic attempt to do the impossible, the result has been a statement that is 
found to be, not only contradictory, but meaningless. 
Similar objections were made against theological statements in the Logical Positivism of 
A. J. Ayer. According to Ayer, `any transcendent truths of religion', (by which he infers 
to such supposed metaphysical obscurities as theistic belief, the hope of eternal life, etc. ) 
immediately fall into this rather unpleasant category of meaningless statements. He 
made this damaging claim in Language, Truth and Logic, from which the following 
passage is also taken: 
For we are often told that the nature of God is a mystery which transcends the 
human understanding. But to say that something transcends the human 
S Russell 1992,59 
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understanding is to say that it is unintelligible, and what is unintelligible cannot 
significantly be described. Again, we are told that God is not an object of reason 
but an object of faith. This may be nothing more than an admission that the 
existence of God must be taken on trust, since it cannot be proved. But it may 
also be an assertion that God is the object of a purely mystical intuition, and 
cannot therefore be defined in terms which are intelligible to reason. And I think 
that there are many theists who would assert this. But if one allows that it is 
possible to define God in intelligible terms, then one is allowing that it is 
impossible for a sentence both to be significant and to be about God. If a mystic 
admits that the object of his vision is something which cannot be described, then 
he must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it. 7 
If this really is the case then, we are to view the vast majority of theological truth claims 
in a similar manner to the `Liar Paradox', and so understand them to be both self- 
contradictory and unintelligible. No sooner does any person, whether theistic believer or 
otherwise, begin to talk about God, than she must admit that such language is 
incoherent. Hence, for the Logical Positivist, God-talk becomes impossible as it can 
only lead us `into paradox and incomprehensibility'! 
`Sublime Paradoxes' 
Paradox, in the senses discussed so far, has been seen to denote an occasion where 
language has gone out of bounds. Such a paradox contravenes the rules of logic, and 
therefore by virtue of this, runs straight into absurdity. If Ayer is to be taken at his 
word, then most religious language can be rejected for these very reasons. With such a 
hostile verdict in mind, we would naturally interpret Kierkegaard's writings as denying 
the logical possibility of the central doctrine of the Christian faith: the Incarnation. 
However, as the period of Kierkegaard's authorship pre-dates the rise of this particular 
form of philosophy by some time, it might be somewhat inappropriate to interpret his 
texts as if he shared the same, pseudo-scientific views about language. We cannot 
expect Kierkegaard to employ the manner of philosophical discourse and reasoning that 
developed out of British empiricism and into, say for instance, the Logical Positivism of 
' Ayer 1980,155 
$ Ferre 1961,32 
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the early twentieth century. Yet his critics appear to judge his use of language as if he 
did, and in so doing reach their negative interpretations. 
As I explained in the first chapter, Kierkegaard's use of language arose largely out of 
Romanticism. As such it is highly rhetorical, being designed for anything but the 
precision and near mathematical accuracy that is demanded by many contemporary 
Anglo-Saxon philosophers. Like any figure in the history of ideas, it is important that 
his writings be considered as products of their times and hence be interpreted in that 
context. As Frederick Ferre states, we must be critical of `the readiness of many 
philosophers to place a narrow or unsympathetic interpretation on the traditional 
terminology of theology, seeking to force words which were coined in earlier centuries 
into the contemporary technical vocabulary - and expressing shocked surprise at the 
resulting logical confusion! '9 We ought therefore to be careful in such matters of 
interpretation. As Gustav Aulen argues, the meaning of religious statements (or, to use 
his term, `statements of faith') is dependent upon the specific religious contexts in which 
they occur. Taking these particular statements out of their contexts and then attempting 
to turn them into general religious propositions can all too easily result in a loss of 
meaning. 10 
So, could we in fact understand `paradox' in a less constrictive sense than has been 
described so far, or is it to remain merely a univocal term devoid of alternative 
meanings? `When is a contradiction not a mere contradiction', asks R. W. Hepburn, `but 
a sublime Paradox, a Mystery? How can we distinguish a viciously muddled confusion 
of concepts from an excusably stammering attempt to describe what has been glimpsed 
during some "raid on the inarticulate", an object too great for our comprehension, but 
none the less real for that? " If we return to the definitions of paradox provided in the 
dictionary we can see that one of them is `a seemingly absurd or contradictory 
statement, even if actually well-founded'. Within this category we may include 
statements which, although they may appear to be contradictory, are actually supported 
by logical grounds, however tenuous these may at first appear to be. Hepburn draws 
9 Ibid. 42 
10 Aulen 1970b, 138. Cf. also T. F. Torrance's discussion of coherence-statements for further 
clarification. (Torrance 1996,179). 
11 Hepburn 1958,17 
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parallels with certain scientific theories, which, in their earlier formulations appeared to 
contain mutually exclusive principles. For instance, light had to be technically explained 
by both wave and particle movements, even though they at first seemed to be 
incompatible. Yet it is accepted in modern scientific thinking that both are required in 
order to construct a viable hypothesis. If we were to renounce either element `in favour 
of conceptual tidiness and freedom from paradox', we would be denying a vital part of 
its composition. We never hear of anybody rejecting the factual existence of light 
because of the logical difficulties perceived in forming an all embracing theory! 12 
The same claim can be made in defence of religious language, especially when 
attempting to describe the nature of God. In this context it is claimed that paradoxes 
arise from our attempts to explain various phenomena, or a greater reality, beyond our 
normal range of experience. 13 It does not logically follow from this that the religious 
truth-claims in question become nonsensical as a result. Our knowledge might be 
incomplete at this stage of the enquiry, or our language found to be inadequate to the 
task assigned. Yet this is all because we are trying to grasp something standing beyond, 
and not against, the reaches of our intellects. Aulen cites the relationship between grace 
and works in the Lutheran doctrine of salvation as a prime theological example of this 
case. Although exhortations to do good works, to repent, etc., might easily make sense 
12 Ibid. 17ff 
13 As Christoph Schw6bel points out, this is hardly a new claim in the history of Christian theology. 
However, according to Schwöbel the reasons behind it are more far reaching than have been given here. 
He states that, 
The fact that certain configurations of problems and the philosophical antinomies, paradoxes 
and confusions they contain regularly return in the history of the rational exposition of the 
Christian understanding of God points to more than the limitations of human reason and the 
inexhaustibility of the subject-matter of theological and philosophical reflection. The 
reappearance of the antinomies and paradoxes after every attempt at resolving them seems to 
indicate that we have to deal here with structural problems of the Christian understanding of 
God Structural problems can be seen as such problems which do not arise from a specific 
conceptual exposition of the Christian conception of God (there remain enough of those), but 
which appear in every such exposition, because they belong to the basic constitution of the 
Christian conception of God. Without the element constituting these problems the Christian 
view of God could not be authentically and plausibly expounded. Structural problems are 
distinguished from other kinds of problems by the fact that every attempt at offering a solution 
for them can only be seen as adequate if it also justifies why the problem could appear in the 
first place. The justification of the problem in its attempted solution indicates that the initial 
problem was not simply a mistake, but arises out of the genuine aspects of the situation which 
is seen as problematical, calling for a resolution. (Schwöbel 1992,46). 
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to humanity, the nature of divine grace and forgiveness is not so easily grasped. As he 
explains, 
It states that the action of divine love is not based on any performance from the 
side of man, that this love accepts man, unworthy as he is and fundamentally 
wholly unacceptable. This would entirely lose its religious meaning if it were 
subjected to rationalizing interpretations, whether they attempted to discover 
some human qualifications or to develop the idea that through Christ God was 
given some compensation or satisfaction. In either case God's agape would 
cease to be what it is for faith: wholly undeserved and therefore 
incomprehensible, a mystery. " 
It is therefore important not to reject some apparently contradictory concepts out of 
hand. As he continues, 
When used in the context of a doctrine, the word [i. e. `paradox'] means that this 
content cannot be rationally explained, and that we have not the ability to 
interpret it and give an adequate description of it. But this does not necessarily 
mean that the linguistic form in which the doctrine is clothed need be paradoxical 
in the sense of being logically contradictory. So the word `paradox' occurs in 
two quite different senses, and it is the confusion of these two that gives it an 
ambiguous character. " 
The existence of paradoxes in this context must be embraced as a challenge to the 
intellect, not rejected as the objects of scorn. 16 In such situations we are forced to 
reconsider the of our strength methods and the validity of our presuppositions. Only by 
doing this can it be ascertained whether the paradox in question really is a paradox, or 
merely a mistake. '7 This is, I believe, a vital consideration to be born in mind when 
seeking to interpret Kierkegaard's use of the term. As he put it in an early entry into his 
journal, `Paradox is the real pathos of the intellectual life, and just as only great souls are 
exposed to passions, so only great thinkers are exposed to what I call paradoxes, which 
are nothing other than rudimentary majestic thoughts. i18 
14 Aulen 1970b, 139; cf. also Ibid. 132 
is Ibid. 140 
16 Fehe 1961,46-7 
17 Cf. T. F. Torrance 1996,179-180 
18 J&P 3070, hA 755 n. d., 1838 
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2. The Incarnation as `the Absolute Paradox' 
Moving on now to Kierkegaard's Christology, I intend to show how `the Absolute 
Paradox' of the Incarnation is in fact what he also refers to as the `moment in time', 
something which I discussed in the last chapter, and, as such is the core of Kierkegaard's 
theology. Donald Baillie relates how, because of this, Kierkegaard's thought `has been 
described as par excellence "the theology of paradox"'. 19 However, `paradox' is a word 
used only rarely by Kierkegaard in his published, signed works, and it is entirely absent 
from the homiletic Upbuilding Discourses. Instead it is far more commonly found in the 
vocabulary of the early pseudonyms, the study of which still dominates Kierkegaard 
scholarship, to the frequent disregard of the later (and in my view, to a certain extent, 
better) works which more accurately reflect his own theology. A careful read through 
the aesthetic literature would show that Kierkegaard employs `paradox' in several 
contexts through different pseudonyms. For instance, in the lyrical Fear and Trembling, 
Johannes de Silentio stands aghast at Abraham's `prodigious paradox of faith'. 20 But 
this is not a reference to the nature and subject of the Christian faith, but to `the purely 
personal definition of existential faith', that is to say `faith' in more general, broadly 
religious terms. 21 It is in the writings attributed to Johannes Climacus that we first 
encounter a pseudonym referring to paradox in the context of Christianity. 
But w. the real `theology of paradox' - Kierkegaard's, Climacus', or both of them? ) 
I have ready tackled the problem of irony and the pseudonyms in the first chapter. 
There I came to the conclusion that, whilst we must take seriously such warnings as The 
Point of View and the disclaimer in the Postscript that `in the pseudonymous books 
there is not a single word by me', 22Kierkegaard's name does still appear on their title 
pages as the `editor' of both of the Climacus texts. There is therefore something within 
them that he wishes to convey that is at least in some ways close to his own beliefs. 
Regarding the problem of `paradox', Alastair McKinnon argues that, `whereas the 
pseudonyms repeatedly use the terms absurd and paradox, Kierkegaard himself can 
write about Christian belief at length without ever using these terms. '23 This is because 
19 D. M. Baillie 1963,107 
20 F&T 53 
21J&P 11, X B80n. d., 1850 
22 CUP 1: 626 
23 McKinnon 1988,192 
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these particular pseudonyms `find Christianity absurd or paradoxical primarily because 
they are not themselves Christians. By the same token Kierkegaard has no use for these 
terms because in some sense he writes from within Christianity. ' 24 
Although I do agree with him on the non-Christian perspectives of the pseudonyms, it is 
surprising that McKinnon refuses to give significant weight to the numerous occasions 
paradox occurs in a Christian context throughout the Journals. The entries are dated 
from the late 1830s till the last year of Kierkegaard's life and they provide numerous 
valuable insights into his theological development. We therefore cannot dismiss the 
existence of `paradox' from Kierkegaard's thought on the grounds that it is merely to be 
attributed to the pseudonyms. Because of this, in order to find references to `the 
Absolute Paradox' of the Incarnation we will not only turn our attention to Climacus' B 
hypothesis (referred to as Religiousness B in the Postscript), but also to relevant 
material from the Journals. I will begin by offering some criticisms of the traditional 
interpretations of `the Absolute Paradox' in which it is taken to be a formal 
contradiction. After that, I will move on to offer a revisionist view in which I examine 
the alleged contradictions of Kierkegaard's two natures Christology, first with regard to 
time and eternity, and then as regards the concepts of humanity and deity. From this, it 
will be seen that, the issue in question is not so much one of finitude, but of human 
perspectives on sin and salvation. 
On whether the Absolute Paradox is a Formal Contradiction 
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript Climacus tells us that, `the thesis that God has 
existed in human form, was born, grew up, etc. is certainly the paradox sensu 
strictissimo, the absolute paradox. '2' And in Fragments he discusses `the coming into 
existence of such a paradox, or, as you put it, in the god's planting himself in human 
form'. 26 According to the traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard's writings, the 
statement that God became an individual man presents us with a formal contradiction in 
the terms explained in the previous section. For instance, it has been argued that 
'Kierkegaard's expositions look like a thorough elaboration of Tertullian's famous 
24 Ibid; cf. also Ibid 214 
u CUP 1: 217 
26PF107 
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saying: Credo quid absurdum'. 27 This is on the grounds that we are being asked to 
believe in something impossible, that is to say that an eternal God could enter time and 
take the finite form of a single human being. In a similar vein, Alastair Hannay claims `it 
is contradictory to talk of an eternal historical fact'. 28 Patrick Gardiner agrees with this 
interpretation, saying that: 
Such a conception is paradoxical. Indeed, according to Kierkegaard, it 
represents what he calls `the Absolute Paradox'. For it requires us to believe 
that there is a moment at which the eternal enters the temporal sphere, taking on 
the limitations of finite existence, and this seems to involve a manifest 
impossibility, something that cannot be accommodated within the bounds of 
human thought and comprehension. 29 
Returning to Hannay's argument, we hear that the Incarnation is to be regarded as 
paradoxical on the grounds that `eternity' is to be understood as `timelessness' as 
opposed to `everlasting duration'. According to Hannay, 
The paradox presents itself as a direct breach of the general logical principle that 
nothing can simultaneously have and lack the same property. The property in 
question can be named `possessing spatio-temporal boundaries', or `having 
either or both a beginning and/or an end' and it is ascribed to the eternal, which 
by definition has no duration and lacks both a beginning and an end. I am 
assuming that the concept of eternity here is not that of infinite succession or 
everlasting existence, i. e. `sempiternity' which is a limiting case of duration, but 
that of the eternal in contrast to time, i. e. timelessness (Plato's ali voS or 
Parmenides' tib ev). In other words, I assume we are to think of the eternal here 
as that in which all temporal distinctions vanish or are illusory. 30 
Similar arguments can be found across the breadth of Kierkegaard scholarship, serving 
to make this the most widely accepted interpretation. 31 What these scholars have in 
2'Brandt 1966,68 
28 Hannay 1991,106 
29 Gardiner 1988,71 
30 Hannay 1991,107 
31 Other notable examples include Louis Pojman The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's philosophy 
of Religion (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1984) 89,102, where he argues that `the 
Absolute Paradox' is a self-contradiction. Focusing on the Postscript, Herbert Garelick's The Anti- 
Christianity of Kierkegaard (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965) maintains that 'God-man' is a 
nonsensical statement resulting from the linking of man and not-man (P =m+ -m) which violates both 
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common is the belief that Climacus' paradox revolves around the antithetical 
juxtapositioning of the concepts of time and eternity. This is taken as the most 
significant difference between humanity and deity, something which therefore constitutes 
the stumbling block that stands before any acceptance the doctrine of the Incarnation. 
The Absolute Paradox as an Apparent Contradiction 
Contrary to the above interpretations, it is my argument that a closer reading of the 
Climacus texts will reveal an altogether different understanding of `the Absolute 
Paradox'. It will be seen that, according to Climacus in Fragments, the Incarnation is 
actually held to be paradoxical on two separate accounts: 
In order for the teacher to be able to give the condition, he must be the god, and 
in order to put the learner in possession of it, he must be man. This 
contradiction is in turn the object of faith and is the paradox, the moment. That 
the god once and for all has given man the condition is the eternal Socratic 
presupposition, which does not clash inimically with time but is incommensurable 
with the categories of temporality. But the contradiction is that he receives the 
condition in the moment, and, since it is a condition for the understanding of 
eternal truth, it is eo ipso the eternal condition. If this is not the structure, then 
we are left with Socratic recollection. 32 
This passage echoes the earlier claim that the paradox results from the unity of humanity 
and deity, but, it adds to it the second, also `paradoxical' fact that the `eternal condition' 
is received in `the moment'. I now wish to examine both of these reasons in some detail 
and show how the traditional interpretation, although so often popular with scholars, is 
mistaken. 
(a) Humanity and Deity 
On the alleged paradox of God becoming man, the first task is to deny the charge that 
Kierkegaard's use of the term `paradox' implies a formal contradiction as explained at 
the beginning of the chapter. In his recent study of Kierkegaard's Fragments entitled 
reason and common sense. (Garelick 1965,28f). Further support is rendered to this interpretation in 
the recent article by Ed. L. Miller `At the Centre of Kierkegaard: An Objective Uncertainty', Religious 
Studies 33 (1997) 433-441. 
32 PF 62 
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Passionate Reason, C. Stephen Evans argues that Climacus is in fact referring to an 
apparent contradiction. Evans identifies the major weakness in the traditional 
interpretation, namely, that in order for Climacus to claim convincingly that the 
proposition `God became a human being' is a logical contradiction, he must be able to 
show that `God' and `human being' are mutually exclusive predicates. 33 However, 
Climacus never attempts to offer such clarification. Chapter III of Fragments, `the 
Absolute Paradox', begins by describing Socrates' ignorance of human nature, and it 
then moves on to show how Climacus believes that his contemporaries are, to a certain 
extent, just as ignorant. 34 Although he gladly remarks on this ignorance in others, there 
is no indication from the text that he is able to furnish a philosophically credible 
definition himself, and so it appears that Climacus is just as ignorant as they. This might 
come as a surprise when we consider that Kierkegaard's thought offers many deep and 
penetrating insights into human nature. As the author of two great psychological works 
(The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death) we could be forgiven for 
expecting something more detailed. However, Climacus is only being used as a means 
to convey the fact that, however much we do know, we do not possess perfect 
knowledge, hence some aspects of human nature could well remain a permanent mystery 
to US. 35 
Added to this, Climacus' theism in Fragments is at best imprecise. On the question of 
God's nature he is largely agnostic, at times referring to God as `the god', and at other 
times simply as `the unknown'. 36 In fact, Kierkegaard purposefully leaves Climacus' 
theism largely undeveloped in Fragments as an indication of the allegedly experimental 
33 Evans 1992,103 
' PF 37f. Climacus `bold proposition' in this passage: 'let us assume that we all know what a human 
being is', is quite ironic in that he is only confident that his readers can differentiate human beings from 
other animals or inanimate objects! See for instance his comments in the footnote: 'I still wonder if in 
our age the matter has been clarified in such a way that it does not need to feel a bit uneasy about itself 
at the thought of poor Socrates and his awkward position. ' (Ibid. 38fn). 
35 Some insights from Kierkegaard's anthropology are quite useful here. In The Sickness Unto Death 
Anti-Climacus states that, 'A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal 
and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. ' (SUD 13). Likewise, in the Journals 
he puts it that, `every man is a synthesis, is animal-spirit', and also, 'Man is a synthesis. He is an 
animal, but there is also a possibility of something divine in him. ' (J&P 87, XI 1A 408 n. d., 1854; 
Ibid. 83, XI 1A 358 n. d., 1854). In another journal entry Kierkegaard does suggest that spiritual and 
corporeal natures conflict, yet this is not within the context of metaphysics but of Christian living. 
(Ibid. 4354, XI 1A 558 n. d., 1854; Kierkegaard also refers to this as the `complete qualitative 
difference between being spirit-man and animal-man. ' Ibid. 81 XI 1A 225 n. d., 1854). In view of this, 
would it not seem that human nature is just as mysterious as the God-man? 
36 Ibid. 39 
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nature of the argument and of Climacus' non-Christian, aesthetic stance. Those in 
search of Kierkegaard's own beliefs regarding the nature of God would be better 
directed towards the Journals, the Upbuilding Discourses or Practice in Christianity, 
all of which illustrate a traditional Christian theism, (although this is normally implicit 
within the content of what is said rather than forming the main subject under 
discussion). 37 Although Kierkegaard did not share the agnosticism of Climacus, he uses 
this pseudonym to illustrate the impossibility of human attempts to know the essential 
nature of God apart from that revealed by the Incarnation. Even with this revelation we 
can only know in part. It can therefore be seen that Evans makes a valid objection, and 
this can stand as the first point against the traditional interpretation. 
A further objection may be derived from this point, namely the fact that, by definition, a 
formal contradiction is composed of elements that are within reason. 38 However, as 
God is `the unknown' in Climacus' eyes, he admits that he is confronted with a subject 
beyond the scope of his understanding, and so in a sense above reason. He is therefore 
unable to make confident assertions regarding the nature of God as he lacks both the 
faith and the knowledge to do so with any sense of certainty. The `paradox' occurs 
when this unknown God chooses to make Himself known in and through the 
Incarnation. 39 Such a revelation contradicts Climacus' previous assumptions regarding 
the nature and existence of God. He prefers to keep a certain distance between himself 
and what he discusses, and in so doing we are reminded that `he is engaged not in 
theological reflection but in a thought experiment. His fundamental presuppositions 
exclude the possibility that his position can be Christian. ' Because of this, `the mystery 
of the Incarnation, of divine grace, eludes him. 40 The Incarnation appears to be 
paradoxical, partly because Climacus does not understand it, and partly because he does 
not want to understand it. It is ironic that Climacus' very comments betray the fact that 
37 Cf. Chapter 5 `The Doctrine of God and Natural Theology' for my treatment of Kierkegaard's theism 
in more detail. In a more recent work on Christology, Evans describes Kierkegaard's position 
regarding the extent of our knowledge of God and human nature as one of `modest agnosticism'. 
(Evans 1996,123). 
38 Emmanuel 1996,45 
39 Ibid. 49. Cf. also Kierkegaard's comment in the Journals that `In relation to everything divine there 
is always the paradox'. (J&P 3217, X1A 628 n. d., 1849) 
40 Ahorne 1990,43; 42 
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he is in the same position as the learner in his own hypothesis, who is `untruth', and so 
by virtue of this Climacus too is `polemical against the truth' 41 
Additional support is rendered to the `apparent paradox' interpretation by Merold 
Westphal in his study Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society: 
The affirmation of the Incarnation as a contradiction is embedded in a context 
that forbids us to take this in a formal sense. The only possible ground for 
another understanding of Kierkegaard here is that what becomes historical in the 
Incarnation does so `against its nature'. But when the iron axe head floated for 
Elisha and when Lazarus rose from the dead at the command of Jesus, they 
certainly did so against their nature, though I do not formally contradict myself if 
I affirm these events, nor utter a tautology if I deny them. The impossibility of 
things behaving contrary to their nature is not a logical impossibility. 42 
Westphal therefore sees the paradox of the Incarnation in the same sense as a miracle. 
There is good textual evidence to be found in the Postscript that fits in well with 
Westphal's argument: `The historical is that the god, the eternal, has come into 
existence at a specific moment in time as an individual human being. The special nature 
of the historical in this case, [is] that it is not something historical in the ordinary sense 
but the historical that has been able to become historical only against its nature. 43 The 
Incarnation arises from the action of an omnipotent, personal God who shatters our 
preconceptions and self-defined limits of reality. The charge of `paradox' does not 
result from a contradiction of the immutable laws of logic, but betrays the human 
reaction to the unexpected power of God. Climacus calls this reaction `offense', which 
in turn is `the erroneous accounting' and `the conclusion of untruth' and `a 
misunderstanding of the moment". 44 
To the Christian believer, the situation is different. In an Upbuilding Discourse of 1844 
entitled `He Must Increase; I Must Decrease', Kierkegaard compares the birth of John 
41 PF 15 
42 Westphal 1991,102 
43 CUP 1: 578 
44 PF 51. In the following chapter I will argue that it is the notion of `offense' (I have chosen to use the 
American spelling throughout the thesis as this will occur frequently in material quoted form the 
American translations of Kierkegaard's works), rather than `paradox', which dominates much of 
Kierkegaard's later Christology. 
78 
the Baptist with that of Christ: `His origin was as marvelous as the one whose coming 
he proclaimed, but the difference here again was the same as the difference between the 
marvel that an aged woman becomes pregnant, which is contrary to the order of nature, 
and that a pure virgin bears a child by the power of God, which is above the order of 
nature. '45 Speaking directly in this instance, Kierkegaard makes no attempt to 
rationalize the doctrine of the Incarnation, nor does he wish to dismiss it as a logical 
contradiction. It is interesting to observe that he states here that it is the birth of John 
the Baptist that is contrary to nature, thereby something going against our expectations 
of what is deemed to be normal. It does not then follow that he rejects it on the grounds 
of its being a self-contradiction, but instead it is accepted as a `marvel', or miracle. The 
virgin birth, on the other hand, is in a higher category as it is even more miraculous and 
therefore `above the order of nature'. 
An important point to be made regarding the `apparent' nature of the paradox derives 
from the Germanic background to Kierkegaard's authorship. Both Evans and Westphal 
argue that we must understand `paradox' to incorporate aspects of the use of 
`contradiction' in the Hegelian sense, whereby it is used `to designate situations of 
opposition, otherness, difference, and tension rather than in the narrow sense of formal 
logic'. 46 In Hegelian philosophy `contradiction' became a very broad, even vague term. 
Evans therefore suggests that we may allow the term `incongruity' to be viewed as an 
appropriate alternative designation, although he realizes that Climacus' form of 
argument could seem very sloppy to modem readers. 
47 
45 EUD 277 
46 Westphal 1991,125 
47 Evans 1992,100. Evans provides a clear treatment of this topic in his earlier study Kierkegaard's 
'Fragments' and 'Postscript' (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989). He argues that, 'Since 
the works are specifically aimed at Hegelians, particularly the Danish Hegelians, it is only to be 
expected that the linguistic usage is shaped by the customary meanings in the Hegelian world of 
discourse. ' However, 'This by no means implies that Climacus slavishly accepts his language from the 
Hegelians; he generally takes this language and gives it his own special sense. But some of the 
Hegelian meaning usually still remains. ' Evans continues, saying, 'For Hegel, any relation of 
opposition can be described as a contradiction ... Contradictions are the creative oppositions that when 
mediated by thought, lead to higher realizations of spirit. They are thus found in every element of the 
Hegelian system, including logic, nature and spirit itself. ' Unlike Climacus'/Kierkegaard's 'paradox', 
Hegelian contradictions are only relative and so capable of being resolved by reason. In this case, the 
'paradox' of the incarnation can in fact be seen to be 'the Absolute Paradox' when compared to other 
such relative contradictions. (Evans, 1989,213-14). 
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Finally, being mindful of Ayer's earlier charge that theological statements can be shown 
to be meaningless, we can see that Kierkegaard's understanding of paradox by no means 
implies that something is nonsensical. 48 On this Kierkegaard unequivocally states `the 
paradox is composed in such a way that reason has no power at all to dissolve it in 
nonsense and prove that it is nonsense; no, it is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle 
about which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not 
follow thereby that it is nonsense. '49 This therefore helps to counter any suggestions 
that Kierkegaard wished to use the Climacus texts to argue that the classical doctrine of 
the incarnation is incoherent. 
(b) Time and Eternity 
In offering us his meta-concept of `the Absolute Paradox', Kierkegaard was attempting 
to underline `the absolute difference by which a human being differs from God'. 50 As I 
showed earlier in this section, those who follow the traditional line of interpretation tend 
to see this as a conflict arising out of the incompatibility between the timeless nature of 
God and the temporal finitude of humanity. With both of the Climacus texts being at 
times notoriously ambiguous, this claim of finitem non capax infiniti does at first appear 
to be the correct reading of certain passages. Consider the following statement from the 
Postscript, for instance, `But the absolute difference between God and a human being is 
simply this, that a human being is an individual existing being ... [but] God, however, 
is 
the infinite one, who is eternal. '31 However, the difference is not one of finitude. 
Instead, as Mullen argues, it can be shown that it is a difference in quality between, on 
the one hand the perfection of God and, on the other hand, `human existence, 
characterized by a giant chasm separating the sublime and the mundane. 52 As I 
explained in the previous chapter, the theologically defining limitation of human 
existence is that we are all in a state of sin. This fact is affirmed by Climacus in 
Fragments: `What, then, is the difference? Indeed, what else but sin, since the 
'$ Something implied in e. g. Garelick 1965,28 
49J&P7, X 2A354n. d., 1850 
50 CUP 1: 217 
51 Ibid. 
52 Mullen 1995,158 
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difference, the absolute difference, must have been caused by the individual himself 43 
The same point is later made in more detail by Anti-Climacus: 
The teaching about sin - that you and I are sinners -a teaching that 
unconditionally splits up `the crowd', confirms the qualitative difference between 
God and man more radically than ever before, for again only God can do this; sin 
is indeed: before God. In no way is a man so different from god as in this, that 
he, and that means every man, is a sinner, and is that `before God', whereby the 
opposites are kept together in a double sense: they are held together 
(continentur), they are not allowed to go away from each other, but by being 
held together in this way the differences show up all the more sharply, just as 
when two colors are held together, opposita juxta se posita magis illucesunt [the 
opposites appear more clearly by juxtaposition]. Sin is the one and only 
predication about a human being that in no way, either via negations or via 
eminentice , can be stated of God. 
'4 
As Anti-Climacus then goes on to explain, the situation becomes more `paradoxical' by 
God's attitude to human sin: 
As a sinner, man is separated from God by the most chasmal qualitative abyss. 
In turn, of course, God is separated from man by the same chasmal qualitative 
abyss when He forgives sins. If by some kind of reverse adjustment the divine 
could be shifted over to the human, there is one way in which man could never in 
all eternity come to be like God: in forgiving sins. 55 
The paradox is produced by the fact that God chooses to forgive sins, something 
humanity would not do if the situation were in reverse as this contravenes our concepts 
S3 PF 47 
34 SUD 121-2. See also the following journal entry: `For this reason only is Christianity the absolute 
religion, because it conceives of men as sinners, for no other distinction can in this way recognize man 
in his difference from God. ' (J&P 46, VA 16 n. d., 1844; cf. `God cannot be the highest superlative of 
the human: he is qualitatively different. ' Ibid. 77, X3A 186 n. d., 1850). This point is also brought 
out, although in this instance it is referred to as `an eternal difference', in Gospel of Sufferings. In one 
of the discourses in this text entitled `The Joy in the Thought that before God a Man is always 
accounted Guilty', Kierkegaard affirms the sinlessness of Christ against the rest of humanity and states 
that Christ is the only one to have suffered before God in innocence. Therefore, `With him none dare 
compare himself, or apply his measure to himself; between him and every man is an eternal difference: 
whence it is manifest now with fresh clearness, that before God a man suffers always as one who is 
guilty. ' (GOS 91). 
55 SUD 122 
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of what is rightly deserved. Although we earnestly desire divine forgiveness when we 
are in the wrong, it is another thing when we are wronged by another. The reality of 
divine grace is beyond our expectations and we are not confronted with a metaphysical 
paradox pertaining to the nature of the Incarnation, but with the moral paradox of its 
purpose: the Atonement, whereby the `absolute' difference of sin is undeservedly 
annulled. 56 
The paradox is `absolute', not only because it cancels the absolute difference of sin, but 
because it is absolutely unique. 57 Whether this is portrayed as Climacus' B hypothesis, 
or later by Anti-Climacus, or by Kierkegaard himself directly, all importance is assigned 
to Christ in the process of humanity's salvation. In affirming the uniqueness and finality 
of the Incarnation, Kierkegaard was to a certain extent setting himself up against the 
theology of Schleiermacher's On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers. Here 
Schleiermacher posits Christ as only one possible mediator between God and humanity 
and allows for the fact that there may be more, and better, later. " 
Kierkegaard was additionally, and more specifically, reacting against the ideas of 
Lessing, the well known literary and philosophical figure of the Aufklärung whom he 
admired yet still criticized. 59 The subject of Lessing brings us back to the title page of 
Fragments. Upon this we find Climacus' question, `Can a historical point of departure 
be given for an eternal consciousness? ' which was inspired by Lessing's theological 
work On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power. Lessing had followed the general trait of 
many in the Aufklärung who categorized religious truth as eternal and necessary. In so 
doing he comes under Climacus' broad umbrella term of a `Socratic' thinker as was 
introduced in the first chapter of Fragments. In Lessing's thought, historical events 
came into an entirely different category from religious events, as he understood 
historical events to come into existence in freedom and not necessity, they were 
This is in fact the same as Gustav Auldn's example of a theological paradox (but not a formal 
contradiction) which I cited earlier in this chapter. (Cf. Aulen 1970b, 139). 
57 Evans 1992,102f 
58 'Allow yourself to enjoy an old rejected concept [i. e. Christology], and seek out among all the holy 
men in whom humanity is immediately revealed one who could be the mediator between your limited 
way of thinking and the eternal limits of the world; and when you have found him, go through all of 
humanity and let everything that heretofore appeared to you differently be illuminated by the reflection 
of this new light. ' (Schleiermacher 1995,124). 
59 Cf. Gouwens 1996,45 
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therefore contingent, even `accidental'. 60 In the Postscript Climacus puts it this way: 
`Everything that becomes historical is contingent, inasmuch as precisely by coming into 
existence, by becoming historical, it has its element of contingency, inasmuch as 
contingency is precisely the one factor in all coming into existence. i61 Because of the 
implicit uncertainty regarding historical events, Lessing argued that `contingent truths of 
history can never become the demonstration of necessary truths of reason'. 62 As Alister 
McGrath points out, according to Lessing's philosophy `historically mediated 
knowledge of God must be regarded as a contradiction'. 63 Yet once the historical event 
of the Incarnation is held to be the decisive event of all religious significance, we are 
faced with an incongruity - how can something merely historical and contingent be of 
eternal and necessary importance? It does not logically follow that it should be this way 
and presents a difficulty to anybody who tries to accept it: `That, that is the ugly broad 
ditch that I cannot cross, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the 
leap. '64 There appears to be a movement between categories for which Lessing uses 
Aristotle's phrase a µct&ßaatS eiS äXXo y vor 65 This is the basis for the apparent 
paradox between time and eternity, as Climacus states, `the basis of the paradox of 
Christianity is that it continually uses time and the historical in relation to the eternal. '66 
The Incarnation is therefore understood by Climacus to be the relative historical event of 
absolute meaning. 67 A similar sentiment is found in the Journals where Kierkegaard 
writes that `the forgiveness of sin is indeed a paradox insofar as the eternal truth is 
related to an existing person; it is a paradox in so far as the eternal truth is related to the 
person botched up in time and by time ... but forgiveness of sins is really a paradox 
only when it is linked to the appearance of the god. '611 To claim that the actual events 
occurring within the thirty or so years of Christ's earthly existence are decisive for all 
eternity contravenes the whole temper of Lessing's Deistic thought. Yet this `paradox' 
was by no means confined to Lessing and other like-minded thinkers of that period. 
60 As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the distinction between the contingent and necessary, as originally 
derived from the Platonic dualism of the sensible and intelligible realms, has permeated much of 
Western thought since antiquity. (Cf. Gunton 1983,139f; Torrance 1997a, 108). 
61 CUP 1: 98 
62 Lessing, quoted in ibid. 1: 97 
63 McGrath 1986,14 
" Lessing, quoted in CUP 1: 98 
6s Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 1: 95. Cf. also J&P 73 X2A 406 n. d., 1850 
67 Cf. Hartshorne 1990,98n 
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Such a `paradox' has been produced by those throughout history who object to the 
exclusive claim of Christianity, and is more often referred to as `the scandal of 
particularity' 
69 
3. Excursus: Christology and Mystery in the Church Fathers 
In the above section I have shown that Kierkegaard's Absolute Paradox is not a formal 
contradiction, and additionally, that neither is it a charge of absurdity against the 
doctrine of the Incarnation. The traditional interpretation (whose contemporary 
proponents include Hannay and Gardiner) holds that the paradox is a formal 
contradiction between time and timelessness in the union of God and a human being. 
Against this I have argued the following: that although the paradox arises out of the 
joining of humanity and Deity, the problematic difference is not finitude but sin; that the 
Absolute Paradox is so called because of the overcoming of this `absolute difference'; 
that the `paradox' is not a formal contradiction that contravenes the rules of logic, but is 
an apparent contradiction; that it refers to something above the limitations of human 
reason, or contrary to nature as we perceive it; that Kierkegaard is employing `paradox' 
in the broad Hegelian sense of contradiction; that Kierkegaard is also offering a critique 
of Lessing's dictum `contingent truths of history can never become the necessary truths 
of reason'. 
Now that I have clarified Kierkegaard's use of paradox in the context of `the Absolute 
Paradox' of the Incarnation, I wish to move on to consider how far his Christology is in 
tension with classical Chalcedonian orthodoxy. In order to do this I will examine some 
notable exponents of classical Christology among the Church Fathers in order to 
discover whether we may trace some continuity from them to Kierkegaard. This will 
begin with Tertullian, discussing the reasoning behind the `credo quia absurdum'. I 
will then discuss the concept of the Incarnation as co nap&So4o racov as found in 
Athanasius. Following this will be an examination the terms incomprehensibilis and 
68 J&P 3085, VI B 45 n. d., 1845 
69 Cf. J. Baillie 1962,204 
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sacramentum (or do µvatirlpiov) in Hilary of Poitiers. Finally, I will examine some of 
the implications for the öitooüatoc in the Chalcedonian Definition. 
Tertullian, De Came Christi 
The second century theologian Tertullian is often hailed as `the father of Latin theology', 
and his numerous writings helped to shape the course of Christian thought in both East 
and West for several centuries. 70 Although Tertullian was from Latin-speaking North 
Africa, it is appropriate to consider him to have been the last Greek apologist, as he was 
a thinker who was well versed in the details of pagan Greek philosophies (notably of 
Stoicism, his creed before conversion), and more fluent and able in the Greek language 
than most of the Latin theologians after him. 71 However, his links with the Montanist 
heresy have led some to discredit him in addition to denying his doctrinal orthodoxy 
(though it is disputed as to whether he actually left the Catholic church 72). The most 
common charge levied against him is that he was an irrationalist, or at best an extreme 
fideist. His accusers derive their charge from the infamous phrase `credo quid 
absurdum' which is allegedly found in his Christological treatise De Carne Christi and 
which is held to reflect his theological outlook as a whole. Henry Chadwick claims that, 
for Tertullian, `to reduce all to sweet reasonableness is to miss its supernatural 
character, and therefore his ultimate Christian confession is the grinding paradox "I 
believe because it is absurd". ' Chadwick then continues by stating that, `[Tertullian's] 
notorious utterance is a milestone along a path in Christian thought which leads ... to 
Kierkegaard and his modern disciples. 73 
It is easy to see some similarities between Tertullian and Kierkegaard if we interpret 
both of them in the manner prescribed by traditional scholarship. Kierkegaard had 
studied Tertullian and he often mentions him in his Journals, describing him as `the 
unconditionally most consistent and most Christianly two-edged of all the Church 
fathers'. 74 He also refers to him a few times in his authorship, most famously when he 
cites the quia absurdum in Fragments, but also in The Concept of Irony ('credo quia 
70 Prestige 1975,97; see also Grillmeier 1965,140; Kelly 1973,149 
" Prestige 1975,97 
72 Cf. Hall 1991,67ff 
" Chadwick 1966,2 
74 J&P 542, X5A 98 n. d., 1853 
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absurdum') and The Concept of Anxiety (in which he offers some discussion of 
Tertullian's teaching on sin). " Yet, I have sought to refute the charge that 
Kierkegaard's meta-concept of `the Absolute Paradox' implies irrationalism. Therefore, 
if there really are similarities between the two thinkers they cannot (or must not) be 
attributed to the traditional, and often rather unfavourable, interpretation of either. 76 
Therefore Tertullian's `credo quid absurdum' stands in sore need of a revisionist 
interpretation. 
It would perhaps be easy to take literally the `credo quid absurdum' as Tertullian's 
motto if he were known to have been a man of no learning and narrow-mindedness. Yet 
despite his severity and almost legalistic moralism, his style and arguments betray a keen 
mind and (perhaps because of these factors), Christian tradition asserts that he was a 
professional lawyer. ' He was certainly well educated and aware of the academic 
developments of his time. Was he really one to turn his back on reasoned discourse 
when it came to communicating the truth of his Christian faith? Quite obviously I wish 
to argue. that he did not do this at all. Regarding Tertullian's attitude towards 
philosophy, Eric Osbourne claims that `while Tertullian distrusts philosophy because of 
its part in division and heresy, there is ample evidence for his use of it and other 
elements in classical culture. His mind is marked by classicism, a wide culture as well as 
his own distinctive way of thinking. ''' This view is also supported in the detailed study 
of Tertullian by Timothy Barnes who points out the extent of Tertullian's knowledge of 
classical literature. 79 
It soon becomes apparent that an important contributing factor to this debate is the 
significant role played by rhetoric in Tertullian's writings. Like any other educated 
Roman citizen of the second century, Tertullian would have undergone rigorous training 
in the skills of oratory, a vital background for anybody destined for public service and 
the principal skill of a professional lawyer. Barnes states that, 
Philosophy and theology, it must be concluded, are subordinated to oratory - 
which accounts for the effectiveness of Tertullian's writings. `What has Athens 
15 PF52-3; COl 329; COA 27 
76 Cf. Rae 1997,111 
" Hall 1991,67 
78 Osbourne 1993,276 
79 Barnes 1971,210 
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to do with Jerusalem? ' he once exclaimed `or what has the Academy in common 
with the Church? ' Almost every word he wrote gave the lie to the answer he 
implies. Tertullian would have deplored the attempts of Justin, Clement and 
Origen to reconcile Christianity and pagan philosophy. He explicitly rejected a 
Stoic, Platonic or dialectical Christianity. But in a wider sense, he had himself 
reconciled Christianity and classical culture. For he used the benefits of a 
traditional education and the fruits of his pagan erudition to defend and to 
propagate what he considered to be the truth. The closing words of the De 
Palio resolve any conflict between the two cultures: the humble pallium of the 
pagan philosopher is ennobled once it is donned by a Christian. In Tertullian's 
hands, rhetoric too underwent a similar transformation. 8° 
It appears in the light of this that, to a certain extent, we can see Tertullian as a Christian 
orator, a subtle combination of the content of strict Biblical preaching with the 
stratagems of classical rhetoric. If this is the case, then it would appear that secular and 
non-Christian learning were employed by Tertullian in support of his faith, but not to 
rationalize faith's content, nor to accommodate it with the various trends of his time. 
Secular, or non-Christian philosophy is therefore found to be useful to the extent that its 
theological limitations are kept in mind and its methods and preconceptions are not 
allowed to dominate the subject. Kierkegaard spotted this in Tertullian's thought, 
commenting that, 
Tertullian stresses the difference between faith and non-Christian wisdom. He 
declares that among other things the difference is in range. `Christianity is the 
complete revelation and has a definite goal. We do not need to speculate further 
after we have found the gospel. Since we believe, we do not need to go further 
than to believe, for above all we believe that there is nothing more that we have 
to believe. ' This is the boundary, otherwise we would have to go on seeking in 
the infinite. Philosophy, on the other hand, has no boundary and therefore goes 
on into the infinite. 81 
At this point we do, almost inadvertently, come across a parallel with Kierkegaard, as he 
too made use of the literary forms of his period (in his case those of the Romantic 
Ironists) in service of Christianity. Kierkegaard could not agree with the beliefs of the 
so Ibid. 
81 J&P 4767, X4A 140 n. d., 1851 
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Romantic Ironists, but, it is only too apparent that for him their methods of 
communication had their uses. Likewise, whilst Tertullian might not agree with the 
religious beliefs of Latin culture, he was to employ its rhetorical devices with 
devastating effect. 
Returning to the `credo quid absurdum' of such notoriety, we can begin to see how it 
fits into Tertullian's agenda. The De Carne Christi in which it occurs was written 
against Marcion, a contemporary of Tertullian's who rejected numerous orthodox 
Christian beliefs about the person of Christ. In particular he decried Christ's human 
birth as an absurdity even though he was prepared to accept the fact of the crucifixion. 
The question then arises why it is so that he could be willing to accept one and not the 
other. Both contravene the accepted doctrines of Graeco-Roman mythology, as well as 
the rival philosophical pagan beliefs concerning the nature of God - although adherents 
to the former were perfectly at ease with the thought of their deities taking on the forms 
of swans, bulls or showers of golden rainlf2 Tertullian asks Marcion which is really to 
be the most shameful, be it intellectually or morally, the manner of Christ's death or the 
manner of His birth? 
The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men must needs be 
ashamed [of it]. And the Son of God died: it is by all means to be believed, 
because it is absurd. And He was buried, and rose again: the fact is certain 
because it is impossible 
... Thus the nature of the two substances displayed him 
as man and as God, - in one respect born, in the other unborn; in one respect 
fleshly, in the other spiritual; in one sense weak, in the other exceedingly strong; 
in one sense dying, in the other living. This property of the two states - the 
divine and the human - is distinctly asserted with equal truth of both natures 
alike, with the same belief both in respect of the Spirit and of the flesh. The 
powers of the Spirit proved Him to be God, His sufferings attested the flesh of 
man. '3 
'2 Consider Tcrtullian's comments on this: 
These things certainly are not 'foolish'. Inquire again, then, of what things he spoke, and 
When you imagine that you have discovered what they are, will you find anything to be so 
'foolish' as believing In a God that has been born, and that of a virgin, and of a fleshly nature 
too ... And yet, according to the world's wisdom, it is more easy to believe that Jupiter became a bull or a swan, than that Christ really became a man, if we listen to Marcion. 
(ertullian 1870,172). 
as Ibid. 1734 
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From this passage the actual wording and true context of Tertullian's alleged dictum can 
be seen: `And the Son of God died: it is by all means to be believed, because it is 
absurd', or `et mortuus est dei filius; credibile est, quid ineptum est'. For Tertullian, 
the facts of the Incarnation are not absurd, neither are they shameful. But Marcion 
claims that they are, and Tertullian's response is to turn his opponent's position on its 
head by adopting the following trick from Aristotle's The Art of Rhetoric: 
Another line of argument refers to things which we supposed to happen and yet 
seem incredible. We may argue that people could not have believed them, if they 
had not been true or nearly true: even that they are the more likely to be true 
because they are incredible. For the things which men believe are either facts or 
probabilities: i& therefore, a thing that is believed is improbable and even 
incredible, it must be true, since it is certainly not believed because it is at all 
probable or credible. "" 
So, when Tertullian proclaims `credibile est, quid ineptum est' he is applying Aristotle's 
tactic to his defence of the doctrine of the Incarnation. The most problematic area of 
debate within the Christology of that time, and the centuries that followed, focused upon 
the question of Christ's two natures. Numerous heterodox teachings arose that 
attempted to circumnavigate the problem by denying the validity of either Christ's 
humanity or of his Deity. Tertullian adhered to the orthodox teaching that Christ is both 
human and divine without attempting to deny the significance of one or the other. We 
are confronted by a mystery that cannot be explained away, but, is still central to the 
Christian faith. 
Athanasius, De Incarnation 
Athanasius' Christology puts great stress on the concept of the unity of Christ's person, 
that although he possesses two natures, they are not to be understood as being side by 
side, nor are they in any way mingled together. " Utilizing the vocabulary of Greek 
philosophy, he defends a Christology of the Word, in which the eternal X6yoS, the Son 
of the Father, truly God and 6µoo6vtoc with the Father, has become man. " The idea of 
'4 Aristotle 1923.1400 a SR 
ýs Sellers 1940.36 
Ibid. 34. I lowcvcr, it must be noted that Athanasius did not generally employ the term 60oo(atos till 
over twenty rears after writing De Incarnatione. (cf. Heron, in (cd. ) Torrance 1981.65). 
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the Mpg, originally borrowed from Stoic thought, referred to the governing, animating 
principle of the whole universe, and something parallel albeit on a far greater scale to the 
rational human soul. There was a complication in his ideas in how to reconcile the fact 
that, whilst the XryoS was in control of the whole universe, he was at the same time 
incarnate and thereby (it logically follows) limited to one location. 17 Athanasius 
develops and presents his Christology in De Incanunione, from which the following is 
an extract. 
The Word was not confined within His body, nor was He there and nowhere 
else; He did not activate that body and leave the universe emptied of His activity 
and guidance. Here is the supreme marvel [to napä6oýo to tov]. He was the 
Word and nothing contained Him; rather He Himself contained all things. He is 
in the whole creation, yet in His essential being He is distinct from it all, while 
He is in all things in the activities of His power, ordering all things, extending 
over all things His universal providence, quickening each and every thing at 
once, containing the universe and not contained by it, but in His Father alone 
existing wholly and entirely. So also when He was in human body He Himself 
gave that body life, and at the same time He was of course giving life to the 
whole universe, and was present in all things; and yet distinct from and outside 
the universe. " 
In the above passage to nap&8o? otazov is translated as 'the supreme marvel', although 
it is also possible to translate it as 'paradox', it is usually and more appropriately 
translated as 'beyond reason' or 'miraculous'. " There is at no point any implications 
that Athanasius is referring to a logical contradiction. Like Tertullian, although less 
rhetorically, he is allowing for a certain level of mystery as forming an indispensable 
component within his Christology. 
117 Kelly 1960,28 
"Athanasius, in ed. ßcttenson 1969,288 
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Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate 
A younger contemporary of Athanasius was Hilary of Poitiers, described by some as `the 
Athanasius of the West' 90 He was the leading Latin (Western) theologian in the 
development of Christology in the fourth century, an area which at that time was heavily 
dominated by developments in the Greek East. To a large extent the West still followed 
the theological tradition of Tertullian, and it was not until Hilary that there was any real 
original or decisive development 91 Exiled to the East from AD 356 till AD 359, he had 
used this time as an opportunity to become well acquainted with the theological ideas 
and debates of the East, a chance that would have been denied him had he remained in 
the theologically xenophobic West. In an informal way he stood as an ideological bridge 
between East and West, helping theologians from both sides to understand the ideas of 
the other. 
Like Athanasius, Hilary allows for the fact that any intellectual inquiry into the nature of 
the Godhead will be bound to involve a certain element of mystery. This matter comes 
to the fore in the text of his De Trinitate during a discussion of the co-inherence of the 
Father and the Son (a passage similar to that of Athanasius on the X&yos incarnate). 
Referring to John 14: 11 where Jesus states that `I am in the Father and the Father is in 
me' (NRSV), Hilary admits that this statement may well 'confuse many minds, and not 
unnaturally, for the powers of human reason cannot provide them with any intelligible 
meaning. It seems impossible that one object can be both within and without another. '92 
G. L. Prestige claims that this is an admission of a real impossibility, and hence is to be 
understood as an actual paradox in the formal sense of the term. 93 However, the accent 
in I lilary's statement falls on the fact that coinherence seems to be impossible, not that it 
actually is, so we are in fact faced with an apparent paradox. Hilary continues: 'This is a 
problem which the wit of man will never solve, nor will human research ever find an 
analogy for this condition of Divine existence. But what man cannot understand, God 
can be. I do not mean to say that the fact that this is an assertion made by God renders 
90 I3cttcnson 1970,5; 11x11 1991,200 




it at once intelligible to us. '94 There can be no immediate recourse to some Divinely 
imparted higher knowledge in resolving this matter. It is the task of the believer to 
come to understand what he can, as far as he is able considering the nature of the subject 
and the extent of our limitations. As Hilary later states, `We must think for ourselves, 
and come to know the meaning of the words, "I in the Father and the Father in me": but 
this will depend upon our success in grasping the truth that reasoning based upon Divine 
verities can establish its conclusions, even though they seem to contradict the laws of the 
universe. '" 
Like Kierkegaard over a thousand years later, Hilary is careful to affum that the nature 
of God transcends our understanding and hence cannot be described without a certain 
number of apparent contradictions. That is not their only similarity, as for the means 
whereby God chooses to make Himself known to us, Hilary relies on a concept of 
revelation that is strictly Incarnational: `For He, being invisible and bodiless and 
incomprehensible, as the Son of God, took upon Him such a measure of matter and 
lowliness as was needed to bring Him within the range of our understanding, and 
perception and contemplation. '" Regarding the description of God as being 
`incomprehensible' (incomprehenribilis), we must be careful to deny any charges of 
irrationality. On this point I am in agreement with G. L. Prestige when he explains that, 
`when God is called incomprehensible, it does not mean that He is irrational -a 
conception which the Greek Fathers would have considered purely self-contradictory - 
but it does imply that His wisdom ranges infinitely further than human wisdom can 
compass, just as His power infinitely excels human creative capacity. '97 Such Divine 
incomprehensibility does not denote the existence of contradictions, neither does it 
suggest meaninglessness, but instead stands for the honest human description of the 
infinity and power of God. 
We must not repose so blind a confidence in the human intellect as to imagine 
that we have complete knowledge of the objects of our thought, or that the 
ultimate problem is solved as soon as we have formed a symmetrical and 
consistent theory. Finite minds cannot conceive the Infinite; a being dependent 
94 1{ilary 1995,62 
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for its existence upon another cannot attain to perfect knowledge either of its 
Creator or of itself, for its consciousness of self is coloured by circumstances, 
and bounds are set which its perception cannot pass. " 
The Incarnation in particular may well appear to be `contrary to our experience of 
nature'. 99 Mary describes this as sacramentum, a term used rather vaguely in Latin and 
similar to the Greek To µua rtptov, normally translated as `mystery' (originally `secret'). 
The term is applied in De Trinitate to the `mystery' of Divine unity, Christ's divine 
nature, the Incarnation and the role of Christ as mediator between God and the world. '00 
With regard to the Incarnation (and to the others) this is `a mystery [sacramentum], not 
for Himself [i. e. God], but for us'. 101 
The Definition of Chalcedon 
The Definition of the Faith as produced and ratified by the fourth Ecumenical Council of 
the Church at Chalcedon in AD 451 has remained the authoritative statement regarding 
the doctrine of the Person of Christ within the mainstream Christian traditions. Part of it 
" 
reads as follows: 
Therefore, following the holy Fathers, we all with one accord teach men to 
acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in 
Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting also of 
a reasonable soul and body; of one substance [öµooüatoc] with the Father as 
regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance [bµoo(atoS] with 
us as regards his manhood; like us in all respect, apart from sin; as regards his 
Godhead, begotten of the Father before the ages, but yet as regards his manhood 
begotten, for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin, the God-bearer 
[OcotoxoS]; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognized in 
two natures [Lv 6(o cp(actv], without confusion, without change, without 
division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way annulled 
by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and 
9Ifilary 1995,69 
99Ibid 156 
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coming together to form one person [npbawnovj and one subsistence 
[vn6a, taatS], not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same 
Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord, Jesus Christ. '02 
Opinion is divided as to whether we are to view this as an exhaustive definition, or as a 
principle that provides the framework for further Christian reflection upon the nature of 
Christ. However, if we examine the Chalcedonian definition in its historical and 
doctrinal context it will quickly become clear that it arose, not out of any desire on the 
part of the Church Fathers to impose a straight jacket upon theology, but as an effort to 
safeguard the doctrine of the Incarnation from the doctrinal errors that were threatening 
to split the Catholic Church at the time. 103 In the light of this Eric Mascall argues that, 
`it both needs and is patient of much more exploration and extension than it has in fact 
received. It may well be that the very authority which it has been accorded in 
Christendom has led to it being treated too often as a static and finished product and to 
its potentialities for development being ignored. '104 The significance of the definition 
lies in its simplicity: `It is that the Lord Jesus Christ is one person, and that He is truly 
and perfectly God and is truly and perfectly man. It is not denied that this is a great and 
wonderful mystery or that it raises deep and perhaps insoluble problems for the human 
mind; but the statement itself is brief and lucid. '10' 
By discovering the contents of the views which Chalcedon set itself against, it is possible 
to discern the importance and value of the technical Greek terms used within it. Against 
the Arian heresy Chalcedon followed the earlier Council of Nicaea in declaring Christ to 
be `of one substance [6goo6atoSJ with the Father'. Where Apollinarianism denied 
Christ's full humanity, Chalcedon declares that Christ has `a reasonable [i. e. human] soul 
and body'. Against Nestorianism it affirms that Mary is the 'God-bearer' [OcoTkoS], 
and that Christ 'is to be acknowledged in two natures [kv S{>o cp aety] ... without 
separation', in 'one person [npbacunov] and one subsistence [ünöaTaatS]'. Finally, in 
102 Owen 1984,40 
103 Cf. Gunton 1983,168 
104 Mascall 1980,37 
10S Ibid 29 
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refuting the Eutychian teachings Chalcedon states that, Christ is `of one substance 
[61oo6atoS] with us as touching the manhood'. 106 
As to the lasting value of the Definition, T. F. Torrance comments that: 
Jesus Christ was disclosed and known in the first place to the New Testament 
witnesses as Son of the Father, himself God manifest in the flesh, without any 
detraction from the perfection of his creaturely and human nature among men. It 
was precisely this understanding that Nicene and Chalcedonian Christology 
sought to express in such a way that it did full justice to the intersection and 
overlapping of divine and human reality in Jesus Christ, yet in such a way as to 
reject any confusion or separation between them. Judged by modem scientific 
standards alone it was thus an exemplary model of unitary theory and of the way 
in which the languages of the observable and the non-observable are to be co- 
ordinated. Yet the Nicene-Chalcedonian Christology cannot be regarded as 
merely a theory so much as the organized form of apprehension and 
conceptualization forced upon the Church by the ontic necessity of the given 
reality of God in Jesus Christ, although admittedly it cannot be confined within 
the concepts and statements used. Doubtless it stands in need of restatement and 
modification in view of the fuller knowledge of Christ that it has helped to 
mediate, but the very fact all through the history of Christian thought its 
economic simplicity has proved so astonishingly fertile in deepening and 
enlightening our thought far beyond the range of its original application, can only 
command our profound respect. 107 
A similar view is upheld by Mascall: 'Chalcedon was not trying to write metaphysics but 
simply to preserve the truth of the Christian Gospel, and the formula "one person, two 
natures" requires no philosophical expertise for its understanding. '101 
106 CL Owen 1984,3846; Macquarrie 1990,16040 
107 Torrance 1997b, 80-81 
10' Mascall 1980,34. Similarly Colin Gunton likens the Chalcedonian Definition to a map that was 
designed to clarify a few central features of Christology, rather than to stand as an exhaustive definition. 
(Gunton 1983,153). 
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4. The Similarities Between Kierkegaard and the Fathers Considered 
What is the relationship between Kierkegaard's Christology and the views discussed 
above? At the beginning of this chapter I referred to a statement made by Alastair 
McKinnon in which he claims that `by treating the Incarnation as a paradox', 
Kierkegaard `both described an ancient tradition and set theology upon a new and more 
promising path'. '°9 As regards at least one `ancient tradition', I have argued that there is 
a definite influence from Tertullian on Kierkegaard's thought. This can easily be shown 
by the existence of numerous direct references to him in several works and some 
material in the Journals, some of which I referred to when discussing Tertullian's 
Christology. 'lo However, the exact relationship between Kierkegaard and Tertullian is 
perhaps more subtle than has previously been allowed for. As was shown in the 
discussion of Tertullian, his theology is frequently misinterpreted and too much weight 
assigned to the dictum `credo quid absurdum'. Instead, he anticipates one of 
Kierkegaard's tactics in that, at times, his arguments involved a certain amount of 
rhetoric. Like Kierkegaard, his apparent rejection of the rationality of the Incarnation is 
in reality an ironic echo of the negative verdict on it passed by non-Christian philosophy. 
So, for Tertullian the Incarnation is no more an absurdity than it is for Kierkegaard a 
logical contradiction. Instead, both aimed to illustrate the incompatibility between 
Christian faith and the presuppositions of its rivals. 
As regards the influence of such important figures as Athanasius and Hilary of Poitiers, 
the matter is by no means as simple and I have yet to find a single direct reference to 
either's Christology throughout the authorship. Because of this, I have chosen to cite 
details from their Christologies as forming some interesting parallels with those of 
Kierkegaard, rather than go so far as to claim that he was placing himself in any self- 
conscious continuity with them. 1' In this way, I have attempted to illustrate that 
1°9 McKinnon 1988,181 
110 Cf. 83 above 
"' However, according to J. Heywood Thomas, there is evidence that Kierkegaard's use of `the 
Absolute Paradox' was derived directly from his studies of both Tertullian and Athanasius. It would 
appear though that Kierkegaard's knowledge of Athanasius' Christology came largely from secondary 
sources. He possessed three works on Athanasius in his library all dating from before the end of the 
1830s. (Cf. J&P 5321, II A 745 n. d, 1838; Thomas 1957,108). Although I am willing to agree with 
Thomas regarding the extent of Tertullian's influence on Kierkegaard's thought, I am less willing to 
give too much importance to the allegedly direct influence of Athanasius. This is due to the lack of 
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Kierkegaard was by no means alone in his acceptance of the mystery of Christ's two 
natures as a genuine mystery, (but not as a contradiction). 112 
If, however, Kierkegaard had claimed that the classical formulation of the Incarnation is 
a self-contradiction, then he would not have been alone on this account either. The 
nineteenth century had witnessed three significant figures who deserve to be mentioned 
in this context. Schleiermacher had rejected the classical two-natures doctrine in The 
Christian Faith. l13 This was largely over the fact that he felt the phrase `two natures in 
one person' to be a wholly inappropriate use of terms. "4 In a radical development from 
Hegel, D. F. Strauss argued that, `In an individual, a God-man, the properties and 
functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves. "15 Also deriving 
his original inspiration from Hegelianism, Ludwig Feuerbach delivered a far-reaching 
critique of Christian doctrine. In The Essence of Christianity he argued that; 
The divine nature, notwithstanding the position that Christ was at once God and 
man, is as much dissevered from the human nature in the incarnation as before it, 
since each nature excludes the conditions of the other, although both are united 
clear evidence from across Kierkegaard's writings, in particular those in which his major Christological 
discussions are presented, whether pseudonymous or signed. As Kierkegaard was not hesitant in 
referring to his major influences, particularly in his Journals, there would certainly exist some 
references if Athanasius fell into this category. 
"'Consider for example the following statement from the Journals that, `The divine and the diabolic 
are the only genuine mysteries, but the mystery of God is revealed in Christ. ' (J&P 292, II A 767 n. d., 
1838; cf. also 288, II A 276 October 13,1838). Whilst on the subject of the 'mystery' of the 
Incarnation, it is perhaps helpful to compare Kierkegaard's ideas on the nature of mystery and paradox 
with some similar comments from Barth's Church Dogmatics 1.2. Barth states that `Christology deals 
with the revelation of God as a mystery. It must first of all be aware of this mystery and then 
acknowledge it as such. ' (Barth 1988,131). Just as Kierkegaard calls the Incarnation `the Absolute 
Paradox', so Barth describes it as being `the prime mystery'. 
God's revelation in its objective reality is the incarnation of His Word, in that He, the one true 
eternal God, is at the same time true Man like us. God's revelation in its objective reality is 
the person of Jesus Christ. In establishing this we have not explained revelation, or made it 
obvious, or brought it into the series of other objects of our knowledge. On the contrary, in 
establishing this and looking back at it we have described and designated it a mystery, and not 
only a mystery but the prime mystery. (Ibid. 172). 
113 Schleiermacher 1989,391ff 
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unity of life coexist with the duality of natures, unless the one gives way to the other, if the one 
exhibits a larger and the other a narrower range, or unless they melt into each other, both 
systems of ways of action and laws really becoming one in the one life. (Ibid. 393). 
115 Strauss 1973,780 
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in one personality, in an incomprehensible, miraculous, i. e., untrue manner, in 
contradiction with the relation which, according to their definition, they stand to 
each other. 116 
Yet, as I have attempted to show, Kierkegaard remains quite Chalcedonian regarding his 
treatment of the two natures doctrine. An early quotation from the Journals helps to 
illustrate this when he states that: `At every moment Christ is God just as much as he is 
man - just as the sky seems to be as deep in the sea as it is high above the sea. ' 
117 As 
such, he is within the mainstream of the broad spectrum of Western theological 
development. Yet his choice of the threatening meta-concept of `the Absolute Paradox' 
does, at first glance, serve to set him apart from by far the majority of theologians. It is 
only when this meta-concept is interpreted correctly that we can begin to appreciate the 
importance of Kierkegaard's Christology. I shall attempt to show this further in the 
next chapter by moving the discussion away from `the Absolute Paradox' and on to an 
evaluation of Kierkegaard's later Christological concepts, such as `the sign of offense' 
and `the sign of contradiction'. 
116 Feuerbach 1957,333-4 
111 J&P 284,11 A 595 n. d., 1837 
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4 
KIERKEGAARD'S CHRISTOLOGY 2: 
THE SIGN OF CONTRADICTION 
I will now consider some further details of Kierkegaard's Christology. The vast 
majority of Kierkegaard's interpreters have chosen to devote their attentions to 
Fragments and the Postscript. This has generally led to discussions devoted almost 
entirely to `the Absolute Paradox', in the mistaken belief that this is the definitive aspect 
of Kierkegaard's doctrine of Christ. However, Kierkegaard was later to develop a far 
richer Christology in Practice in Christianity under the guise of Anti-Climacus. In this 
work Anti-Climacus has little to say about Christ under the heading of `paradox', and 
instead, he challenges his reader with such Christological titles as `the possibility for 
offense' and `the sign of contradiction'. In many ways Anti-Climacus' Christology 
builds upon the aesthetic-poetical foundations already laid by Johannes Climacus in the 
B hypothesis we found in Fragments. The distance between the Christology of Anti- 
Climacus and that of Kierkegaard himself is minimal. In fact, Anti-Climacus generally 
serves to present Kierkegaard's own thought on this topic. Therefore, Practice will be 
compared with certain signed works from the late 1840s to the 1850s and in this way 
illustrate the link between them. For this purpose some of Kierkegaard's Christian 
Discourses (written at the same time as Practice) have been chosen, in addition to the 
signed works For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourselfl which were published in 
1851, and a few passages from the Gospel of Sufferings, published under his own name 
in 1847. 
In order to examine Kierkegaard's Christology further the following strategy is adopted 
in this chapter. The first section of this chapter will explore the Christology presented 
by Climacus in Fragments. This will be with particular reference to the `Parable of the 
King and the Maiden' found in chapter two of Fragments, which Kierkegaard uses as a 
vivid illustration of Climacus' ideas. The parable rhetorically offers two hypothetical 
solutions to the problem of how divine revelation is to be communicated to a human 
subject. The first solution to be offered is that the human subject might be raised to the 
level of divinity. The second is a dramatic reversal of the first, whereby the god descends 
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to humanity as one of us. Within the second possibility (for, after all, we are allegedly 
still musing freely within the framework of the B hypothesis), there arises the problem of 
our being offended by the nature of this divine incarnation. 
Most of the second section of this chapter explains how the nature and problem of this 
offense are expounded by Anti-Climacus in Practice. He carries this out under three 
headings: offense at Christ when viewed merely as a human political figure; offense at 
the `God' in `God-man'; and lastly, offense at the earthly reality of Christ's humanity. 
This section ends with a discussion of the doctrine of `Christ as Redeemer and 
prototype' as expounded within Kierkegaard's direct works and Journals, showing how 
this relates to Anti-Climacus' theology. 
In the third section, I will question whether Kierkegaard is putting forward a form of 
kenotic Christology, that is, whether he envisages Christ as really emptying himself of 
certain properties of his divinity. The final section will then compare Kierkegaard's 
views with Luther's theologia crucis, or theology of the cross, in which the believer 
encounters the reality of God primarily through the suffering Christ on the cross instead 
of the theologia gloriae of works, natural theology, or philosophical speculation. In the 
light of this it will be seen to what extent Kierkegaard is offering us his own version of 
the theology of the cross, and how this serves to determine his whole theological 
method. 
Before progressing further it is necessary to answer a possible objection to this 
discussion. David Law points out that it is debated whether there is a coherent 
Christology as such in Kierkegaard's writings. Those who would adhere to this view 7 
cite the fact that much of the traditional Christological terminology is omitted from 
" 
Kierkegaard's works. Law explains that, `there is little or no discussion of the 
relationship between the divine and human natures in Christ, no discussion of the 
relationship between the Second person and the other Persons of the Trinity, and no 
detailed treatment of the titles applied to Jesus in the New Testament. ' However, Law 
protests that these objections rely upon `too narrow a definition of Christology. 
Christology is Christ-logos, that is discourse on Christ. Since a large proportion of 
Kierkegaard's literary output was devoted to discourse on Christ, we can, I believe, 
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speak of a Kierkegaardian Christology. " In agreement with Law's argument, let us now 
go on to examine the Christology in Philosophical Fragments. 
1. Christology in Philosophical Fragments 
We have already seen that in Fragments Climacus rejects the `Socratic' hypothesis as 
inadequate. We then saw how he posits in its stead the B hypothesis, with its concept of 
the god as teacher, in answer to the question `can the truth be learned? ' I argued that, 
through his answer, Climacus was making an indirect reference to the doctrine of the 
Incarnation. He develops this theme further in the second chapter of Fragments, under 
the heading `The God as Teacher and Saviour'. However, we must be careful not to 
take him too literally, as the chapter's subtitle, `A Poetical Venture', helps to betray the 
aesthetic nature of the discourse that follows. Climacus is careful to remind the reader 
repeatedly that, after all, he is `only a poet'. In addition to this he offers apologies for 
his efforts, because `the reader may already have lost patience when he hears that our 
analogy begins like a fairy tale and is not at all systematic'. 2 At the end of the chapter, 
we come across the words of an apparently enraged reader who protests against 
Climacus' `shabbiest plagiarism, since it is nothing more or less than what any child 
knows'.; The reader's complaint is representative of the reaction Kierkegaard expected 
from the average church-going Dane, someone Kierkegaard hoped would easily see 
through the allegedly hypothetical nature of the text. Climacus responds to the charge 
by denying that he is a plagiarist, in fact, he admits that he is not referring to any human 
invention. So, he claims, `perhaps it is not a poem at all, or in any case is not ascribable 
to any human being or to the race, either. '4 This teaching did not originate in anyone's 
imagination. Behind the rhetorical hypothesizing there stands a matter far too important 
for mere poetic rendition alone. 
Is not the whole thing wondrous, does not this word come to my lips as a 
felicitously foreshadowing word, for do we not, as I in fact said and you yourself 
involuntarily say, stand here before the wonder. And since we both are now 
standing before this wonder, whose solemn silence cannot be disturbed by human 
Law 1993,182 
2PF26 
3 Ibid. 35 
4 Ibid. 
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wrangling about what is mine and what is yours, whose awe-inspiring words 
infinitely drown out human quarrelling about mine and thine, forgive me my 
curious mistaken notion of having composed it myself. It was a mistaken notion, 
and the poem was so different from every human poem that it was no poem at all 
but the wonder. 5 
It could well be that, as Evans suggests, Kierkegaard's own Christian faith slips past the 
pseudonymity at this point in the discussion. 6 However, this seriousness only really 
applies to the closing passage of the chapter, for the most part we are left to delve 
beneath Climacus' aesthetic ponderings in order to discover Kierkegaard's own 
theology. 
Unhappy Love 
The parable (Climacus calls it an `analogy') of the King and the Maiden is introduced 
within the context of a discussion of `unhappy love'. Climacus explains that the god is 
motivated to reveal himself out of love for the human learner, yet this love appears to be 
considerably stronger on one side than on the other. First, although the god certainly 
loves the learner, the learner might not actually be very desirable according to human 
criteria. There is no evidence that the learner does in any way merit the god's love. 7 
Second, the god is eternal, and by virtue of this we may safely conclude that his love is 
also eternal. Yet this love is fulfilled in time, during `the moment', and so this appears 
to be a predominantly one-sided relationship. Climacus describes this as `the relation of 
the eternal resolution to the unequal occasion'. 8 This of course stands in stark contrast 
to the `Socratic' hypothesis, where the relationship between teacher and learner is 
S Ibid. 36. Climacus' use of `the wonder' with reference to the incarnation is somewhat reminiscent of 
the use of `mystery' (whether sacramentum or co µvaTijptov) as was found in the Patristic theologians 
cited in the previous chapter. 
6 Cf. Evans 1992,55 
1A similar theme is later taken up in Gospel of Sufferings. Speaking without the aid of a pseudonym, 
Kierkegaard declares that: 
Humanly speaking, we reckon unhappy love to be the hardest form of suffering, but we may go 
further, for of unhappy love the hardest, the most agonising, form, is when love's object is 
essentially unworthy of being loved, and yet it is this object that the lover in his inmost being 
longs for as for his unique desire. For is love's object is in fact by its nature worthy of being 
the object, but yet fulfilment is denied, then an unhappy love is less unhappy, less agonising. 
Then fu filment may be denied, but the object is not lost; on the contrary, it holds all that 
perfection in itself that so completely satisfies what love demands. (GOS 67). 
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posited as being one of equals. 9 For Climacus, the existence of such inequality between 
the god and the learner seems to present us with a problem in need of his resolution, for 
what can be the god's motivation for revealing himself to such an undeserving subject? 
Out of love, therefore, the god must be eternally resolved in this way, but just as 
his love is the basis, so also must love be the goal, for it would indeed be a 
contradiction for the god to have a basis of movement and a goal that do not 
correspond to this. The love, then, must be for the learner, and the goal must be 
to win him, for only in love is the different made equal, and only in equality or in 
unity is there understanding. Without perfect understanding, the teacher is not 
the god, unless the basic reason is to be sought in the learner, who rejected what 
was made possible for him. 'o 
Climacus' dilemma concerns how the god will be able to reveal himself appropriately to 
the capacity of the human subject: `this love is basically unhappy, for they are very 
unequal, and what seems so easy - namely, that the god must be able to make himself 
understood - is not so easy if he is not to destroy that which is different. 
" So, we are 
confronted with the problem. On the one hand, the god, who is self-existent, motivated 
wholly out of selfless love and sinless, desires to reveal himself to humanity, which is 
sinful, totally dependent upon the god (although blissfully unaware of this need as yet), 
and, in comparison with the god, extremely fragile. Climacus considers the possibility of 
communication between the two to be difficult, to say the least. Unable to explain the 
situation literally, Climacus metaphorically compares it to two types of unhappy love. 
The first arises because the two lovers cannot be together, the second arises because 
they are unable to understand each other. In the latter situation, `this infinitely deeper 
sorrow is identified essentially with the superior person, for he alone also understands 
the misunderstanding. It is identified essentially only with the god, because no human 
situation can provide a valid analogy, even though we shall suggest one here in order to 
awaken the mind to an understanding of the divine. '12 In this way Climacus introduces 
the `Parable of the King and the Maiden'. 
9 Ibid. 24 




The Parable of the King and the Maiden 
Climacus relates his analogy, or parable, very much in the manner of a fairy tale. This is 
perhaps not all that surprising when we realise that he was an acquaintance of the 
novelist Hans Christian Andersen, and that he wrote his first book, From the Papers of 
One Still Living, as a satirical attack upon Andersen's work Only a Fiddler. '3 
However, rather than branching out his expertise into the writing of fairy tales, it is 
possible that Kierkegaard is adopting this method as a minor ironic jibe at the Romantic 
fascination with folklore. This fascination had been inaugurated, on the cultural level, by 
Johann Gottfried Herder towards the end of the eighteenth century. It was then carried 
on after him in a more political vein by Clemens Brentano and Achim von Arnim. 14 
Although this movement is now best remembered in Britain through the works of the 
Brothers Grimm, the interest in national folklore contributed in some ways to the growth 
of nationalist feelings and `culture Protestantism' amongst German intellectuals that 
Kierkegaard despised. In lightly presenting his hypothesis as a fairy tale, the very form 
of Climacus' parable was in ironic mimicry of the Romantic genre, in some ways being 
in anticipation of his polemical, satirical verdict upon his contemporaries. 
Passing swiftly on from form to content, the parable relates how there was a king who 
had fallen deeply in love with `a maiden of lowly station in life'. Yet this particular king 
terrified all those around him, hence, 
His resolution was easy to carry out, for every politician feared his wrath and 
dared not even to hint at anything. Every foreign country trembled before his 
power and dared not to refrain from sending a congratulatory delegation to the 
wedding. And no cringing courtier, grovelling before him, dared to hurt his 
feelings lest his own head be crushed. " 
Yet the king could not ever let her know of his feelings, for how could it be possible for 
such a king as this to tell the maiden of his love for her? There would be no way that 
she could respond to his love freely. Instead, in this fairy tale medieval world, there 
would always be the fact that he was the king, and she but a commoner, to prevent them 
13 Cf. Collins 1983,8 
14 Cranston 1994,45 
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from feeling as equals in each other's company. `Alone he grappled with the sorrow in 
his heart: whether the girl would be made happy by this, whether she would acquire the 
bold confidence never to remember what the king only wished to forget - that he was 
the king and she had been a lowly maiden. ' 16 
Climacus breaks from the story a moment in order to relate the analogy back to the rest 
of the argument in Fragments. 
Now if the moment is to have decisive significance (and without this we return 
to the Socratic ... 
), the learner is in untruth, indeed, is there through his own 
fault - and yet he is the object of the god's love. The god wants to be his 
teacher, and the god's concern is to bring about equality. If this cannot be 
brought about, the love becomes unhappy and the instruction meaningless, for 
they were unable to understand each other. We probably think that this may be a 
matter of indifference to the god, since he does not need the learner, but we 
forget - or rather, alas, we demonstrate - how far we are from understanding 
him; we forget that he does indeed love the learner. '7 
If Climacus is to be taken at all seriously, it is actually the god who is in difficulty and in 
need of some help to overcome this problem! Just as the king wonders how he could 
approach the maiden he loves without frightening her into terrified submission, so the 
god `knows how nearly impossible it is to maintain the learner's bold confidence, 
without which understanding and equality disappear and the love is unhappy'. '8 We find 
that the god is at a loss, and who can offer assistance but the poet? Climacus graciously 
comes to his aid. After all, `the poet's task is to find a solution, a point of unity where 
there is in truth love's understanding, where the god's concern has overcome its pain, 
for this is the unfathomable love that is not satisfied with what the object of love might 
foolishly consider himself blissfully happy to have. " 19 
According to M. Holmes Hartshorne, Climacus' apparently arrogant attitude in this 
context illustrates `the aesthetical standpoint in its cold, cynical purity, barely disguised 
16 Ibid 27 
17 Ibid. 28 
'$ Ibid 
19 Ibid. 28-29 
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as religious concern'. 20 At first this might seem to be a harsh judgement. After all, this 
is but a fairy tale and every good fairy tale must have its narrator, be he a medieval bard 
or a Romantic poet. His is a pivotal role in making the story come alive for the reader, 
and the narrator is in a sense a part of the tale and yet, at the same time, he maintains a 
certain theatrical distance from the plot and the characters participating in the story 
which he brings to us. Yet, Climacus' parable is not a passion play but a fictional 
hypothesis, composed solely for his own intellectual amusement. He never asks to be 
taken seriously and in the book's preface he evens forbids it. Towards the end of this 
chapter he admits to his `plagiarism', thereby further absolving himself from any 
responsibility for the book's contents. 21 The god of his deliberations might not 
necessarily be the Christian God, '2 and Climacus cannot recognize the seriousness of the 
subject he tackles as the religious life- view is beyond him. Holmes Hartshorne's 
interpretation fails to realise that Climacus does not wish to deceive us into believing 
that he really exists within the religious life view. Instead Climacus just, quite casually, 
presents some possibilities for our consideration. 
Possibility A 
As Climacus explains his two possibilities, he constantly alternates, almost as if at 
random, from talking about the king and the maiden in the fairy tale, to talking about the 
god and the learner in the B Hypothesis of the main argument of Fragments itself. In 
this way the analogy and the hypothesis are closely intertwined. He places his two 
possibilities under the headings of A and B. In so doing he leaves the reader to wonder 
whether these are in any way to be referred back to certain themes within the `Socratic', 
or A Hypothesis, and the B Hypothesis (of which this chapter is a part). As I discuss the 
possibilities, it will become apparent whether or not this is an appropriate link to be 
made. 
20 Hartshorne 1990,34 
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Within possibility A there are two options. The first of these is that the god and the 
learner are to be made equal through the learner being elevated to the same state as that 
of the god. As Climacus explains, 
The god would then draw the learner up toward himself, exalt him, divert him 
with joy lasting a thousand years (for to him a thousand years are as one day), let 
the learner forget the misunderstanding in his tumult of joy. Yes, the learner 
would perhaps be very much inclined to consider himself blissfully happy because 
of this. And would it not be glorious suddenly to score a great success because 
the god's eye fell on him, just as it would be for that lowly maiden; would it not 
be glorious to be of assistance to him in taking the whole thing in vain, deceived 
by his own heart! 23 
This is, however, not an effective solution and it actually turns out to be nothing more 
than a hollow deception. Instead of dealing with that most important and limiting 
difference between humanity and deity, namely, that caused by human sin, this possibility 
can only make the god forget all about the learner's sin. In possibility A it is not 
suggested that the problem of sin is first cancelled out by the outworking of divine 
grace, after which the now perfect learner is deified. Instead, it implies that the still 
sinful learner becomes an immortal. There is no question of repentance. Neither is it 
even mentioned that the learner is at all aware of his sin, nor whether sin is construed as 
forming any sort of barrier between humanity and the god. This possibility is 
reminiscent of the Socratic Hypothesis which we encountered earlier, as here too the 
problem of sin is disregarded. As Stephen Dunning puts it, 
In both cases, the opposition between the human and the divine is denied by 
divinizing the human. It is salvation by apotheosis. The learner simply forgets 
his error and sin; they are shown to be of no more consequence for the relation 
with the divine teacher than were the historical occasions or the Socratic learner. 
In short, apotheosis begs the question; it denies the very problem that the 
possibility of revelation poses. 24 
Quite understandably, Climacus does not even pretend to support this option, yet not 
because of the problem of sin. To him the first option of possibility A is but a deception 
23 lbld 29 
24 Dunning 1985,170 
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because, `one is most terribly deceived when one does not even suspect it but remains as 
if spellbound by a change of costume. '25 Once the learner is deified by the god, or, to 
return to the fairy tale, once the maiden is granted the status of royalty, each one faces 
the following personal dilemma: have I been exalted because I am loved, or am I loved 
because of my recent exaltation? Unsure whether they were equally precious in their 
original, humble state, they are unsure of their standing in the new situation. After all, if 
someone were to take away the maiden's regal costume, would she still be a queen in 
her rags? So then, Climacus needs to find an option in which the learner, and the 
maiden, can be genuinely loved without being inappropriately transformed into 
something that they are not. In this way Kierkegaard allows his pseudonym to begin to 
affirm the intrinsic dignity of human persons. 
The second option within possibility A is that, `the unity could be brought about by the 
god's appearing to the learner, accepting his adoration, and thereby making him forget 
himself. Likewise, the king could have appeared before the lowly maiden in all his 
splendor, could have let the sun of his glory rise over her hut, shine on the spot where 
he appeared to her, and let her forget herself in adoring admiration. '26 Yet here again 
we are faced with the problem of deception. Climacus continues, 
This would perhaps have satisfied the girl, but it could not satisfy the king, for he 
did not want his own glorification but the girl's, and his sorrow would be very 
grievous because she would not understand him; but for him it would be still 
more grievous to deceive her. In his own eyes, just to express his love 
incompletely would be a deception, even if no one understood him, even if 
reproach sought to vex his soul. 27 
What involves the pomp and splendour of a royal visit in the fairy tale, becomes the 
direct self-revelation of the god in the Hypothesis. In both cases the problem is the 
same: how can either the maiden, or the learner, freely respond to the offer of love? The 
maiden would be totally overawed by the mighty king's personal visit and any chance of 
him discovering her real feelings for him would be denied. Likewise, if the god chose to 
appear to the learner in the manner of, say an Old Testament theophany, then it seems 
25 PF 29 
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highly likely that the learner would fall on his knees in front of him just as much out of 
fear as out of any other motive. This reaction is especially pertinent if we remember that 
the learner is `untruth' in that he is orientated against the truth. 28 In this case he could 
just as easily recoil in horror if the god in whom he had never believed suddenly turned 
up in front of him! Thoughts of selfless love, mutual equality and intimate divine-human 
relationships would probably be the last things to cross his troubled mind on such an 
auspicious occasion. 
Yet the fact remains that the god earnestly desires to express his love in a way 
appropriate to the learner, and he cannot rest content until this has been done. What has 
become apparent is that, however this may be done, the god must allow the learner the 
genuine freedom to respond with whatever love he is able. There must be no reaction 
out of fear or any other negative motive. Such a response would be one of 
misunderstanding, creating a vast distance between the god and the learner, and that is 
exactly what Climacus' poetic solution is trying to avoid. 
Stephen Dunning argues that through the above discussion it is shown that `the god is. . 
. totally other and cannot 
be revealed to mere humans. With the logical rigour of an 
Apollinarius, Climacus asserts the incapacity of human nature to host the divine. '29 
Dunning's position denies, not only the possibility of a real divine self-revelation, but 
also prohibits any orthodox understanding of the Incarnation. There can therefore be no 
`point of unity' and Climacus' search for a solution to the god's problem is in vain. To 
agree with Dunning here would mean to subvert the very theological principles that 
motivated Kierkegaard to write Fragments in the first place. Namely, that God has 
chosen to reveal himself to humanity, and, that this has been accomplished to the 
greatest possible extent in and through the historically real event of the Incarnation. As 
I have constantly argued in the previous two chapters, Kierkegaard understood the 
greatest problematic difference between God and humanity to be sin, not finitude (which 
almost pales into insignificance by comparison), and hence because of this, `God is at 
one and the same time infinitely close to man and infinitely far away. '3° There is never at 
"' Ibid 13f 
29 Dunning 1985,170 
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any point, either through Climacus, or through Kierkegaard himself when writing 
`directly', the assertion that the divine cannot assume human nature. 
Instead, we find that what is said in the passage is that: `not to disclose itself is the death 
of love; to disclose itself is the death of the beloved. '31 By this Climacus is stating that 
the god's love must be expressed. Otherwise it is as if it were `dead', but, as we have 
seen, the direct, theophanous manner would render the learner insignificant in the 
process as they lose themselves in the reality of the divine, and hence contribute to their 
apparent `death'. True, the learner would be deified, and the maiden would be a queen, 
but they would no longer be the free individuals they once were, and this is what is so 
important to the god and to the king. 
`The human mind so often aspires to might and power', he continues, `and in its 
constant preoccupation with this thought, as if achieving it would transfigure everything, 
it does not suspect that there is not only joy in heaven but sorrow also: how grievous it 
is to have to deny the learner that to which he aspires with his whole soul and to have to 
deny it precisely because he is the beloved. '32 The learner would gladly welcome the 
god's love and deification, but if this is simply handed out in obvious splendour and in 
full view of others, would the learner really value it, would he really love the god? The 
situation is the same with the maiden. It would be easy for her to feign love when 
accepting an offer of marriage from the most powerful king on earth, and so the king is 
loved for the power and position he brings. But what if the same offer came from 
somebody at the bottom of the social pile? This leads us to possibility B. 
Possibility B 
So, Climacus' concern is to find a way to the truth that, whilst allowing the learner to 
have significance, manages to avoid the failings of the `Socratic'. Previously it was seen 
that the learner becomes the midpoint, and that the teacher finds himself dismissed as 
being unimportantly `accidental'. 
If, however, the moment is to have decisive significance ... then this [i. e. the 
`Socratic'] is certainly not the truth, for the learner owes the teacher everything. 
31 PF 30 
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Just as the teacher's love, Socratically understood, would be a deceiver's love if 
he let the pupil go on thinking that he actually owed him something, whereas the 
teacher was supposed to assist him to become sufficient unto himself, so the 
god's love - if he wants to be a teacher - must be not only an assisting love but 
also a procreative love by which he gives birth to the learner, or, as we have 
called him, one born again, meaning the transition from `not to be' to `to be' 33 
In possibility B there can be no question of the god's role being accidental, in fact 
Climacus accentuates the god's role to the highest degree as `the learner owes the 
teacher everything'. Because of this, we can see that possibility B is already beginning 
to resemble the B Hypothesis of the previous chapter. Yet, the god's love requires that 
the learner cannot in any way be disregarded in this process, despite the inequality that 
stands between them. Possibility A offered us two options whereby, in effect, the 
learner is `annihilated'. Through the god's actions, according to possibility B, the 
learner is enabled to be himself to a far higher degree than he was before. Yet, things 
are not so clear-cut as in the previous options, and it is not long before we find ourselves 
being confronted with some `paradoxes'. Climacus tells us that, 
The truth then is that the learner owes him everything, but that which makes 
understanding so difficult is precisely this: that he becomes nothing and yet is not 
annihilated; that he owes him everything and yet becomes boldly confident; that 
he understands the truth, but the truth makes him free; that he grasps the guilt of 
untruth, and then again bold confidence triumphs in the truth. 34 
There exists here a dialectical relationship between god and learner, as the learner, 
though still confined to the limitations of finite, sinful humanity, is enabled to be himself 
as he recognises the truth and reality of his state before the god. 
However, how does Climacus suggest that this is possible? If it is not appropriate to 
elevate the learner to the status of divinity, nor for the god to appear to the same learner 
in a triumphant blaze of glory, then what other option remains for the god? 
If, then, the unity could not be brought about by an ascent, then it must be 
attempted by a descent. Let the learner be X, and this X must also include the 
lowliest, for even Socrates did not keep company solely with brilliant minds, how 
33 Ibid 30 
34 Ibid 301 
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then could the god make distinctions! In order for unity to be effected, the god 
must become like this one. He will appear, therefore, as the equal of the lowliest 
of persons. But the lowliest of all is one who must serve others - consequently, 
the god will appear in the form of a servant. " 
In a radical reversal of roles, the god adopts a most unlikely appearance in order to 
communicate his love to the learner effectively: the master becomes the servant. 
For the king, such an action would involve dressing up as a peasant and acting the 
relevant part until the maiden came to love him in that state. The weak point in the 
argument is that in the fairy tale the king must himself hide behind a facade. On this 
point the analogy really begins to break down, for, on this level possibility B falls into 
the same trap of requiring the king to deceive the maiden. Once she falls in love with 
the king as a peasant, he will at some point have to come clean and admit his true 
identity - that all the time he was really the king and it was only a costume act that had 
made him out to be otherwise. Where she had previously thought she loved her equal, 
the maiden now finds herself with her tyrannical overlord. Where is the equality in their 
situation now? The maiden remains a servant girl and the king remains a king. The 
difference is still there between them and the moment that the king shows his true nature 
it is as if we are in the royal visit suggested in possibility A. What is there to prevent the 
maiden from feeling deceived? There is of course the possibility that her love for the 
king would overcome such feelings, but the king runs a serious risk that this may not be 
the case. 
Returning to the B Hypothesis, the situation between the god and the learner is different 
and such deception is painstakingly avoided. Climacus explains, 
But this form of a servant is not something put on like the king's plebeian cloak, 
which just by flapping open would betray the king ... - but is his true 
form. For 
this is the boundlessness of love, that in earnestness and in truth and not in jest it 
wills to be the equal of the beloved, and it is the omnipotence of resolving love 
to be capable of that of which neither the king nor Socrates was capable, which 
is why their assumed characters were still a kind of deceit. 36 
35 Ibid. 31 
36 Ibid 31-2 
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From this passage onwards we leave the fairy tale behind, and the rest of Climacus' 
discussion refers solely to the B Hypothesis itself. However, the aesthetic-poetical 
banter of Climacus' earlier deliberations now gives way to a more serious reflection 
upon the surprising nature of the god's incarnation. 
Climacus' main concern is to illustrate the actuality of the god's human nature. 
Alongside this he is careful to stress throughout the hypothesis that the god is acting out 
of unconditional love for the learner. Apart from these two concerns, much of what 
would be demanded for a comprehensive, systematic Christology is omitted. Rather 
than interpret this as a doctrinal failing on Kierkegaard's part, we must be careful to 
remember that Fragments is intended to be an introduction, not to Christian doctrine, 
`but to becoming a Christian. 37 Catechetical instruction can follow conversion, and it is 
the task of the various Discourses and later works such as Practice in Christianity to 
expound upon some of the finer theological details of his Christology. 
Regarding the god's human nature, Climacus asserts that `it is his true form', and that 
there can be no deception. So, clearly Climacus is no docetist, for the god does not 
appear to be human, he is human. Neither is his argument suggestive of 
monophysitism. We must remember that he is only stressing certain aspects of the 
Incarnation and because of that, Kierkegaard purposefully prohibits Climacus from 
embarking upon the subtleties of wider Christological and Trinitarian theology. All we 
need to know here is that God ('the god' for Climacus) loves us and comes to us as the 
historical person of Christ. He stresses the human nature in phrase with obvious Biblical 
allusions: `therefore the god must suffer all things, endure all things, be tried in all 
things, hunger in the desert, thirst in his agonies, be forsaken in death, absolutely the 
equal of the lowliest of human beings - look, behold the man! 08 
With this `Ecce homo! ' Climacus' god is seen to be the lowest common denominator, 
and in that way he is able to reach out to the learner, whatever the learner's status may 
be. `For love', he explains, 
37 CUP 1: 381ff 
38 1bid 1: 32-3 
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Any other revelation would be a deception, because either it would first have had 
to accomplish a change in the learner (love, however, does not change the 
beloved but changes itself) and conceal from him that this was needed, or in 
superficiality it would have had to remain ignorant that the whole understanding 
between them was a delusion (this is the untruth of paganism). For the god's 
love any other revelation would be a deception. 39 
However, there is no delusion on the god's side that the learner will automatically 
respond with anything like the love that he has offered him. In adopting the reality of a 
human nature the god makes himself vulnerable, not only to physical suffering and 
death, but to the possibility of being rejected by the learner he came to save. The lowly 
manner of his manifestation would seem absurd, almost as if he were inferior to us, but, 
If I pleaded with him to change his resolution, to manifest himself in some other 
way, to spare himself, then he would look at me and say: Man, what have you to 
do with me; go away, for you are of Satan, even if you yourself do not 
understand it! Or, if he just once stretched out his hand to bid it happen, and if I 
were to think that I understood him better or loved him more, I would then very 
likely see him weep also for me and hear him say: To think that you could 
become so unfaithful to me and grieve love in this way; so you love only the 
omnipotent one who performs miracles, not him who humbled himself in equality 
with you. 4° 
The notion of the god becoming like this all for the sake of the learner is something that 
is difficult to comprehend. In this way the god's incarnation serves to challenge all 
previously held concepts of divinity. 
And the situation of the understanding - in its frailty, how close it is at every 
moment to the border of misunderstanding when the anxieties of guilt disturb the 
peace of love. And the situation of understanding - how terrifying, for indeed it 
is less terrifying to fall upon one's face while the mountains tremble at the god's 
voice than to sit with him as his equal, and yet the god's concern is precisely to 
sit this way. 4' 
39 Ibid. 1: 33 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid. 1: 34-5 
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Such a notion of equality stands in stark contrast to human hopes of glorification and 
worldly power. In this way our whole process of making theological value judgements 
is itself judged and found to be wanting. The god's entry into our form of existence 
calls into question our very ability to recognise the truth at all. `Look, there he stands - 
the god. Where? There. Can you not see him? He is the god, and yet he has no place 
where he can lay his head, and he does not dare to turn to any person lest that person be 
offended at him. '42 So, the god becomes one of us, but we do not like what we see and 
find him offensive. Or, unable to penetrate the divine incognito, we are offended that 
our own abilities are inadequate without his assistance. With the possibility of offense it 
becomes appropriate to turn to the Christology of Practice in Christianity. In this Anti- 
Climacus presents Kierkegaard's theology in greater detail, and, in a manner that is more 
overtly within the Christian tradition. From this it will be seen that the possibility of 
offense, not paradox, stands as the hallmark of Kierkegaard's Christology. 
2. Christology in the Later Writings 
We meet with several different pictures of Christ in Kierkegaard's later writings. As I 
claimed in the introduction to this chapter, Kierkegaard chose to offer much of his own 
Christology through the mouthpiece of Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity. In 
addition to this he presented it as more noticeably his own in some of the signed works 
from 1848 onwards. To support this assertion, I will use material from some of these 
signed works such as Christian Discourses, Gospel of Sufferings, For Self-Examination 
and Judge For. Yourself! at certain points in the following text where the connection is 
most obvious. The Christology of these later works builds upon the foundations 
already laid through Climacus in Fragments, although it does, quite understandably, lack 
his aesthetical-poetical approach to the subject. However, there are some differences 
between the two, a factor that may be attributed to the different perspectives of 
Climacus and Anti-Climacus/Kierkegaard rather than any conscious shift in doctrine on 
Kierkegaard's part. For instance, where in Fragments Climacus talks impersonally of 
`the paradox', Anti-Climacus, in the second part of Practice in Christianity, chooses 
42 Ibid. 1: 32 
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instead to refer to Christ as `the possibility of offense'. It is largely under this somewhat 
threatening heading that I have chosen to examine his Christology. Anti-Climacus 
considers Christ to be `the possibility of offense' in three different senses. In the first 
section I will discuss `the possibility of offense that is not related Christ as Christ (the 
God-man) but to him simply as an individual human being who comes into collision with 
an established order'. 43 Second, and more important, is `the possibility of essential 
offense in relation to loftiness, that an individual human being speaks or acts as if he 
were God, declares himself to, be God, therefore in relation to the qualification "God" in 
the composition God-man'. 44 Third, which is the key to Kierkegaard's Christology as a 
whole, comes `the possibility of essential offense in relation to lowliness, that the one 
who passes himself off as God proves to be the lowly, poor, suffering, and finally 
powerless human being'. 45 In the following three sections each of these categories of 
offense will be discussed in turn, with reference to the signed works and Jounials as 
well as to Practice. After these will be a fourth section in which I examine 
Kierkegaard's doctrine of Christ as Redeemer and prototype as it is found in the later 
writings. This theme follows on directly from the last possibility of offense and forms a 
more traditionally recognisable Christological discussion within his thought. In this way 
it will be possible to explain and evaluate the details of Kierkegaard's doctrine of the 
person of Christ. 
Offense at the Christ Who Comes into Collision with an Established Order 
Anti-Climacus cites two New Testament passages in support of this first category of 
offense. Matthew 15: 1-12 relates how Christ and the disciples clashed with scribes and 
Pharisees over a matter of ritual cleanliness. Then in Matthew 17: 24-27 tax collectors 
question Peter on Jesus' payment of the temple tax. In neither case is the dispute over 
whether Jesus is God, nor does it arise over whether he is the hoped for Messiah. 
Instead the matter is quite mundane: will an individual human being respect the norms of 
his society? The concern is not over a matter of mere etiquette however, and the real 
question underlying the words of Christ's contemporaries is this: `Is the single individual 
43 PC 85 
44 Ibid. 94 
45 Ibid. 102 
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higher than the established order? With this question or, more correctly, with this 
protest, the established order wants to force him either to come back again or to state 
categorically that he is more than human - and then the offense is present. 46 
The offense arises out of Christ's seeming to place himself in the position of being able 
to pass judgement upon the order and traditions of his surrounding society. In taking 
such an elevated stance does he consider himself to be more than human? However, 
there is nothing distinctively Christological in this situation and Anti-Climacus argues 
that it is possible for any individual person to find himself in this position. 
Here Christ is in the more ordinary sense a teacher, a teacher of godliness, of 
inwardness, who with originality (without any question of his claim to be God) 
emphasises inwardness in contrast to empty outwardness, a teacher who 
transforms outwardness into inwardness. This is the collision, a collision that 
appears again and again in Christendom; to put it briefly, it is the collision of 
pietism with the established order. 47 
Where Christianity had become `Christendom', that most despised of Kierkegaard's 
objects of attack, he saw only an impersonal institution, a faceless crowd. Kierkegaard 
believed that the individual Christian possesses the inalienable right to stand up for the 
truth of his or her beliefs, even when this entailed contradicting those of the majority. It 
is at such a moment of collision that the believer's choice to follow Christ is made 
manifest in his life, and through it is the truth of the gospel proclaimed. In his later years 
Kierkegaard was again to associate this form of Christianity with pietism: 
Yes, indeed, pietism (properly understood, not simply in the sense of abstaining 
from dancing and such externals, no, in the sense of witnessing for the truth and 
suffering for it, together with the understanding, together with the understanding 
that suffering in this world belongs to being a Christian, and that a shrewd and 
secular conformity with this world is unchristian) - yes, indeed, pietism is the one 
and only consequence of Christianity. 48 
46 jjCI. 85 
47 Ibid. 
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It follows therefore that real Christianity cannot avoid this collision, and so he declares 
that, `to be a Christian in Christendom in plain and simple conformity is just as 
impossible as doing gymnastics in a straightjacket. '49 
It is interesting to observe that there are similarities between this form of offense at 
Christ and the reaction of the early pseudonym Johannes de Silentio to Abraham in Fear 
and Trembling. Johannes de Silentio has difficulties accepting the religious faith of 
Abraham, specifically at the point when Abraham is called by God to sacrifice his only 
son Isaac as recounted in Genesis 22. Such a calling clearly contravenes the genteel 
morality of Johannes' bourgeois society and he cannot conceive of how God could 
possibly require such an action. To Johannes the demands of the religious life, in order 
to be reasonable, must be in conformity with the accepted moral standards of the society 
in which one lives: the `universal', or the ethical life-view. Abraham, however, bases his 
life upon the revealed will of God, without recourse to the approval of his 
contemporaries, thereby positing a higher authority than the `universal'. On this 
Johannes de Silentio begins to sound a little like his namesake, Johannes Climacus: 
`Now we are face to face with the paradox. Either the single individual as the single 
individual can stand in an absolute relation to the absolute, and consequently the ethical 
is not the highest, or Abraham is lost. "0 For Abraham, God is the absolute measure of 
all things, whereas society (or the state, the establishment, etc. ) provides but a relative 
standard. In this case the object of true faith must be something, or rather someone, 
who transcends the immanent surroundings of the individual. Otherwise faith becomes 
acceptance of the norm, whatever the norm might be, and hence faith becomes 
something that is neither distinctive nor valued. As Silentio chooses to put it: 
`Therefore, either there is an absolute duty to God - and if there is such a thing, it is the 
paradox just described, that the single individual as the single individual is higher than 
the universal and as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute - 
or else faith has never existed, or else Abraham is lost. '51 
The reaction of Silentio is that of the universal, or the established order. He is the one 
offended by Abraham, the man of faith, and he is also likely to be offended by Christ for 
49 Ibid. 409, XI 2A 349 n. d., 1854 
50F&T 113 
51 Ibid. 81 
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similar reasons. Kierkegaard uses Anti-Climacus to speak from the other side of the 
relationship. Through the myth of Christendom the established order becomes deified. 
In Practice this is somewhat unsurprisingly attributed to Hegel, although we need not 
consider him the only culprit as this is a modem example of a tendency that has often 
occurred in world history. It follows from such a deification that any protest against the 
established order is then seen as rebellion against God, with the assumption that 
whoever rebels is somehow claiming divinity. When deity is understood entirely in 
terms of what is embodied by the established order this leads to the secularization of 
everything, even the believer's relationship with God. 52 When nothing higher than this 
established order can be visualised by those who are within it, it becomes the object of 
ultimate loyalty and devotion, the immanent god made in our own image. As Anti- 
Climacus puts it: `so holy do people always become when they deify the established 
order that their worship makes a fool of God: under the guise of worshipping and 
adoring God, they worship and adore their own invention. 53 This distorted image 
becomes the criterion for all that is true. Such an image is threatened by the Christ who 
calls their very presuppositions into question. He posits in their stead a different kind of 
piety, one that is defined through relationship with the transcendent God who is distinct 
from the established order. Anti-Climacus' Christ does this with the simple authority of 
a teacher with no claim to divinity, yet the reaction of the established order is to charge 
him with blasphemy. In reality, the situation is reversed as it is the self-deified 
establishment which is found to be blasphemous. 54 
The vision of Christ as the champion of individual rights, of unorthodoxy and of protest 
against an unjust establishment may well be a popular one today. It fits in well with the 
political theologies that have arisen out of the dissatisfactions permeating many levels of 
contemporary society. To a certain degree there were similar feelings in the mid 
nineteenth century. It witnessed the composition of the Communist Manifesto, plus the 
violent outbreak and aftermath of the 1848 revolutions that occurred throughout much 
of mainland Europe. Yet it will be seen that Kierkegaard was not limiting his 
Christology to the confines of secular protest and liberation, however important both of 
52 PC 87 
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these might be. If he were to do this there would be little distance between his theology 
and those in the Enlightenment who wished to portray Christ as a merely human teacher. 
In this way Christ-the-teacher was often conceived along similar lines to Socrates, 
namely, as the innocent individual condemned by a society that failed to understand him. 
Although there are differences in that, unlike the first view, the later portrayal tended to 
be little more than a defence of Enlightenment values, in both versions the result is that 
the Gospel message is confined to ethics and the Kingdom of God does not transcend 
the boundaries of this earth. 
Such a humanistic Christology would fail to do justice to Christ's divinity and to the 
extent of his saving work. Besides which it -goes against the whole tenor of 
Kierkegaard's affirmation of Christ's humanity and deity through his proclamation of 
`the Absolute Paradox' as discussed in the previous chapter. In Practice, any purely 
human Christology is considered to be an `aberration', or `a fallacy with respect to the 
God-man' of which Ebionitism is cited as the prime example. " For that reason, the 
offense against Christ in this category is not what Anti-Climacus terms `essential' 
offense, for it 'd6es not relate specifically to Christ as Christ, as the God-man'. 
56 To 
discover what this entails we must move on to discuss the next category of offense. 
Essential Offense Against Loftiness 
The second form of offense is in essence the opposite of the first. Where previously 
Christ was envisaged as a purely human figure, an offense to `respectable' society due to 
his priorities, in the second category the case is regarding `the possibility of essential 
offense in relation to loftiness, that an individual human being speaks or acts as if he 
were God, declares himself to be God, therefore in relation to the qualification "God" in 
the composition God-man'. 57 Anti-Climacus further explains that on this occasion `the 
contradiction in which the possibility of offense lies is to be an individual human being, a 
lowly human being - and then to act in the character of being God'. 
58 Passages used to 
illustrate this category of offense at Christ are Matthew 11: 3-6 and John 6: 51-61. Both 
55 PC 123 
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of these episodes relate how people are faced with the situation where Jesus challenges 
them to accept who he really is, something which seems to be wholly incompatible with 
his human nature. In the passage from Matthew's Gospel, John the Baptist sends a 
messenger to ask Jesus if he is the Messiah. Jesus' reply is to point to his actions and 
then state `and blessed is he who is not offended at me', 59 thereby leaving John to decide 
the answer for himself. This surely begs the question that, if not even John the Baptist 
was immediately able to recognise Jesus for who he is, then what about the rest of his 
contemporaries? Through this passage, and Anti-Climacus' discussion of it, it becomes 
clear that he was by no means directly recognizable as the Son of God. `Pay attention to 
the situation of contemporaneity', Anti-Climacus warns the reader, `if you do not pay 
attention to that, then you deceive yourself into a delusion. The point is that in 
Christendom one has only a fantasy picture of Christ, a fantasy God-figure, directly 
related to performing miracles. But this is an untruth: Christ never looked like that. 60 
Over the centuries it has become easy for Christian apologists to stress the significance 
of the miraculous events in Christ's life and so use them as seemingly conclusive 
evidence for his divinity. In this way it appears pure madness for those around him not 
to recognise him. But through the Gospel passages it is brought home to us that this 
was not necessarily the case. It is important to remember that there existed a constant 
contradiction between Christ's outward appearance and the fact that he performed 
miracles. Many people would have had little trouble in revering him as a great teacher, 
even as one chosen by God, but the idea of him actually being divine was another matter 
entirely - in Anti-Climacus' terms, one that was liable to cause offense. 
If this level of offense is omitted it becomes possible to believe that Christ's divinity was 
directly visible, something Anti-Climacus is at great pains to deny wholeheartedly. 61 Yet 
it remains quite a common practice to treat the miracles in particular as providing direct 
and conclusive demonstrations of this fact: 
In Christendom ... every 
demonstration and every folio end with: ergo, Christ 
was the one he claimed to be. By means of the demonstrations it is just as 
certain as 2+2=4 and as easy as putting one's foot into a sock. With this 
59 Ibid. 94 
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irrefutable `ergo', which directly clarifies the matter, the assistant professor and 
preacher bid defiance, and the missionary confidently goes forth to convert the 
heathen with this `ergo' 62 
This leads to a rationalist form of apologetics that is unfaithful to the Biblical witness. 
There will be a full discussion of Kierkegaard's approach to Christian apologetics 
alongside consideration of his treatment of the traditional proofs of God's existence in 
the next chapter. However, at this point it is pertinent to consider the Christological 
implications of Anti-Climacus' discussion. In this context, the claim that Christ's 
divinity was directly visible may be seen to lend itself to a form of docetism. This would 
claim that Christ's humanity is but an appearance, and hence, `Jesus the man is the 
transparent cloak for God. '63 Although docetism formed one of the most ancient of 
Christological heresies in the early Christian period, arising out of Gnosticism, similar 
ideas have persisted into the modern age. John Macquarrie cites Kant's humanistic 
Christology as an example as his Jesus is merely the temporal personification of the 
eternal moral archetype ('the personified idea of the good principle'), an archetype that 
is recognizable to all rational beings through its conformity with an eternal ideal that is 
already present in their minds. 64 
The second passage used to illustrate `the possibility of essential offense at loftiness `65 is 
the `Bread of Life' discourse in John 6: 51-62, where many followers found Christ's 
teaching about himself hard to bear. But, nearly two thousand years later, the original 
difficulty of this passage can easily be overlooked. `These words have now been placed 
in the context of Holy Communion; a doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body has been 
advanced, and because one has in Christendom a fantastic Christ-figure, all this is not 
incomprehensible and in no way does it contain the possibility of offense. '66 On the 
reference to the ubiquity of Christ's body it would seem very likely that Kierkegaard is 
implying the Lutheran doctrine of the genus majestaticum which occurs within the 
framework of the communicatio idiomatum (communication of attributes). Through 
62 Ibid 95-6 
63 Bonhoeffer 1981,76 
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this it is claimed that whatever is said of Christ's deity may be said of his humanity and 
vice versa. 67 Care must be taken in interpreting this passage. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Kierkegaard was attempting to refute this doctrine, particularly as it is one 
that stands at the heart of classical Lutheran Christology. Instead, just as with the 
previous passage, his main concern is to use Anti-Climacus to draw attention to the 
situation of contemporaneity. As the pseudonym explains to his readers: 
It is in the situation of contemporaneity with an individual human being, a human 
being like others - and he speaks about himself in such a manner! He defines 
himself as superhuman, spiritual in such a way that he speaks of eating his flesh 
and drinking his blood as fantastically as possible in the direction of a divine 
quality, omnipresence, and yet the next time as paradoxically as possible, that it 
is his flesh and blood. He says that he will rise on the last day only the person 
who eats his body and drinks his blood - certainly defining himself as God in the 
most decisive terms. He says he is the bread that comes down from heaven - 
another striking expression in the direction of the divine. And since he knew that 
his followers grumbled about this and found it a hard saying, he says, `Does this 
offend you? 3,68 
So, the point being made is the same as with the first passage. To his contemporaries 
Christ was just another man, unremarkable in appearance to the extent that few would 
have recognised him as the Son of God. If what has been termed the `fantasy figure' of 
Christ is put forward then this is obscured and the possibility of offense removed: The 
danger with the highly developed Christologies of Christian tradition is that this can 
happen and thereby create such a distance between the modern believer and the details 
of the Biblical witness. 
Essential Offense Against Lowliness 
This is the final and most important of Anti-Climacus' three categories of offense. He 
describes it as `the possibility of essential offense in relation to lowliness, that the one 
who passes himself off as God proves to be the lowly, poor, suffering, and finally 
67 Cf. Bonhoeffer 1981,91ff 
68PC100 
123 
powerless human being'. 69 This is a radical change from the previous category of 
offense where it is the divinity of Christ that is being questioned. In the final category it 
is not the possibility of the Incarnation that gives rise to offense, but instead it is the 
specific nature of Christ's humanity: `Here a person brought to a halt by the possibility 
of offense says: Assuming for a moment that you are God, what foolishness and 
madness that you are this lowly, poor, powerless man! '7° 
To appreciate the significance of this category of offense it is appropriate to remind 
ourselves of the ideological background to Kierkegaard's theological reflection. It can 
hardly come as any surprise to hear that this category of offense, like so much of 
Kierkegaard's thought, implies a reaction against the influence of Hegelianism. To 
Hegelian Idealism the very fact that God had chosen to become incarnate in an 
individual human being at all ran counter to its presuppositions. Consider the following 
passage from Practice: 
In the first period of Christendom, when even aberrations bore an unmistakable 
mark of one's nevertheless knowing what the issue was, the fallacy with respect 
to the God-man was either that in one way or another the term `God' was taken 
away (Ebionitism and the like) or the term `man' was taken away (Gnosticism). 
In the entire modem age, which so unmistakably bears the mark that it does not 
even know what the issue is, the confusion is something different and far more 
dangerous. By way of didacticism, the God-man has been made into that 
speculative unity of God and man sub specie aeterni or made visible in that 
nowhere-to-be-found medium of pure being, rather than that the God-man is the 
unity of being God and an individual human being in a historically actual 
situation. 71 
As the first two possibilities of offense related to Ebionitism and Gnosticism, it is quite 
fitting that the final category now takes on this `speculative unity of God and man'. 
Ever one to champion the particular over the general, Kierkegaard wholeheartedly 
rejects any abandonment of Christ's individual human nature. Hegel's Christology 
understood Christ to be a manifestation of the divine-human unity that was an immanent 
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possibility for the entire human race by virtue of its own historic evolution towards the 
Absolute. 72 So, in this case Christ is the illustration of what we all might become quite 
naturally, not the incarnate Son of God of classical Christology. 
Such an understanding of the Incarnation can be seen as a contribution to the 
secularization of Christianity. This is on the grounds that, if it is true that humanity is 
naturally progressing towards God through the evolutionary development of history, 
then it follows that `to be God becomes a direct superlative of what it is to be a human 
being'. 73 Because of this it becomes easy to believe that to be a good Christian entails 
nothing other than what it is to be a good citizen. If this is the case civic norms serve to 
dictate Christian behaviour instead of vice versa. 74 In this scenario we can only return to 
the previously rejected `ethical' life-views of pseudonyms such as Judge William or 
Johannes de Silentio in Either/Or and Fear and Trembling respectively. 
Because of the discrepancy between the Hegelian and the orthodox Chalcedonian 
understanding of the Incarnation, on one occasion Anti-Climacus goes so far as to 
describe the nature of the Incarnation as a `self-contradiction'. In this context the term 
is employed in its literal sense. However, it does not refer to the linking of God and a 
human being per se, but to the lowly nature of the human being in question. It therefore 
concerns precisely `this boundless self-contradiction: that God should be a mortal man 
like this'. " Kierkegaard develops the same theme in his Journals: `He is this very 
paradox, the compounding of God and a socially insignificant man ... Jesus 
Christ is the 
72 Reardon 1989,84. Nowhere was this concept to be developed more fully in Kierkegaard's lifetime 
than by David Strauss in The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (London: SCM, 1973). In the 
`Concluding Dissertation' of this work Strauss asks that, 
If reality is ascribed to the idea of the unity of the divine and human natures, is this equivalent 
to the admission that this unity must actually have been once manifested, as it never had been, 
and never more will be, in one individual? This is indeed not the mode in which the Idea 
realizes itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar, and be niggardly to all 
others - to express itself perfectly in that one individual, and imperfectly in all the rest ... And is this no true realization of the idea? is not the idea of the unity of the divine and human 
natures a real one in a far higher sense, when I regard the whole race of mankind as its 
realization, than when I single out one man as such a realization? is not an incarnation of God 
from eternity, a truer one than an incarnation limited to a particular point in time. This is the 
key to the whole of Christology, that, as subject of the predicate which the church assigns to 
Christ, we place, instead of an individual, an idea ... In an individual, a God-man, the 
properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; in the idea 
of the race they perfectly agree. (Strauss 1973,779-80). 
73PC104; J&P3102, X12A212n. d., 1854 
'4 PC 111; JFYl 166 
75 PC 102 
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sign of offense and the object of faith. Only in eternity is he in his glory. Here upon 
earth he must never be presented in any other way than in his social insignificance - so 
that everyone can be offended or believe. '76 One wonders how much Kierkegaard 
would have agreed with Dostoyevsky's similarly radical vision of Christ as presented in 
the character of Prince Myshkin in (and as) The Idiot. 
He does not separate himself, but clumsily causes offense everywhere. He does 
not go around with the great ones, but with children. He is laughed at and 
loved. He is the fool and the wise man. He bears everything and he forgives 
everything. He is revolutionary and yet he conforms. He does not want to - but 
he does - call attention to himself just by his existence. Who are you? Idiot or 
Christ? " 
Although he might not agree with the concept of Christ `clumsily' causing offense, 
Kierkegaard holds that Christ draws attention to himself by what he is, and in this way 
he demands a response from those who encounter him: whether to be offended, or to 
believe in him. 78 
In support of this argument Anti-Climacus refers to Paul's description of Christ in 1 
Corinthians 1: 23 as being `an offense to the Jews, and foolishness to the Greeks'. 79 
Kierkegaard illustrated the significance of this verse in his Journals a couple of years 
before publishing Practice when he argued that, 
Christianity must be foolishness to the Greeks, because God's revelation of 
himself in suffering was precisely the paradox; suffering is abnormality, 
weakness, and yet it is the negative form of the highest - the direct form is 
beauty, power, glory, etc., but for the highest to have its adequate form in the 
direct form shows thereby that the highest is not the extraordinarily the highest. 8° 
The Greek word here translated as `foolishness' in 1 Corinthians is µwpia, which 
implies a note of madness. This is appropriate because the details of Christ's earthly life 
openly conflicted with the expectations of educated Greek society. As Martin Hengel 
explains, 
76J&P321, IX A 57 n. d, 1848 
" Bonhoeffer 1981,35 
78 PC 126 
79 Ibid. 135 cf. also JFY! 201. 
80 J&P, 3087, VII 2B 235, pp. 66-67 n. d, 1846-47 
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To believe that the one pre-existent Son of the one true God, the mediator at 
creation and the redeemer of the world, had appeared in very recent times in out- 
of-the-way Galilee as a member of the obscure people of the Jews, and even 
worse, had died the death of a common criminal on the cross, could only be 
regarded as a sign of madness. 81 
Kierkegaard was not alone in employing Paul's motif of Christ as foolishness. Probably 
the most famous use of this theme can be found in Erasmus' wonderfully satirical Praise 
of Folly, from which the following is taken: 
All mortals are fools, even the pious. Christ too, though he is the wisdom of the 
father, was made something of a fool himself in order to help the folly of 
mankind, when he assumed the nature of a man and was seen in man's form; just 
as he was made sin so that he could redeem sinners. Nor did he wish to redeem 
them in any other way save by the folly of the cross and through his simple, 
ignorant apostles, to whom he unfailingly preached folly 82 . 
One of the most frequent problems with satirical works is that their readers often forget 
to recognise the satire. Erasmus had to compose the Letter to Martin Dorp in order to 
explain the real significance of Praise of Folly to a Catholic theologian of that name. 
Just as Kierkegaard employed his pseudonyms, so Erasmus' satirical mouthpiece is the 
female personification of Folly herself. Her words are not always to be taken literally 
and serve to call attention to the misunderstandings of the world, hence, 
There is surely no danger of anyone's imagining that the apostles and Christ 
were fools in the literal sense. Yet in them too there is some sort of weakness 
due to human affections which in comparison with the pure eternal wisdom can 
be seen to be not wholly wise. This is the folly which triumphs over the whole 
world... Thus, in showing a folly which is wise, I also showed an insanity which 
is sane and a madness which retains its senses. 83 
Both Erasmus and Kierkegaard use `foolishness' with caution, mindful that the world's 
charges of foolishness soon rebound back to where they came. 
81 Hengel 1986,98f 
82 Erasmus 1985,198-9 
83 1bid 233 
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Yet if Christ is to be foolishness to the Greeks, then there are to be reasons why he is an 
offense to the Jews. In the passage from 1 Corinthians the Greek word translated in 
Kierkegaard's works as `offense' is ax6tv5a). ov, from which we get `scandal', and is 
normally rendered `stumbling block'. 84 The original use of ax&v&aXov in classical 
Greek literature was in the sense of `an enticement' to trap an opponent, but in the LXX 
and New Testament both senses are found. " In the context of I Corinthians 23 it is 
universally agreed that `stumbling block' is appropriate, denoting `something which 
stops a man's progress, something which trips him up, something which bars the way to 
him. That something may come from the malicious action of others, or it may come 
from the prejudice and the pride of a man's own heart'. 86 The latter certainly calls to 
mind Kierkegaard's `possibility of offense at lowliness'. 87 First century Judaism found it 
very difficult to stomach the concept of a suffering Messiah, despite the words of Isaiah 
53 concerning the suffering servant. Instead, it was generally expected that the true 
Messiah would come doing signs and wonders in order to prove his divine calling, 
something several individuals had already tried that century. 88 Another contributive 
factor to the `offensiveness' of Christ to the Jews was the manner of his death, as 
according to Deuteronomy 21: 23 `anyone who is hung on a tree is under God's curse'. 89 
So, clearly the doctrine of a lowly, crucified Messiah ran counter to the expectations of 
the age. 
Christ as Redeemer and Prototype 
Although the categories of offense in Practice do present us with elements of 
Kierkegaard's own Christology, they do not contain a complete exposition of his ideas. 
84 Kierkegaard offers some illustration of the synonymity of `offense' and `scandal' in a journal entry 
written in 1849, a year before the publication of Practice in Christianity. (J&P 3034, X2A 117 n. d., 
1849). 
85 Barclay 1964,255-6 
86 Ibid. 257 
$' It is important that both the intellectual and the moral factors are taken into consideration when 
interpreting Kierkegaard's use of Christ as 'offense' in this context. Otherwise, to perceive the nature 
of offense in Kierkegaard's Christology as applying solely to the intellectual acceptance of the historical 
figure of Jesus would be to confuse Kierkegaard with the speculative philosophy he wished to refute. 
Although Brunner's general discussion of the `stumbling block' in The Mediator (London: Lutterworth, 
1963) 42, brings both factors to the fore, it is unfortunate that he makes the mistake of criticizing 
Kierkegaard's concept to be of intellectual significance alone. 
88 Barclay 1965,20 
89 Cf. Galations 3: 13 
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Notoriously unsystematic as he was, Kierkegaard leaves the reader to piece together 
numerous details from several different works. Apart from the categories of offense in 
Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard's Christology in his later works employs a 
terminology that is more in keeping with traditional Christological discourse. In these 
writings his Christology is dominated by the doctrine of Christ as Redeemer and 
prototype. 
It is obvious from the start that Kierkegaard remains clearly within Christian orthodoxy 
by accentuating the completeness and uniqueness of Christ's saving work. 90 Likewise, 
in true Lutheran fashion he is careful to stress that the Atonement is an act of God, not a 
human reward for deeds done, and hence it is entirely a gift of grace. However much 
Kierkegaard sought to uphold the doctrine of Christ as the Redeemer, he also wished to 
give a special emphasis to the doctrine of Christ as the prototype, where, `looking at his 
life, we shall see the unconditional requirement and see it fulfilled. '91 Where some see 
only foolishness and offense, the dedicated believer sees his goal. In this way the radical 
disjunction between the values of Christ and those of the world are brought out, and 
`according to Christian doctrine, there is only one loftiness, that of being a Christian; 
everything else is lowly, lowliness and loftiness'. 
92 True loftiness is defined by existing 
wholly before God, that is to say that the believer's life is determined entirely by her 
God-relationship through Christ instead of by her relationship with others. She strives 
to be herself in truth before God. The reasoning behind this is simple enough to 
understand, even if it is difficult to put into practice. `There is only one who completely 
knows himself, who in himself knows what he himself is - that is God, ' explains 
Kierkegaard. `And he also knows what each human being is in himself, because he is 
that only by being before God. '93 But only the prototype was able to do this, and so it 
follows that Christ is the only real criterion for a full human existence. 94 
90 JFYI 147; GOS 52; CD 298-9; cf. Rae 1997,237ff 
91 JFYI 159. See also Practice: `Christ's life here on earth is the paradigm; I and every Christian are to 
strive to model our lives in likeness to it'; and, `every generation must begin from the beginning with 
Christ and then set forth his life as the paradigm. ' (PC 107). 
92 CD47 
93 Ibid. 40 
94 JFYj 198. Kierkegaard's argument for this point also serves to counter the interpretation of `the 
Absolute paradox' as arising out of the metaphysical incompatibility between humanity and deity. In a 
journal entry of 1848 he states that: `Because Christ simply expresses that he was a human being like 
everybody else, he is truly the prototype, but he also constitutes the eternal strenuousness in what it 
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However, the importance of Christ as prototype must not be stressed to the level that it 
obscures his role as Redeemer. In fact, Kierkegaard posits a fundamental link between 
these two functions, with each one being dependent upon the other. A passage from his 
Journals remarks on this: 
Galatians 2: 19 (for I through the law died to the law) corresponds to the 
presentation I usually give of our relationship to `the prototype'. `The 
prototype' must be presented as the requirement, and then it crushes you. `The 
prototype', which is Christ, then changes into something else, to grace and 
compassion, and it is he himself who reaches out to support you. 95 
The same point is also clearly shown in the prayer introducing the discussion of Christ 
as prototype in Judge For Yourself!: 
Help us all, each one of us, you who both will and can, you who are both the 
prototype and the Redeemer, and in turn both the Redeemer and the prototype, 
so that when the striving one droops under the prototype, crushed, almost 
despairing, the Redeemer raises him up again; but at the same moment you are 
again the prototype so that he may be kept in the striving. " 
Kierkegaard's reasons for choosing to maintain this particular balance are explained in 
the following two passages from the Journals: 
Since the Middle Ages had gone farther and farther astray in accentuating the 
aspect of Christ as the prototype - Luther came along and accentuated the other 
side, that he is a gift and this gift is to be received in faith... But now in our time 
it is clear that what must come to the fore is the aspect of Christ as prototype. 
The main point is to have learned from the Middle Ages to avoid the errors of 
this approach. But it is this side which must come to the fore, because the 
Lutheran emphasis on faith has now become a fig leaf for the most unchristian 
shirking. 9' 
Luther is entirely right in what he says in the preface to his sermons about the 
distinction between Christ as pattern and as gift. I am quite conscious of the fact 
means to be a human being. He makes the divine commensurable with being a completely ordinary 
human being. ' (J&P 1848, IX A 101 n. d., 1848). 
95J&P349, X2A170n. d., 1849 
' JFY! 147; cf. also J&P 1863, X6B 241 n. d., 1849-51 
97 J&P 2481, X1A 154 n. d., 1849 
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that I have moved in the direction of Christ as pattern. But something must be 
kept in mind in this regard. Luther was confronted by the exaggerated misuse of 
Christ as pattern; therefore he accentuates the opposite. But Luther has long 
since been victorious in Protestantism and Christ has been completely forgotten 
as the pattern, and the whole thing actually has become pretence in hidden 
inwardness. 98 
Therefore it can be seen that, as may be expected, Kierkegaard was attempting to 
correct perceived errors within his own tradition. He is not attempting to level criticism 
at Luther's abandonment of the doctrine of the imitatio Christi as some have argued. 
Instead, with the classical Lutheran emphasis upon salvation by faith alone taken to 
extremes in more recent developments in Danish Lutheranism, Kierkegaard now felt 
himself compelled to propose his exemplarist Christology as a corrective. 100 Yet it is 
with the difference that now `Christ as the pattern ought to jack up the price so 
enormously that the prototype itself teaches men to resort to grace', and thus avoid the 
danger of suggesting salvation by works. '°' 
3. Kierkegaard and Kenotic Christologies 
I have just shown that through both Fragments and his later works, Kierkegaard lays 
exceptional stress upon the lowliness of Christ's humanity. Whether in Climacus' poetic 
parable of the god and the maiden, or in the directness of Kierkegaard's discourses, it is 
98 Ibid. 2503, X2A 30 n. d, 1849 
99 Gouwens 1996,128 
00 J&P 1877, X3A 409 n. d, 1850 
'o' Ibid. 2503, X2A 30 n. d., 1949. The following passages from the Journals expand upon this: 
By becoming contemporaneous with Christ (the prototype), you simply discover that you are 
not like it at all, not even in what you call your best moment ... 
The result is that you 
effectively learnt to flee to faith in grace. The prototype is that which requires itself from you; 
alas, and you feel the unlikeness horribly, then you flee to the prototype that he may have 
compassion on you. In this way the prototype is simultaneously the one who infinitely judges 
you most severely - and also the one who has compassion on you. (Ibid. 692, IX A 153 n. d., 
1848). 
Christ's death is not a task for imitation but is the atonement -I do not dare to regard or 
consider Christ as a merely historical person. When I am reflecting upon his life and his 
death, I think that I ought to be thinking that I am a sinner... Therefore it is not simply a 
matter of Christ's being the prototype and that I simply ought to will to resemble him. In the 
first place I need His help in order to resemble Him, and, secondly, insofar as he is the Saviour 
and the Reconciler of the race, I cannot in fact resemble him. (Ibid. 693, X1A 132 n. d., 
1849). 
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affirmed that Christ has become `absolutely the equal of the lowliest of human 
beings'. 102 Due to this and his emphasis upon the actuality of Christ's sufferings, it has 
been claimed by a variety of scholars that Kierkegaard is putting forward a kenotic 
Christology. 1°3 Such a view proposes that the Son of God was compelled to empty 
himself of certain divine properties in order to become incarnate. However, supporters 
of kenotic Christology differ according to both the extent and the necessity of this divine 
self-emptying. 
It is therefore appropriate to begin by determining what is generally contained within the 
doctrine of kenosis as found in kenotic Christology. This will primarily involve some 
examination and evaluation of kenotic theories as developed within Lutheranism, 
although it will also be necessary to compare these briefly with a few relevant 
developments outside of that tradition. After this I will then move on to discuss 
whether, in view of this, Kierkegaard's Christology may genuinely be classed as a 
kenotic Christology, or whether some alternative classification is required. 
Kenosis 
As I have already stated above, kenotic Christology holds that the Son of God was 
forced to empty himself of certain powers and attributes in order to become incarnate as 
Jesus Christ. The actual term `kenotic' is derived from the Greek verb uevöw ('I 
empty') and refers to the icevwotg, or self-emptying, of the Son of God. The New 
Testament passage most often cited in support of kenoticism is in the second chapter of 
Philippians where Paul states that, `Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of 
God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied 
(Vxtv(oacv) himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. ' 104 
Another passage, sometimes used as additional support, is 2 Corinthians 8: 9: `For you 
know the generous act of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your 
''o5 sakes he became poor, so that by his poverty you might become rich. 
1°2PF33 
103 For some of the most interesting theological discussions in which this view is put forward in recent 
works see for instance: Gouwens 1996,169n59; Law 1993,183-8; Macquarrie 1990,242. 
104 Philippians 2: 5-7, NRSV 
105 NRSV 
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The classical exponent of kenotic Christology was the nineteenth century German 
Lutheran theologian Gottfried Thomasius. He held that humanity was naturally capable 
of receiving and being penetrated by God. In addition to this, Thomasius also held that 
during the Incarnation the whole of the Son of God was present in Christ and so nothing 
of the divine %6yoq existed outside him during this event. This latter point is in 
complete accord with traditional Lutheran Christology, although it is in opposition to 
the Reformed teaching that the Logos also existed outside of Christ during the period of 
the Incarnation (dubbed the illud extra Calvinisticum by the Lutherans). 106 Thomasius' 
problem was to discern how the Son of God could be so compressed (as it were) whilst 
still permitting full divine selfrevelation in and through the Incarnation. 
In his Christ's Person and Work Thomasius attempts to find an answer to this when he 
states that it is the nature of God's love `to accept every limitation. .. What seems to 
be 
the alienation or finitization of deity is the deepest internalization of deity itself, the 
concentration of its energies on one point which, in its significance far outweighs the 
most inclusive manifestation of omnipotence'. 107 In order to relate to the world on 
terms that it could comprehend the Son of God abandons attributes such as 
omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. Such attributes are considered by 
Thomasius to be but `relative attributes', as opposed to the Son of God's `essential 
attributes'. The latter, also called the `immanent attributes', define the essence of God 
and include absolute power, truth and love. In view of this, Thomasius argues that 
Christ `exercised no other lordship at all than the ethical one of truth and love'. '08 
The question arises whether the Son of God actually remains truly divine when incarnate 
if the kenosis is as Thomasius describes. Clearly, if his ideas are to be taken as true then 
we are faced with a very humanistic conception of the Incarnation at the expense of 
Christ's deity. In this case, such a kenotic Christology is not in accord with the 
principles of the Chalcedonian Definition and therefore cannot be accepted as it stands. 
Thomasius appears to be guilty of confusing the humility of the ?. öyyoS Evßapuoq with 
106 Macquarrie 1990,246 
107 Ibid. 247 
108 Ibid 
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the renunciation of the X, yog 6aapicoS. l°9 This confusion was carried further by 
another nineteenth century Lutheran, W. F. Gess. According to Gess, Christ possessed 
only a human consciousness and so the Logos literally ceases to be divine at all during 
the Incarnation. Louis Berkhof remarks that, somewhat unsurprisingly, this form of 
kenoticism has been labelled `incarnation by divine suicide'. '10 
Kenoticism has appeared in other theologies apart from that of the Lutheranism of 
Thomasius and Gess. British theology too has witnessed several developments in this 
area. These have mostly occurred within Anglicanism, beginning with the work of 
Charles Gore in the nineteenth century. However, these have not always been as drastic 
as Thomasius' contribution and they vary considerably as to the nature and extent of 
Christ's abandoning his divine attributes. Gore, for instance, held that the abandonment 
only applied to the %67oS within his human activity. This seems to place Gore within 
Chalcedonian orthodoxy, thereby raising the question whether his Christology really is 
kenotic, 1" or whether kenoticism need be redefined. Due to the variety of allegedly 
kenotic theories, the latter option would appear to be necessary. Although Brian 
Hebblethwaite once described any Christology that takes Christ's humanity `absolutely 
seriously' as kenotic, this is too broad an employment of the term. Instead of this 
Richard Sturch offeis the following definition: 
It might be best to restrict the use of the word to theories which assert that the 
Son no longer possesses, or no longer uses, some of his divine attributes during 
the Incarnation - neither on earth nor in heaven. If, however, it is preferred to 
use it also for views which see the knowledge and power of Jesus as limited, but 
not those of God the Son, even during the earthly life of Jesus, well, that too is 
acceptable. '12 
109 Cf. Bonhoeffer 1981,96 
110 Berkhof 1994,327. It is also the case that kenotic Christology can be criticised from the opposite 
perspective. That is to say, that if the renunciation of certain divine properties by the %6yoq during the 
Incarnation is on the grounds that these divine and human properties are incompatible; then it could be 
suggested that at the end of Christ's earthly life, he likewise sets aside his humanity. In this way the 
Incarnation becomes a temporary event as Christ is first God, then man, then God again successively, 
but not as the God-man' in hypostatic union. (cf. D. M. Baillie 1963,97). 
11' Richard Swinburne uses an argument along these lines to deny that Gore's Christology is actually 
kenotic in the traditionally accepted use of the term. (Swinburne 1994,230n). 
112 Sturch 1991,255-6 
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If this wide definition is to be accepted then it is possible to trace elements of kenoticism 
within many Christologies from the Patristic period. Sturch cites both Gregory of Nyssa 
and Athanasius on the grounds that their Christologies allowed for Christ's ignorance 
when on earth. Later theologians rejected this because of the belief that ignorance is a 
product of the fall and not temporality. 113 Within the Western Patristic tradition it is 
possible to consider Hilary of Poitiers as a proponent of this form of Christology as he 
likened the incarnate state of the Son of God to a kenosis. Hilary manages to avoid the 
problem of verging on to a purely humanistic Christology. As Grillmeier explains, `this 
kenosis or evacuatio, which consists in the renunciation of the forma Dei and the 
acceptance of the forma servi, presupposes in Hilary's writing that in fact the subject 
remains in his divine nature. '114 However, Hilary also states that Christ chooses not to 
show himself completely and retains his divine attributes, therefore miracles come quite 
naturally to him and he was unable to suffer. "" On these grounds it appears that his 
Christology, quite unlike that of kenoticists such as Thomasius, is veering close to 
docetism. On the subject of Christ possessing all the divine attributes, yet choosing not 
to employ them, we move from kenoticism to crypticism, a theory which alleges that 
Christ merely concealed his powers (from xpuynS xpraEoc `hidden power'116). 
Crypticism argued that Christ merely pretended to suffer, something also put forward by 
the docetists. So, like Thomasius' kenoticism, this too moves away from Chalcedon. 
The Abasement of Christ in Kierkegaard's Theology 
The first difficulty with ascribing a kenotic Christology to Kierkegaard is that the term 
does not occur in any of his writings, whether direct or pseudonymous. Neither does 
he mention any of the known German exponents of the theory, even though both 
Thomasius and Gess were near contemporaries. Kierkegaard kept a watchful eye on 
theological developments in Germany. He would surely have cited such theologians )a 
if he was in accord with their views, especially as Thomasius purposefully developed his 
ideas in opposition to Hegelianism. It is of course possible that he would have come 
across other exponents of kenoticism, yet the direct evidence is still lacking from his 
1131bid 256 
114 Grillmeier 1965,308 
115 Ibid. 309 
116Bonhoeffer 1981,94 
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writings. Considering all this, it is interesting to note that Kierkegaard owned and 
studied one work by a kenoticist: Martensen's Christian Dogmatics. Martensen's 
discussion of the kenotic theory is brief but clear, being similar to Gore in that 
Martensen talks more of the limitations of the human Christ rather than of the XbyoS. ' 17 
Although Kierkegaard often attacks Martensen on several issues, he fails to raise the 
subject of kenosis. From all of the above evidence it would seem that, unless he was 
totally unaware of it (which seems somewhat unlikely), Kierkegaard either largely 
ignored traditional kenoticism, or he developed a similar theory independently without 
the traditional terminology. It is now appropriate to consider what evidence may be 
cited from his works to support one or other of these theories. 
From the fact that I have chosen to discuss the question of Kierkegaard's kenoticism 
under the title of Christ's abasement, rather than kenosis, may be taken to suggest from 
the outset that I do not consider Kierkegaard's Christology to be truly kenotic. This is 
on the grounds that Kierkegaard limits his discussion to the abasement of Christ on 
earth, rather than considering a metaphysical abandonment by the eternal Mpg. 
Various passages from his works illustrate this clearly, for instance: 
He lived in actual earthly lowliness ... 
he did not choose to be an eminent 
person and yet a lowly one in his innermost being. No, he literally was the lowly 
person, and in an entirely different way than when a king momentarily sets aside 
his rank and is known by the courtiers, consequently all the more honored - for 
his humility. ' 18 
Taken from Christian Discourses, this passage is set within Kierkegaard's doctrine of 
Christ as the prototype. In this context the emphasis is upon asserting two things: first, 
that contrary to docetism, Christ was genuinely human and hence can be the true 
prototype for the believer. This is reminiscent of the difference between the king who, 
in the parable of the king and the maiden in Fragments, merely puts on a `plebeian 
cloak', and the reality of the god's form of a servant, adopted in order to teach the 
1 17 Martensen 1878,265f, 269. See also Berkhof where the Martensen-Gore link is made. (Berkhof 
1994,328). 
118 CD 54 
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learner. 119 The second point is that, as the prototype, Christ shows genuine faith and 
humility within the lowliness of his social condition. 
Christ's lowly status in society is constantly stressed by Kierkegaard as a means to 
underline the radical nature of his commitment to the Father. The most interesting 
discussion of this theme comes in the section `Christ as the prototype, or no one can 
serve two masters' in Judge For Yourself! He states that Christ `allows himself to be 
born in poverty and lowliness, and not only that, but in disrepute, to a betrothed virgin. . 
. 
That is how he came into the world, as if he were outside the world, ostracized by the 
world immediately on arrival. '120 The significance of these humble origins is that, 
through them `from the very beginning his life was designed to make it possible to serve 
only one master', for, as Kierkegaard continues, `birth is a tie that immediately binds a 
human being in closer alliance with other human beings; an alliance with the world and 
what is of the world, and thus an alliance with other human beings, is what makes it so 
difficult to serve only one master. ' 121 
However, Kenotic elements do seem to spring to the fore on the question of Christ's 
suffering and the extent of what Kierkegaard calls the divine `incognito'. In Practice in 
Christianity Anti-Climacus explains the difficulty of the situation: 
He is God but chooses to become this individual human being... But it is his 
will, his free decision, and therefore it is an omnipotently maintained incognito. 
Indeed, by allowing himself to be born he has in a certain sense bound himself 
once and for all; his unrecognizability is so omnipotently maintained that in a 
way he himself is in the power of his own incognito, in which lies the literal 
actuality of his purely human suffering, that this is not merely appearance but in a 
certain sense is the assumed incognito's upper hand over him... It is a strange 
kind of dialectic: that he, omnipotent, binds himself and does so omnipotently 
that he actually feels bound, suffers under the consequence of his loving and free 
decision to become an individual human 122 
19PF31f 
'm JFY! 160 
121 Ibid. 160-1 
122 PC 132-3 
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Here the limitations of Christ are described, whilst at the same time the omnipotence of 
God the Son is preserved. There is therefore no abandonment of divine attributes as is 
found in Thomasius' Christology. What Kierkegaard is claiming is that the reality of 
Christ's humanity depends upon the exercising of his divine omnipotence. 123 Only in 
this way could Christ genuinely share in the grim reality of human suffering and 
weakness, and be for, us the prototype. Kierkegaard clarifies this in the Gospel of 
Sufferings, a small, direct work which he published the year before Practice: 
He who was and is the Truth, he who knew all, yet learned one thing, and 
nothing else, learned obedience by the things which he suffered. Were it possible 
that a man should learn obedience to God apart from sufferings, then Christ, as 
man, had not needed to learn it from sufferings. It was human obedience that he 
learned from sufferings, for the eternal accord of his will with that of the Father 
is certainly not obedience. Obedience belongs to his humiliation, as it is written; 
`he humbled himself and became obedient' [Phil. 2: 8]. But this, this obedience 
of his is just what it means to be a man, and so it is true of a man in relation to 
God that obedience is learned from sufferings; and if it is true of the pure how 
much more of a sinful man! 124 
Both these passages would place Kierkegaard's Christology within the bounds of 
Sturch's somewhat broad definition of kenoticism, 12S but clearly not with that of 
Thomasius. David Gouwens interprets Kierkegaard as being within the kenotic tradition 
of the school of Geissen in that, although Christ retains his divine powers but chooses 
not to use them. 12" This would seem to be in accord with the material cited, but is it 
really kenoticism in the traditional sense of the term? I do not consider this to be 
genuinely kenotic, although it does fit in with Sturch's definition of kenoticism. 
However, Sturch freely admits that such a definition involves more of a taking up of a 
limited human nature by the XbyoS rather than it does a self-emptying. In the light of 
this he concludes that such a Christology could only really be called kenotic in order to 
123 Cf. also JFY! 174 
124 GDS 63-4 
125 Cf. Sturch 1991,255f 
126 Gouwens 1996,169n 
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avoid adding further to the wealth of titles and terms that can already be found in the 
theological vocabulary. 127 
4. A Theology of the Cross 
In this final section I wish to argue that Kierkegaard's Christology may be more 
appropriately interpreted along the lines of another development in Lutheran theology: 
the theology of the cross. The theology of the cross played a pivotal role in the 
development of Martin Luther's theological position, affecting all aspects of his 
thought. 128 I will argue that Kierkegaard's whole theological approach is dominated by 
the same concerns that are found in this form of theology. The first section outlines the 
'details of Luther's theology of the cross, in particular the doctrine of the hidden and 
revealed God (Deus absconditus and Deus revelatus). After this I will examine the 
importance of Kierkegaard's concept of Christ as `the sign of contradiction" and his 
statement that `Christ cannot give a direct communication'. 
130 Within this final section 
certain questions will be raised regarding the nature of such theological topics as the 
knowledge of God and the nature of faith, the answers to which will be the focus of the 
next two chapters in this thesis. 
'Z' Sturch 1991,260. Sturch is not alone in adapting elements of kenoticism to allow for a Christology 
that falls safely within the boundaries of Chalcedonian orthodoxy. In Christ and Creation (Carlisle and 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Paternoster and Eerdmans, 1992), Colin Gunton suggests that it is possible to 
employ the concept rather than theory of kenosis `if the self-emptying is seen as the expression of the 
divine being rather than its depotentiation'. This avoids the faults of traditional kenoticism and so 
preserves the humanity and the deity of Christ. As Gunton explains, in this way kenosis of the Son of 
God is a plerosis. He states that: 
The one who holds in being the realms of time and space enters their confines in order to 
renew them. In that respect, the emptying is an expression at once of the love of the Son and 
of his being in relation with that which was created through and is upheld by him. Kenosis is 
therefore one concept by which we may express the way in which the eternal Son related 
himself to that which is not God - to the creation. Accordingly we may say that the cross of 
Jesus represents the fulfilment of the self-emptying of the Son that takes form in the 
incarnation. That is only apparently a paradox, for the cross is no act of depotentation. It is 
rather the supreme act of divine power: the power through which the world was made whole. 
Therefore we must say, following Forsyth, that the self-emptying is at the same time an act of 
fulfilment, of plerosis. Infinitum capex finiti. In the incarnation the being of the Son expresses 
itself, is laid out in all its fulness, because in his self-emptying the Son is most fully divine. 
(Gunton 1992,84). 
128 von Löwenich 1976,18 
1" Cf. PC 125f 
130 Ibid. 136 
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Luther's Theology of the Cross 
`Christian faith stands and falls with the knowledge of the crucified Christ, that is, with 
the knowledge of God in the crucified Christ, or, to use Luther's even bolder phrase, 
with the knowledge of the "crucified God". '131 So states Moltmann in his work The 
Crucified God. His statement may be used to introduce the central theme of Luther's 
theologia crucis. Luther developed his theologia crucis (theology of the cross) in clear 
opposition to what he referred to as the theologia gloriae (theology of glory) of 
medieval scholasticism. This is well illustrated in the early stages of his theological 
development in the following theses from his Heidelberg Disputation (1518): 
19. That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the 
invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things 
which have actually happened. 20. He deserves to be called a theologian, 
however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things of God seen through 
suffering and the cross. 21. A theology of glory calls evil good and good evil. 
A theology of the cross calls the thing what it actually is. 132 
For Luther Christian theology cannot do anything but begin with God's self-revelation in 
and through Christ. On this point he makes a radical break with the theological method 
of the Middle Ages, rejecting any attempts to furnish Christian theology with a 
philosophical metaphysic drawn from Platonic or Aristotelian thought. Christian 
theology is a theology of revelation, `God has spoken, and therefore we are able to 
speak about God. God has shown himself, and therefore we know where we must 
look. ' 133 
The XSyoS tioü OEoü is the X6yoq rou^ atiaupob. Not only does the believer see God 
revealed in the cross of Christ, but she also comes to know God through taking up her 
own `cross' of following the crucified Christ. Yet this revelation is not direct, as the 
figure of the suffering, dying Christ seems to proclaim anything but the love and mercy 
preached during his life. God reveals himself indirectly, being hidden in a revelation that 
conflicts with our natural expectations: 
1" Moltmann 1974,65 
132 Luther 1957,40 
133 von Löwenich 1976,19 
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God works in a paradoxical way sub contrariis: his strength lies hidden under 
apparent weakness [and] the future glory of the Christian under his present 
sufferings. It will therefore be clear that there is a radical discontinuity between 
the empirically perceived situation and the situation as perceived by faith. To the 
eye of reason all that can be seen in the cross is a man dying in apparent 
weakness and folly under the wrath of God. 134 
This revelation is addressed to faith, in which the believer has to admit with Isaiah 45: 15 
that: `Truly you are a God who hides himself. 135 McGrath observes that there are two 
different senses of Luther's phrase `the hidden God', or Deus absconditus. There is the 
sense of the God hidden behind his revelation, the essence of God and those of his 
actions which defy human comprehension. Second is the God who is hidden in his 
revelation, to which this discussion refers, where God reveals himself sub contrariis. 136 
At the cross we are faced with the vital choice whether to take notice of its demands or 
to move away. Through the cross human pride in its own works is removed and the 
way to accepting God's revelation of himself opened. 137 
The Sign of Contradiction 
Echoes of Luther's theology of the cross become apparent in Practice in Christianity 
where Anti-Climacus introduces the `sign of contradiction'. `To be a sign of 
contradiction is to be something else that stands in contrast to what one immediately is. 
So it is with the God-man. Immediately, he is an individual human being, just like 
others, a lowly, unimpressive human being, but now comes the contradiction - that he is 
God. ' 138 The concept of the sign of contradiction arises out of the possibility of offense 
at lowliness. On this point Kierkegaard is unavowedly following in Luther's footsteps, 
for both theologians it is the harsh reality of the suffering figure of Christ which 
ultimately forces humanity to choose between faith or offense. 
And only the sign of contradiction can do this: it draws attention to itself and 
then presents a contradiction. There is a something that makes it impossible not 
to look - and look, as one is looking one sees as in a mirror, one comes to see 
134 McGrath 1985,167 
135 NV 
136 McGrath 1985,165 
137 von Löwenich 1976,27; 30 
138 PC 125-6 
ft 
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oneself, or he who is the sign of contradiction looks straight into one's heart 
while one is staring into the contradiction ... It is a riddle, but as he is guessing 
the riddle, what dwells within him is disclosed by the way he guesses. 139 
Kierkegaard also follows Luther in his belief that God's revelation in Christ is indirect, 
and so `the glory is not directly known as glory but, just the reverse, is known by 
inferiority, debasement'. 140 In fact, it is the very nature of the Incarnation that prohibits 
direct revelation, even if Christ were to declare his identity quite openly: 
If someone says directly: I am God; the Father and I are one, this is direct 
communication. But if the person who says it, the communicator, is this 
individual human being, an individual human being just like others, then this 
communication is not quite entirely direct, because it is not entirely direct that a 
human being should be God - whereas what he says is entirely direct. Because 
of the communicator the communication contains a contradiction, it becomes 
indirect communication; it confronts you with a choice: whether you will believe 
him or not. 141 
The nature of God is such that it is impossible to recognise him directly. 142 Therefore, 
added to the lowliness of Christ, it would seem that the Incarnation is in itself the most 
unlikely of events. Turning to his Journals we hear Kierkegaard remark that, `the least 
possible of all places or phenomena - one solitary, destitute, abandoned human being - 
this is the place for God; to such an extent does God relate negatively to appearance ... 
[that] he has to have as little appearance as possible. "43 For Kierkegaard the 
Incarnation `is a heartbreaking inversion of all human categories' through which God is 
revealed sub contrariis'44 
139 lbid. 127 
140 JFY1161 
141 PC 134 
142J&P 3099, XI 2A 51 n. d, 1854 
143 Ibid. 3100, X12 A 212 n. d 
144 Ibid. 333, X1A 245 n. d., 1849. Cf. also. 3102. XI 2A 212 n. d., 1854. At this point in the 
discussion it is interesting to take note of some of the similarities between Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer 
in this area. Where Kierkegaard refers to `the Sign of Contradiction', Bonhoeffer calls Christ 'the 
Counter-Logos' (or Anti-Logos) in that Christ, through his very appearance in history as Christ, 
challenges the dominion of human-centred reasoning. Bonhoeffer puts it that: 
When the Counter-Logos appears in history, no longer as an idea, but as 'Word' became flesh, 
there is no longer any possibility of assimilating into the existing order of the human logos. 
The only real question which remains is: 'Who are you? Speak for yourselfl' The question, 
'Who are you? ', is the question of dethroned and distraught reason; but it is also the question 
142 
These themes of contradiction and indirect communication are not confined to 
Kierkegaard's Christology alone. Just as the theologia crucis was largely to dominate 
Luther's own theological method, so these two themes reoc ur throughout 
Kierkegaard's thought, making his theology a theology of the cross that is radical in its 
programme whilst remaining surprisingly faithful to his Reformation heritage. The 
following two chapters of the thesis are used to explain this further. In chapter five I 
examine certain aspects of Kierkegaard's doctrine of God and illustrate his criticism of 
natural theology's claim to gain knowledge of God entirely independent from his 
revelation in Christ. In chapter six, the final chapter, I discuss Kierkegaard's thoughts 
on the rationality of Christian faith. 
of faith: `Who are you? Are you God himself? ' This is the question with which Christology is 
concerned. Christ is the Counter-Logos. Classification is no longer a possibility, because the 
existence of this Logos spells the end of the human logos. (Bonhoeffer 1981,30). 
143 
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THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND NATURAL THEOLOGY 
As was stated in the previous chapter, Kierkegaard's theology is essentially a theology 
of the cross. Part of my present task is to determine to what extent this theology serves 
to prescribe his doctrine of God. There has been a strongly Christocentric emphasis 
dominating the discussion of Kierkegaard's religious thought so far, yet the subject of 
his Christian theism in general has yet to be dealt with. I therefore intend to offer some 
treatment of the doctrine of God as contained within his writings, illustrating the 
significance of this doctrine for his times, and, to show how this led him to conflict with 
certain views of natural theology. It will also be pertinent to challenge what I consider 
to be some current misinterpretations of Kierkegaard's thought on this subject. 
The first section of this chapter will focus on the concept of God in Kierkegaard's 
writings. This will begin by refuting the charge that his theism is more reminiscent of 
the deity of classical antiquity than it is faithful to the God of Christianity. I will then 
tackle the claim that Kierkegaard holds to an anti-realist doctrine of God. Following 
this will be an examination of his treatment of the themes of divine transcendence and 
divine immanence, showing how Kierkegaard came into conflict with the then popular 
tendencies towards pantheism rcb nn- -t iiin IckäIiist pFiifösöp-hy: -My sectiörifön the 
concept of God will conclude with a brief treatment of the subject of divine omnipotence 
in Kierkegaard's thought. Moving on from the concept of God per se, the next section 
examines how Kierkegaard approaches the problem of the knowledge of God. This will 
begin with some discussion of the relevance of proofs and demonstrations for the 
Christian faith in general. I will then examine Kierkegaard's treatment of two of the 
traditional arguments for God's existence: the ontological argument and the argument 
from design. Finally I will discuss the claim made recently that Kierkegaard's thoughts 
in this area may be classed as negative (or apophatic) theology. Against this it will be 
argued that, just as with his Christology, Kierkegaard's thoughts on natural theology can 
instead be seen to illustrate his Lutheran heritage. 
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1. The Concept of God 
Christian God or pagan deity? 
It has been debated whether Kierkegaard's concept of God does in fact stem from 
Christianity. According to one writer this criticism maintains that, `Because of his use of 
static metaphysical categories in describing God, the God of Kierkegaard's philosophical 
reflections was more like Aristotle's Unmoved Mover than like the God of the Bible. " 
This criticism presupposes that there is a dichotomy between Christian, Biblical theism 
and that of classical Greek philosophy. If this is the case, and Kierkegaard does hold to 
a Greek, be it an Aristotelian, or even Platonic, doctrine of God over that of 
Christianity, how could this be recognized? A few elements will serve to illustrate what 
is contained in the first category. In Existence and Analogy, Eric loe call outlines three A 
leading theological conceptions in Greek thought. First, Greek theism generally held 
that the ultimate divine reality is understood to be identical with nature, and hence the 
distinction between world and deity was at best partial. Each and every natural 
occurrence was seen as a manifestation of divinity. Within this first point, it is also 
possible to discern the two orders of gods, both the heavenly bodies and the gods of 
classical mythology2. Second, the higher deity is impersonal and distant, and so, 
Aristotle's God, though admittedly transcendent, has no power over the world 
except that of originating motion, and even of motion he is only the final, and in 
no way the efficient, cause. Neither form nor matter in natural objects depends 
on him ... 
The only activity of which God is capable is the theoretical activity 
which terminates not upon the world but upon himself. 
Third, in the Timaeus Plato talks of the Demiurge, or Divine Craftsman, but this is no 
omnipotent Creator, `His work is confined to bringing form and matter into union, but 
neither element owes its being to him. '4 It may be seen then that traditional Christian 
theism differs from such beliefs in its rejection of pantheism, its clear affirmations of 
God's omnipotence and creation of the universe out of nothing, and proclamation of 
1 Diamond 1966,123 
2 Cf. Plato 1965,54-7 
3 Mascal 1949,5 
4 Ibid. 6 
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God as Trinity. As I move on to explain Kierkegaard's beliefs it will become apparent 
that his certainly fall within the Christian category. 
The concept of God found within the pages of Philosophical Fragments provides most 
of the ammunition used by Kierkegaard's critics. Instead of referring to `God', the 
pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus prefers to talk of `the god' (Danish Guden 
instead of the usual Gud). According to C. Stephen Evans this denotes a Platonic 
concept of deity, somewhat fitting perhaps for a work dealing with a Socratic lifeview 
and its alternatives. 5 However, rather than go so far as to claim this as being 
Kierkegaard's own vocabulary, Evans allows the pseudonym to stand on his own. 
Climacus never describes himself as a believer, instead he is content to remain an 
observer. He does not claim to represent full Christian doctrine on any point. Therefore 
it would be far more appropriate to interpret the use of `the god' as being indicative of 
Climacus' speculative distance from the subject he seeks to discuss 6 
The charges of this nature have also been produced by a reference to the Unmoved 
Mover of Aristotle's Metaphysics? found in ragments: `He must move himself and L. 
continue to be what Aristotle says of him, 
ltvrItioS 
n6v va xtvct '. '8 However, the 
context in which this occurs should be taken into consideration. In this case Aristotle's 
term is employed in order to illustrate the freedom of the god to become incarnate, 
against the thesis that he was compelled by force of human action, or other external 
forces. Climacus wishes to show that the god is entirely motivated by love, as opposed 
to being moved by obligation, or by need. 9 
The same phrase is also found in the Postscript. In this case Climacus is comparing the 
eternal reality of God against the fluctuations of human existence. 
Inasmuch as existence is motion, it holds true that there is indeed a continuity 
that -holds the motion together, because otherwise there is no motion ... 
The 
motionless belongs to motion as motion's goal, both in the sense of ceXoS [end, 
goal] and p. etipov [measure, criterion]; otherwise the statement that everything is 
5 Evans 1992,185 
6 Holmes Hartshorne 1990,33 




in motion - if one takes away time and says that everything is always motion - is 
eo ipso stagnation. Aristotle, who in so many ways emphasizes motion, 
therefore says that God, himself unmoved, moves everything. 10 
From this passage it can be seen that Climacus is merely asserting the dependence of 
finite existence upon a transcendent God. His use of Aristotle here is in keeping with 
Western theology and follows Aquinas, so he cannot be taken as negatively as some 
would wish to assume. However, it is understood that Aristotle's concept of God, 
despite some valuable insights, is incomplete and abstract. " If this information may be 
taken into consideration, then the charge of Aristotelian theism may be seen to be 
unsupported. 
Yet it is apparent that Kierkegaard does make frequent use of classical Greek 
terminology, both in the pseudonymous works and his Journals. Additionally it cannot 
be denied that he held many figures from classical thought and culture in high esteem. 
For instance in 1844 he wrote the following praise of antiquity in his Journals: 
It is a very strange experience for me to read the third chapter of the third book 
of Aristotle's De Anima. A year and a half ago I began a little essay, De 
omnibus dubitandum, in which I made my first attempt at a little speculative 
development. The motivating concept I used was: error. Aristotle does the 
same. At that time I had not read a bit of Aristotle but a good share of Plato. 
The Greeks still remain my consolation. The confounded mendacity which 
entered philosophy with Hegel, the endless insinuating and betraying, and the 
parading and spinning out of one or another single passage in Greek 
philosophy. 12 
Kierkegaard's admiration of classics and of Greek philosophy in particular cannot be 
overlooked. For instance, a fair proportion of Kierkegaard's attacks upon Hegelianism 
were inspired by the Aristotelian scholar and logician Adolf Trendelenburg. 
13 A 
contemporary of Kierkegaard, Trendelenberg was professor of philosophy at Berlin and 
an opponent of Hegel. He sought to illustrate that, whilst Greek philosophy was in need 
'°CUP 1: 312 
11 Cf. J&P 1332, IV A 157 n. d, 1843 
12 Ibid. 3300, VA 98 n. d., 1844 
'3 Gardiner 1988,81; cf. CUP 1: 110 
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of modification, it held many lasting insights. 14 It is not so surprising that Kierkegaard 
held Aristotle himself very highly, although, as the above quote states he did not begin 
reading him until the early 1840s, being far more a reader of Plato throughout his life. It 
is quotations and allusions to Plato's dialogues that so often adorn the pages of 
Kierkegaard's texts, yet they occur in reference to Socrates rather than Plato himself. 
Need we forget that his doctoral thesis was entitled On the Concept of Irony, with 
Continual Reference to Socrates? But may it be concluded from all this that his 
religious thought is dominated by Greek religious thought to the detriment of his 
Christian orthodoxy? 
It is an unquestioned historical fact that both the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies 
have played a most significant role in the development of Christian thought throughout 
the centuries. Despite the apparent antagonism between Greek philosophy and Biblical 
Christianity in the minds of some at that time, Platonic thought dominated the Christian 
theology of the Patristic period. This Neoplatonism as it was called (in fact a mixture of 
Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic elements) became embedded in the thought of both the 
Western and Eastern traditions. Its topple from power in Europe only came with the 
resurgence of Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages (courtesy of Arabic translators, such 
was the lack of Greek expertise in the West! ). Platonic thought made a little comeback, 
both during the Renaissance and in nineteenth century Romanticism, (although England 
produced the Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century, who owed more to the 
Neoplatonism of Plotinus than to Plato himself). However, Aristotelianism remained an 
intrinsic element of the European intellectual tradition until challenged by the rise of 
rationalism and empiricism from the seventeenth century. Its influence may have 
diminished, but it is by no means a spent force even in contemporary philosophy. 
Therefore, should it in any way be surprising then that Kierkegaard should exhibit some 
Greek influence in his writings? With much of both the school and university curricula 
of Kierkegaard's time being devoted to classics, it would be all the more startling if he 
were not to allow any mention of its contents to appear on his pages. 
14 Copleston 1963,386f 
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Is Kierkegaard an Anti-realist? 
Not only have some interpreters argued for his holding to an impersonal Aristotelian 
concept of deity, but, others have detected the traits of an anti-realist (or non-realist) 
(a)theism from Kierkegaard's works. Probably the most notable contemporary 
proponent of this view is Don Cupitt, although another interesting variation of anti- 
realism has been put forward by D. Z. Phillips. 's In The Sea of Faith Cupitt argues that, 
`Kierkegaard is seeking to go beneath realist ideas of God to the primal meaning of God 
as my God, my life-aim, my spiritual task and goal; and "my God" is not a metaphysical 
being but the expression of my spiritual commitment to my life-aim. "6 According to 
Patrick Gardiner's description, such an interpretation of Kierkegaard's theism therefore 
claims that, 
Propositions concerning, for example, the nature of God or of personal 
immortality should not be treated as involving determinate truth-claims about a 
transcendent or supernatural reality; instead, they are best understood in a `non- 
realist' and practically orientated way, and as playing a regulative rather than a 
descriptive or predicative role in religious contexts. '7 
Both Cupitt and Phillips are normally seen to represent a recent development in modem 
thought, with Phillips in particular drawing most of his inspiration from Wittgenstein's 
later philosophy. However, the attempt to ground theology wholly within the sphere of 
this worldly human existence has not been confined to the late twentieth century and 
may be seen in the writings of some of Kierkegaard's contemporaries. 
Developments in Hegelian philosophy had led to the emergence of various splinter 
groups amongst his German followers in the mid nineteenth century, one of the most 
's Phillips claims that 'Theology is the grammar of religious discourse' and as such does not relate to 
the objective reality of God as an independent being outside of the framework of a religious `form of 
life'. In his view 'the grammatical parameters of our forms of discourse are not descriptions of 
anything. Rather, they determine what it means to offer a description or to make an existential claim in 
that context. But the metaphysical realist wants to ask, independently of any context, "But is it really 
so? "' Further illustration of his `anti-realism' can be seen when, in support of his position, Phillips 
refers to Simone Weil: 'Simone Weil says that anything that exists is unworthy of absolute, 
unconditional love. In saying this she believes religion is rescued from anthropomorphism and idolatry; 
a god who is no more than man writ large, a natural god. She says that we need a purifying atheism. 
In loving God, she concludes, we love something that does not exist. God is more important than 
anything that exists. ' (Phillips 1993,4; 15; 13). 
16 Cupitt 1984,24 
" Gardiner 1988,3-4 
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radical of these was known as the `Young Hegelians'. Like Kierkegaard they criticized 
the alliance of state Christianity with German culture. Unlike Kierkegaard they 
employed elements of Hegelian thought in their rejection of traditional theism in favour 
of atheism. The major figure of influence in the early development of this school was 
Ludwig Feuerbach, author of The Essence of Christianity. 18 In this radical work he 
claimed that, 
Religion, at least the Christian, is the relation of man to himself, or more 
correctly to his own nature (i. e., his subjective nature); but a relation to it, 
viewed as a nature apart from his own. The divine being is nothing else than the 
human being, or, rather, the human nature purified, freed from the limits of the 
individual man, made objective i. e., contemplated and revered as another, a 
distinct being. All the attributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of 
the human nature. 19 
Rejecting belief in God as an objectively real, transcendent being, Feuerbach posited in 
its stead the concept of God as an `objectification' ('projection' in some English 
translations) of human attributes. Religion is, for Feuerbach, a matter of feeling and a 
mark of humanity's infancy, something it will grow out of as it progresses. Where 
Hegel saw the process of history as the unfolding of the self-consciousness of the 
Absolute, Feuerbach instead saw it as humanity's move to its own self-consciousness. 20 
Through this historical development theology will become anthropology as humanity 
realizes that `in the origin of religion there is no qualitative or essential difference 
whatever between God and man'. 
21 
This last point brings Feuerbach into conflict with Kierkegaard's constant assertion that 
`there is an infinite, radical, qualitative difference between God and man'. u Kierkegaard 
was aware of Feuerbach's philosophy, le was one of the most talked about philosophers ý 
in Germany during the 1840s andVKierkegaard owned a copy of The Essence of 
Christianity which he read whilst writing Philosophical Fragments. 23 There are also a 
18 Some of the more famous members of the group at one time included Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx 
and Bruno Bauer. 
19Feuerbach 1957,14 
20 Harvey 1988,26 
21 Feuerbach 1957,17 
22 J&P 1383, X1A 59 n. d, 1849 
23 Cf. Rae 1997,41 
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few direct references to Feuerbach in the Journals. In some ways they were similar in 
that through t ere riticism of him they both sought to `stand Hegel on his head'. 24 Yet 
despite hei shared animosity towards Hegel, Kierkegaard was to list Feuerbach 
amongst his opponents (alongside `speculation' and `Anabaptists'), thereby considering 
him to be a threat to the Christian faith as Kierkegaard saw it. 23 In fact, according to 
Murray Rae, Feuerbach is one of the prime targets of Kierkegaard's polemic in the first 
two chapters of ragme5? 26 This is on the grounds that his attempts to describe 
Christianity wholly in human terms do it a gross injustice and fall within the category of 
the Socratic hypothesis. In addition to this, further evidence may be found in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript where Climacus states, 
But that the by-nature eternal comes into existence in time, is born, grows up, 
and dies is a break with all thinking. If, however, the coming into existence of 
the eternal in time is supposed to be an eternal coming into existence, then 
Religiousness B is abolished, `all theology is anthropology', Christianity is 
changed from an existence-communication into an ingenious metaphysical 
doctrine addressed to professors. 27 
Without the reality of the God-man there can be no full doctrine of God nor any 
Christianity. In the light of this, and of the general distance between Kierkegaard and 
Feuerbach, the anti-realist interpretation seems to be without foundation. 
Transcendence and Immanence 
Having countered the previous two charges, I now wish to clarify more of what 
Kierkegaard actually did hold to. It is my contention that the majority of his assertions 
regarding the nature and attributes of God are intended to refute the pantheism he felt to 
be inherent within the then fashionable Idealist philosophy in particular. He sought 
instead to affirm a doctrine of God that included, not only such attributes as 
omnipotence and omnipresence, but especially transcendence. But of course, being who 
he was, Kierkegaard had to do so in no direct manner. Through the voice of Climacus 
he declares, 
24 Hannay 1991,52 
u J&P 3477, VIII 1A 432 n. d, 1847 
26 Rae 1997,41 
27 CUP 1: 57 
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What, then, is the unknown? It is the frontier that is continually arrived at ... 
Defined as the absolutely different, it seems to be at the point of being disclosed, 
but not so, because the understanding cannot even think the absolutely different . 
.. It cannot absolutely transcend 
itself and therefore thinks as above itself only 
the sublimity that it thinks by itself. If the unknown (the god) is not solely the 
frontier, then the one idea about the different is confused with the many ideas 
about the different. The unknown is then in Staanopä, and the understanding 
has an attractive selection from among what is available and what fantasy can 
think of (the prodigious, the ridiculous, etc. ). 28 
He wishes to leave us in no doubt that God totally transcends our thoughts' abilities to 
attain him. Even for Climacus, the deity is `absolutely different" from us, otherwise we 
remain within the realm of fantasy and our own `prodigious' or `ridiculous' creations. 
Leaving the aesthetic texts behind we swap pseudonyms and encounter the later 
pseudonym Anti-Climacus. Within his writings the absolute difference becomes a 
qualitative difference: 
Let us never forget that Socrates' ignorance was a kind of fear and worship of 
God, that his ignorance was the Greek version of the Jewish saying: the fear of 
the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. Let us never forget that it was out of 
veneration for God that he was ignorant, that as far as it was possible for a pagan 
he was on guard duty as a judge on the frontier between God and man, keeping 
watch so that the deep gulf of qualitative difference between them was 
maintained, between God and man, that God and man did merge in some way, 
philosophice, poelice, etc., into one. 2' 
As he goes to great lengths to explain in The Sickness Unto Death, from where this 
passage is taken, this qualitative difference is none other than original sin. It is an 
entirely Christian concept which makes it radically different from other religions. 
Without it, could humanity not better itself and claim divinity? This is not so much a 
metaphysical statement as it is an existential one, but with it the absolute difference 7 N,,,,,, 
between God and fallen creation is maintained. If that is not so, and sin is removed, 
there need be neither Incarnation nor atonement; humanity may then progress to its own 
28 PF 44-45 
29 SUD 99 
152 
autonomous fulfilment and `the qualitative difference between God and man is 
pantheistically abolished' 30 
In an entry in his journal two years earlier in 1847, Kierkegaard criticized pantheism as 
being `an optical illusion, a vaporous image formed out of the fog of temporality or a 
mirage formed by its reflection, which claims to be the eternal '. 3' Kierkegaard's 
dissatisfaction with pantheism can be traced back at least to one of his earliest journal 
entries where he refers to `the error in Schleiermacher's definition of religion as 
remaining in pantheism'. 32 In the case of Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard attributes his 
pantheism as being a throwback to Stoicism. 33 However, the main motivation behind 
the nineteenth century trend towards pantheism was a resurgence of interest in 
Spinoza's philosophy. This was brought about largely through the efforts of Schelling in 
his early philosophy, yet Schleiermacher also admired him. 34 
Kierkegaard in no way sought to deny God's omnipresence. As Anti-Climacus tells us 
in Practice in Christianity, God may be `invisible on high, [but] he is also present 
everywhere'. " In his Upbuilding Discourses of 1844, Kierkegaard openly declares how 
God is always present with the believer, `present as swiftly as only one can be who was 
already present. ' 36 But he is always careful to prevent any interpretation of his words 
30 Ibid. 117 
31 J&P 2004, VIII 1A 482 n. d, 1847 
32 Ibid. 3849, II A 91 n. d, 1837 
33 Ibid. 3848, IA 305 n. d, 1836 
34 Traits of pantheism can be detected throughout Schelling's philosophical output, even in his last 
years when he returned to Christianity (see Heywood Thomas, in eds. Smart et al 1988,70). 
Schleiermacher, on the other hand, did not wish to accept this classification and he frequently 
attempted to dispel the charges of pantheism made against him by his critics. At one point in The 
Christian Faith he claims that any appearance of pantheism in his theology arises out of the failings of 
philosophy to provide 'a generally accepted formula to express the relation of God and the world'. 
Because of this, theological discourse on this topic alternates between the two extremes of pantheism or 
of putting God and world in opposition to each other (Schleiermacher 1989,174). However, despite his 
attempts to disassociate himself from pantheism, 
Schleiermacher immensely admired Spinoza, and there is no denying that Spinozic echoes are 
to be heard again and again in his pages, not only in the Reden [Speeches] but in the 
Glaubenslehre [The Christian Faith] also. To conceive of God as the unity correlative with the 
multiplicity phenomenally present as the world, or the equating of the divine omnipotence with 
the totality of natural causes, is a doctrine of radical immanence, a close parallel to the 
Spinozan natura naturans and natura naturata. (Reardon 1985,57). 
Hegel is also frequently cited as a pantheist, yet he denied this in his writings. It would actually be 
more accurate to refer to him as a `panentheist' (Hodgson 1988,85; cf. Hegel 1979,110; 162n7) 
3s PC 155 
36 EUD 322 
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leaning towards pantheism. For instance, consider Climacus' words in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, `Nature, the totality of creation, is God's work, and yet God is 
not there, but within the individual human being there is a possibility (he is spirit 
according to his possibility) that in inwardness is awakened to a God-relationship, and 
then it is possible to see God everywhere. ' 37 It would seem that God is to be 
understood as distinct from creation, but not to the extent that he is absent from it. 
Through Climacus, Kierkegaard is implying that God is not self evident to the casual 
observer, but his presence is discernible to the believer. `Nature is certainly the work of 
God, but only the work is directly present, not God. '38 This is an objective theism in 
opposition to God-concepts which, not only attribute divinity to the world, but the 
process of world history and development. Allowing for the belief that an omnipresent 
God is both transcendent and immanent, the polemical style of Climacus is used to 
deride a one-sided focus upon the latter: `In the world-historical process, God is 
metaphysically laced in a half-metaphysical, half-esthetic-dramatic, conventional corset, 
which is immanence. '39 
Divine Omnipotence 
The doctrine of God's omnipotence also finds its way onto Kierkegaard's pages. It is 
God whose very power sustains the world's very existence at every moment. `You ... 
see many forces stirring in nature around you, but the power that supports it all you do 
not see, you do not see God's omnipotence - and yet it is just as fully certain that he, 
too, is working, that one single moment without him and then the world is nothing. 3,40 
This makes an interesting comparison with two statements in the Upbuilding 
Discourses. 
But in heaven, my listener, there lives the God who is capable of all things, or, 
more correctly, he lives everywhere, even if people do not perceive it. 4' 
O Lord ... your very greatness makes you 
invisible, since in your wisdom you 
are much too far away from man's thoughts for him to be able to see you, and in 
your omnipresence you are too close for him to see you; in your goodness you 
37 CUP 1: 246 
38 Ibid. 1: 243 
39 Ibid. 1: 156 
40 PC 155 
41EUD310 
154 
conceal yourself from him, and your omnipotence makes it impossible for him to 
see you, since in that case he himself would become nothing) But God in heaven 
is capable of all things, and man of nothing at all. 42 
The latter statement in particular illustrates the core content of Kierkegaard's own 
Christian theism. Both of the above were written in 1844, close to the publication of 
Philosophical Fragments. Therefore it is interesting to note the absence of the aesthetic 
terminology that has given rise to the assumptions dealt with earlier. A brief scan of 
both the Upbuilding Discourses and his Journals shows how Kierkegaard's God is 
wholly consistent with the God of traditional Christianity. `The god' of Climacus' 
speculations in Philosophical Fragments is absent, replaced by the `Father in heaven A3 
of Kierkegaard's own experiences. 
The Love of God and Love for God 
The mention of God as Father brings us to the topic of the love of God. This topic 
arises in the discussion as it is a vital component in Kierkegaard's doctrine of God. An 
early illustration of the love of God in Kierkegaard's writings is in Climacus' analogy of 
the King and the Maiden in Fragments where we are told that love is the god's entire 
motive for making himself known to the learner. The god wishes both to love and to be 
loved. 44 Kierkegaard echoes these statements throughout the Journals, giving more 
explicitly theological discussions of Climacus' poetic musings. For instance, he states , 
`Out of love God wants to be reconciled, ' and, `God is love. This is the thesis of 
Christianity. There is a twofoldness in it: God loves - and God wants to be loved. 
These two in equilibrium make true Christianity. ' 45 On the subject of God as love and as 
wanting to be loved by us, Kierkegaard briefly returns to the style of the `King and 
Maiden' analogy to explain the concept further: 
If someone were able to adhere on the greatest scale to the fact that God is love 
in the sense that God loves him and then suddenly come to see the other side, 
that God wants to be loved - he would certainly become anxious and afraid. Just 
42 Ibid. 310; cf. alsoJ&P 1251, VII 1A 181 n. d., 1846 
43 Ibid. 8 
44 PF 24f 
45J&P 532, X4A 212 n. d., 1851 and Ibid 1446, XI 2A 99 n. d., 1854 
155 
as it can be grand and glorious for a poor girl to become the object of a very 
powerful man's love, who loves her with all his soul - but in another sense there 
is an enormous difference when she perceives the earnestness of his passionate 
desire to be loved - just so it is for the Christian. In one sense nothing is more 
blessed than this certainty that God loves him, and also the degree to which God 
is love, the fact that it is his essence - in another sense nothing is more dreadful 
than to be pulled up to this highest level of existence, where in one sense God's 
wanting to be loved is so frightfully earnest. 46 
It would appear then, that to be the object of God's love is a privilege, yet it is also a 
cause for consternation as the believer wonders if he could ever return such love 
appropriately. 
At various times in the Journals Kierkegaard describes God as infinite love, 47 that he 
offers his love to all people equally, 48 and, that his love for us remains unchanged 
throughout eternity. 49 He even refers to God's love as being `the one unshakeable thing 
in life, the true Archimedian point'. 50 Yet these are not glib platitudes and he frequently 
records in his Journals how difficult it can be for the believer to hold on to this when 
God seems distant or uncaring. 
This is spiritual trial, but it is entirely in order that it goes this way; even the 
apostles experienced this in relation to Christ. And yet God is infinite love, but 
he has only the spirit's conception of what constitutes your happiness and 
blessedness - alas, and you are flesh and blood. If you are to become blessed in 
your relationship to him, your conception must be transformed, and this 
transformation, this rebirth, is a very painful operation, and the in process there 
comes the moment when it seems to you as if God were like a superior sort of 
seducer. sl 
The concept of the transformation of our conceptions by God brings us back to the 
subject of t¬v&vota that was mentioned in chapter two. God, out of love, transforms 
46 Ibid. 1446, XI 2A 99 n. d., 1854 
47 E. g. Ibid. 538, X4A 624 n. d., 1852; 1409, X3A 359 n. d., 1850; 1410, X3A 373 n. d., 1850 
48 E. g. Ibid. 1358, VIII 1A 327 n. d., 1847; 1368, IX A 77 n. d., 1848 
49 E. g. Ibid. 1379, IX A 374 n. d., 1848 
s0 Ibid. 5468, III A 73 n. d., 1840 
51 Ibid. 1409, X3A 359 n. d., 1850 
156 
the learner and thereby enables the learner to love him in return. Motivated by this love 
for God, the learner wishes to learn more, and so, in this sense, love is the true starting 
point of theological enquiry. 52 
2. Demonstrations of God's Existence 
Treatment of the traditional philosophical arguments for God's existence does not figure 
predominantly in any of Kierkegaard's writings. Throughout his authorship he appears 
to take God's existence to be the unqualified starting-point and presupposition for all 
that follows, assuming that by far the majority of his readers held to some form of belief 
in God. As I showed in the previous section, his principal concern was to proclaim that 
the God who exists is the Christian God, as opposed to any rival philosophical concepts. 
Commenting on the pseudonymous works, John Elrod writes, `For Kierkegaard, the 
God question is an existential question, not an ontological one. Discussions of God 
appear in his descriptions of the ethico-religious stage of existence, not his ontology. '" 
Therefore, like all other topics of discussion, the context is that of personal relevance 
and appropriation, not that of detached philosophical speculation. With this in mind I 
wish to examine, first, Kierkegaard's thought regarding the validity of attempts to 
demonstrate the existence of God in general, followed by some comment upon the 
significance of `proofs' for the Christian faith. It will then be appropriate to discuss his 
particular rejection of the ontological argument and of the argument from design, most 
of which is to be found presented through the mouth of Johannes Climacus in 
Philosophical Fragments. 
52 Consider the following passage from the Journals: 
Christ says: I will manifest myself to him who loves me. But it is generally true that 
something manifests itself to the one who loves it; truth manifests itself to the one who loves 
truth, etc. We usually think that the recipient is inactive and that the object manifesting itself 
communicates to the recipient, but the relationship is this: the recipient is the lover, and then 
the beloved becomes manifest to him, for he himself is transformed in the likeness of the 
beloved; the only fundamental basis for understanding is that one himself becomes what he 
understands and one only understands in proportion to becoming himself that which he 
understands. (Ibid. 2299, IX A 438 n. d., 1848). 
53 Elrod 1975,70n 
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Demonstrations and the Christian God 
For Climacus, any attempt to demonstrate God's existence is found to be forlorn from 
the very beginning: 
It hardly occurs to the understanding to want to demonstrate that this unknown 
(the god) exists. If, namely, the god does not exist, then it is foolishness to want 
to demonstrate it, since I, in the very moment the demonstration commences, 
would presuppose it not as doubtful - which a presupposition cannot be, 
inasmuch as it is a presupposition - but as decided, because otherwise I would 
not begin, easily perceiving that the whole thing would be impossible if he did 
not exist. 54 
The reason then, is that before any attempt at a demonstration begins, the person 
demonstrating would already be determined for a particular outcome. This would of 
course tend to be in the affirmative, since you cannot demonstrate the existence of what 
does not actually exist. The process is therefore circular as God's existence is actually 
serving as the presupposition of the argument, instead of forming the long awaited 
conclusion. Because of this it is impossible to reach complete objectivity in such 
theological discourse. What in fact results is that the concept of God is given some 
explanation by means of the `demonstration', and so: `If, however, I interpret the 
expression "to demonstrate the existence of the god" to mean that I want to 
demonstrate that the unknown, which exists, is the god, then I do not express myself 
very felicitously, for then I demonstrate nothing, least of all existence, but I develop the 
definition of a concept. '' So God's existence is not proved at all. Instead his existence 
is taken as a given fact and it then follows that his nature is given a technical description 
in the process of the alleged demonstration. Climacus muses on this, saying that, 
`Whether I am moving in theworld of sensate palpability or in the world of thought, I 
never reason in conclusion to existence, but I reason in conclusion from existence. For 
example, I do not demonstrate that a stone exists, but that something which exists is a 
stone. 06 
s'PF39 
ss Ibid 40 
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In a journal entry made in 1846 Kierkegaard claimed that `God cannot be an object for 
man, since God is subject'. 57 This statement was made in the same year as he published 
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript where he allows Climacus to explain this further. 
Leaving the impersonal theism of Fragments behind, he criticizes demonstrations as 
turning God himself into some detached object of enquiry instead of relating to him as 
he really is. 
To demonstrate the existence of someone who exists is the most shameless 
assault, since it is an attempt to make him ludicrous, but the trouble is that one 
does not even suspect this, that in dead seriousness one regards it as a godly 
undertaking. How could it occur to anyone to demonstrate that he exists unless 
one has allowed oneself to ignore him; and now one does it in an even more 
lunatic way by demonstrating his existence right in front of his nose. 58 
To omit the personal, relational aspect, is to misunderstand the nature of God and of 
religious faith entirely. 59 A faith that relies wholly on intellectual assent to what has 
been proved is not really faith, but rather knowledge. Plus, there could always be the 
possibility of its being disproved, and so it follows that if a man had belief in God merely 
because, `he accepted it by virtue of a demonstration, he would be on the verge of 
abandoning his faith. '60 In his typical polemical style Climacus is led to conclude: `For 
whose sake is the demonstration conducted? Faith does not need it, indeed it must even 
consider it an enemy. '61 For, as he sees it, true faith is strong enough without such aid. 
`When faith begins to cease to be faith, then the demonstration is made necessary in 
order to enjoy general esteem from unbelief. '62 
If Climacus is critical of alleged demonstrations, then more so is Kierkegaard in his 
Journals. In his opinion, how can it be that somebody can spend serious time and effort 
developing proofs and demonstrations if he or she already believes in the God they 
apparently wish to `prove'? Special attention in this case is given to the Christian 
academic: 
57 J&P 1349, VII 1A 201 n. d., 1846 
58 CUP 1: 545 
59 Rudd 1993,61; Law 1993,181 
60 CUP 1: 30 
61 Ibid 
62 Jbid 1: 30-1 
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The scientist and the scholar has his personal life in categories quite different 
from those of his professional life, but it is precisely the first which are the most 
important. He prays, for example - and then his entire effort is preoccupied with 
proving the existence of God. But how can he pray fervently in this way when 
his being is fragmented in this self-contradiction? 63 
On this then Kierkegaard's comments certainly appear to lend themselves open to the 
hostile charge of fideism: 
Away with all this world history and reasons and proofs for the truth of 
Christianity: there is only one proof - that of faith. If I actually have a firm 
conviction (and this, to be sure, is a qualification of intense inwardness 
orientated to spirit), then to me my firm conviction is higher than reasons; it is 
actually the conviction which sustains the reasons, not the reasons which sustain 
the conviction. " 
However, that is not to say that for him the intellectual defence of Christianity is 
disregarded per se as irreligious, as some interpreters wish to claim, nor is he arguing for 
the complete abandonment of `the Christian metaphysical system'. "' We must remember 
that Kierkegaard is not seeking to engage in the task of objective Christian apologetics 
for the benefit of those who have rejected Christianity, neither is he attempting to inform 
those who are unaware of the details of the Christian faith. Instead he is writing with 
the self-confessed believer in mind. In this context Kierkegaard does actually allow for 
demonstrations and the like to be valid, but only in that they may offer some limited help 
on the road to faith. What he rejects is the claim that they might lead directly to faith, or 
that faith ought to be grounded in such reasoning alone, as once God is encountered as 
living a reality all else becomes secondary. In a journal entry of 1849 we find the 
following, 
My development, or any man's development, proceeds in this way. Perhaps he 
does begin with a few reasons, but this is the lower stage. Then he chooses; 
63 J&p 928, VII 1A 28 n. d., 1846 
64 Ibid. 3608, X1A 481 n. d., 1849 
65 Cf. Chrsitopher Hamilton: 'For there can be no proof of the existence of God; ... the only thing to do 
is to is to insist on the incomprehensibility of God and its total lack of defensibility in purely rational 
terms that is central to Christianity, ' and, 'Kierkegaard says, then, that belief in God is essentially 
paradoxical. ' (Hamilton 1998,63). According to Hamilton's thesis 'Kierkegaard believed it was 
possible to defend a post-metaphysical conception of such belief by reflecting on its place in what one 
might call the spiritual economy of the life of the individual. ' (Ibid. 61) In such a view of religious 
belief the metaphysical question of God's existence is irrelevant to the Christian life. (cf. Ibid. 73; 75) 
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under the weight of responsibility before God a conviction comes into existence 
in him through God ... Now he cannot defend or prove 
his conviction with 
66 reasons; it is a self-contradiction, since reasons are lower. 
It may therefore be seen that, according to Kierkegaard, reasons may be valid, but they 
can only serve a preparatory role to the conversion of an individual. They are neither 
certain, nor complete, nor sufficient in themselves. 67 In the words of Anti-Climacus, 
`demonstrations can at best serve to make a person aware, so that made aware he can 
now come to the point: whether he will believe or he will be offended. '68 Let us now 
consider how this is done, first with regard to the ontological argument, and then to the 
argument from design. 
The Ontological Argument 
As I have already stated, Kierkegaard's specific treatment of the traditional arguments 
for God's existence is scarce. He briefly rejects the ontological and design arguments, 
but ignores the cosmological and moral arguments. 69 The ontological argument 
attempts to demonstrate God's existence a priori, in that it argues from the concept of 
God alone. According to Richard Swinburne it may be summarized as follows: `God is 
by definition a most perfect being. A being which exists is more perfect than one which 
does not. Therefore God, being most perfect, exists. a70 So it is claimed God necessarily 
exists, or alternatively his essence involves his existence, as Climacus puts it in 
Fragments: `God is not a name but a concept, and perhaps because of that his essentia 
involvit existentiam. '71 
J&P 3608, X1A 481 n. d, 1849 
67 Westphal 1987,94 
1PC96 
69 Having said this, if we call to mind the few references to Aristotle's conception of God as the 
Unmoved Mover in the Postscript, it can be seen that Kierkegaard had the cosmological argument in 
mind. However, he does not actually discuss it at length, nor does he even refer to this argument 
directly. Instead, it would seem that it is merely implicit in the discussion and therefore it would be safe 
to conclude that he did not consider it to be very important. Kierkegaard's reasons for choosing to 
focus on the ontological and design arguments were quite simple. Traditionally the argument from 
design has been the most preferred of the theistic arguments in Protestant theology, and interest in the 
ontological argument had recently been revived by Hegel. The cosmological argument featured far 
more in catholic apologetics and the moral argument was largely a Kantian innovation. As 
Kierkegaard generally had other targets in mind he would not have considered the last two arguments 
relevant to his argument. 
70 Swinburne 1993,273n 
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Although this demonstration is most famous from its use first by Anselm, and then by 
Descartes, 72 Climacus chooses to focus instead to Spinoza's version of it. It would 
seem that, in keeping with the indirect nature of Kierkegaard's criticism Spinoza is not 
the main object of attack. Instead it would seem that Spinoza is used here to portray the 
pantheist tendencies in nineteenth century theology that were inspired by his 
philosophy. 73 Although Martensen swiftly rejected the ontological argument in his 
Christian Dogmatics'74 it did receive lengthy and favourable treatment in Hegel's 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. 75 In his Ethics Spinoza states that, `God or a 
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite 
essence, necessarily exists. ' Also, `since ability to exist is power, it follows that the 
more reality anything in nature has, the more power it will have to exist; and accordingly 
a being absolutely infinite, or God, has an absolutely infinite power of existence from 
itself, and on that account absolutely exists. , 76 This is rejected by Climacus as being 
tautologous since it is impossible to conclude existence from perfection. To try to do so 
is an `intrinsically unclear use of language', and `with regard to factual being, to speak 
of more or less factual being is meaningless. A fly, when it is, has just as much being as 
the god'. '7 
Another of Climacus' objections to this theory centres around the idea that what might 
be appear necessary according to a hypothesis or rule of logic, might not correspond 
with what is actually the case - `What is lacking here is a distinction between factual 
being and ideal being. '7" He explains his particular criticisms at greater length in the 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
When, for example, it is said: God must have all perfections, or the highest 
being must have all perfections, to be is also a perfection; ergo the highest being 
'Z It must be remembered, however, that Anselm's use of the argument differed greatly from that of 
Descartes. A `text-book rationalist', Descartes sought to formulate a logical demonstration in a manner 
akin to that of a mathematical equation. Anselm, on the other hand, whilst not wishing to sacrifice any 
of his intellectual integrity, places his argument within the context of prayer and meditation. The 
central doctrines of Christianity are already presupposed and his intention is, not to `prove' God's 
existence objectively, but to clarify certain aspects of God's nature and character. (Helm 1997,105ü). 
73 Notable examples here would be Schelling and Schleiermacher, see Copleston 1963,100 and 149 
respectively. 
74 Martensen 1878,75 
"Hegel 1979,45ff 




must be, or God must be - the whole movement is deceptive. That is, if in the 
first part of this statement God is actually not thought of as being, then the 
statement cannot come off at all. It will then run somewhat like this: A supreme 
being who, please note, does not exist, must be in possession of all perfections, 
among them also that of existing; ergo a supreme being who does not exist does 
exist. This would be a strange conclusion. The highest being must either not be 
in the beginning of the discourse in order to come into existence in the 
conclusion, and in that case it cannot come into existence; or the highest being 
was, and thus, of course, it cannot come into existence, in which case the 
conclusion is a fraudulent form of developing a predicate, a fraudulent 
paraphrase of a presupposition. In the other case the conclusion must be kept 
purely hypothetical: if a supreme being is assumed to be, this being must also be 
assumed to be in possession of all perfections; to be is a perfection, ergo this 
being must be - that is if this being is assumed to be. By concluding within a 
hypothesis, one can surely never conclude from the hypothesis. For example, if 
this or that person is a hypocrite, he will act like a hypocrite, a hypocrite will do 
this and do that; ergo this or that person has done this and that. It is the same 
with the conclusion about God. When the conclusion is finished, God's being is 
just as hypothetical as it was, but inside there is advanced a conclusion-relation 
between a supreme being and being as perfection" 
So the end result is dependent upon a belief held prior to the demonstration. Even then 
though, everything may be seen to remain within the hypothetical and all that is 
accomplished is the elaboration of a God-concept. 
In making his criticisms, Kierkegaard's pseudonym is closely following Kant's argument 
against Descartes and Leibniz as made in the Critique of Pure Reason. As part of his 
refutation of the ontological argument, Kant states that, 
It is absurd to introduce - under whatever term disguised - into the concept of a 
thing, which is to be thought solely in reference to its possibility, the concept of 
existence ... 
in reality [you] have enounced nothing but a tautology. I ask, is 
the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, 
an analytical or a synthetic proposition? If the former, there is no addition made 
79 CUP 1: 334 
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to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its existence; but either then 
the concept in your minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed 
the existence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its 
internal possibility - which is but a miserable tautology. 80 
In trying to deduce the existence of God through the concept of `being' itself there 
results a general confusion of a logical with a real predicate. Hence Kant likens the 
ontological argument for God's existence with an attempt to increase someone's wealth 
by adding the mere concept of more money, or just by writing a few extra noughts on 
the balance. 81 
The Argument from Design 
Climacus refers to the design argument by its Kantian title of the `physico-teleological 
demonstration', but it will be seen that the similarities between Kierkegaard's 
pseudonym and this German philosopher do not end there. For both figures the 
rejection of the design argument is based upon some of the same premises as the 
ontological argument. Traditionally an argument from design may be described as `one 
which argues from some general pattern of order in the universe or provision for the 
needs of conscious beings to a God responsible for these phenomena'. 82 Climacus' first 
point of contention is that there is no self-evident, or directly obvious, connection 
between God and the universe. The argument rests upon the presumption that there is a 
creator God. Like Kant before him, Climacus refuses to believe that it is appropriate to 
reason from visible causes to God. We are unable to perceive the totality of existence, 
hence the process of reasoning could never be completed and hence remain within an 
`infinite chain of contingencies'. 83 This point echoes David Hume's criticism of such 
arguments that the connection between observable phenomena and the eternal God as a 
first cause `is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on 
the nature of things'. 84 As Climacus explains in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
`I observe nature in order to find God, and I do indeed see omnipotence and wisdom, 
"'Kant 1996,409 
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but I also see much that troubles and disturbs. The summa summarum of this is an 
objective uncertainty. '8S Similar thoughts are also found in Fragments: 
The works from which I want to demonstrate his existence do not immediately 
and directly exist, not at all. Or are the wisdom in nature and the goodness or 
wisdom in Governance right in front of our noses? ... But I still do not 
demonstrate God's existence from such an order of things, and even if I began, I 
would never finish and would be obliged to live in suspenso lest something so 
terrible happen that my fragments of demonstration would be ruined. Therefore, 
from what works do I demonstrate it? From the works regarded ideally - that is, 
as they do not appear directly and immediately. But then I do not demonstrate it 
from the works, after all, but only develop the ideality I have presupposed. " 
For both figures the rejection of the design argument is based upon some of the same 
premises as the ontological argument. Like the ontological argument, we are told that 
the validity of the physico-teleological demonstration is confined to the elucidation of a 
God-concept. 87 An objectively valid, real demonstration in this manner cannot be done, 
and attempts by those claiming to be capable of this are merely `a superb theme for a 
crazy comedy'. 88' It is important then not to fall into the trap of giving it too much 
significance: `At least Socrates, who did indeed advance what is called the physico- 
teleological demonstration for the existence of God, did not conduct himself in this way. 
He constantly presupposes that the god exists, and on this presupposition he seeks to 
infuse nature with the idea of fitness and purposiveness! " 
It may be seen then, that the traditional arguments for God's existence are not rejected 
out of hand but may be acceptable if their limits are allowed for. Namely, `the belief in 
God which the proof is supposed to support is actually supporting the proof, rather than 
the other way around-'90 At no point in any of his writings does Kierkegaard allow 
Climacus to deny that God can be known rationally. The target is those who would use 
demonstrations as the foundations of faith, making God out to be the distant impersonal 
object of speculation. Kierkegaard himself knew God's reality from personal faith and 
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subjective experience, things which textbook reasons could not replace. God is to be 
encountered as a living being, present in ways accessible to all people, not an object 
relegated to the field of philosophical scrutiny. Kierkegaard draws a parallel case with 
the pretensions of some scientists: `Tell him [the natural scientist] that any man has all 
he needs in his conscience and in Luther's Small Catechism, and the natural scientist will 
look down his nose. In an imposing way he wants to make God into a coy beauty, a 
devil of a fellow, whom not everyone can understand. '91 Maybe for Kierkegaard God is 
to be known far more easily than many of his critics would allow. Through Climacus he 
defended the philosophy that `objective speculation and subjective existence are 
opposite and incompatible movements. Thus, to the extent that I try to prove God's 
existence by speculation, I make God's reality appear doubtful by removing myself from 
the existential standpoint which actually offers assurance. '92 The key is to `let go' of 
such proofs, recognizing their limits, and try to relate to God in faith, 
So long as I am holding on to the demonstration (that is, continue to be the one 
who is demonstrating), the existence does not emerge, if for no other reason than 
that I am in the process of demonstrating it, but when I let go of the 
demonstration, the existence is there. Yet this letting go, even that is surely 
something; it is after all, meine Zuthat [my contribution]. Does it not have to be 
taken into account, this diminutive moment, however brief it is - it does not have 
to be long, because it is a leap. 93 
The notion of the leap is well-known in Kierkegaardian studies. In this context it refers 
to the necessity of a personal act of commitment, `It directs our attention to the 
necessity of choice and the inescapability of the leap. It reminds us that theological 
affirmation is grounded in presuppositions that are chosen, not proven. '94 
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3. The Unknown God and Negative Theology 
Returning to the theism found in Philosophical Fragments I now wish to turn to 
Climacus' description of `the god' as `the unknown'. In discussing the limits of human 
knowledge Climacus asserts that, `this, then is the ultimate passion of thought: to want 
to discover something that thought cannot think. '95 By this it is being implied that 
human thought attempts to transcend itself, an impossible and somewhat paradoxical 
task. He then explains that in this situation of constant striving to know more there will 
always be something beyond, and hence unknowable, to reason. 
But what is this unknown against which the understanding in its paradoxical 
passion collides and which even disturbs man and his self-knowledge? It is the 
unknown. But it is not a human being, insofar as he knows man, or anything else 
that he knows. Therefore let us call this unknown the god [Guden]. It is only a 
name that we give to it. 
This statement is in the midst of Climacus' description of the limits of, not necessarily 
knowledge in general, but of what he refers to as Socratic knowledge. This was 
discussed in detail earlier and refers to the theory of Socratic recollection, namely, that 
we posses all necessary truth within ourselves and need only to `recollect' that which we 
already know. " According to Stephen M. Emmanuel the use of `the unknown' in this 
manner is an indictment upon the Socratic position - `that he is unable to advance 
further than to the paradoxical realization that he cannot know the highest truth is itself 
evidence of the inherent conceptual limitations of the Platonic-Socratic view. 
98 Thus he 
would agree with the position which understands Climacus to be but a personification of 
the aesthetic-ethical lifeview, not the proponent of a valid theological position on behalf 
of Kierkegaard himself. 
A different interpretation has recently been put forward by David Law in his book 
Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian and Michael Hardin in an article on Kierkegaard's 
spirituality in the Scottish Journal of Theology. 
99 Although these two scholars seem to 
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have arrived at their positions quite independently of each other, there are some marked 
similarities between them. First, both fail to distinguish between `God' and `the god' in 
the Climacus texts, taking either of Climacus' terms to denote the Christian God. '°° 
Second, their interpretation of Kierkegaard's writings lays little stress upon the 
pseudonymity and irony, hence there is minimal distinction between the views of i%A 
Climacus and those of Kierkegaard. 101 Due to this[he-result-is-that1Climacus' thought is 
treated entirely seriously, detecting within his theism strands of `apophatic', or negative 
theology. Law offers the following evidence for his position: 
The unknown that is God, however, is not unknown because the individual lacks 
knowledge. God is unknown because human reason is simply not capable' of 
grasping Him. To gain purchase on God, reason would have to be above God. 
God would then be subject to its laws and open to examination and explication. 
God, however, is the creator of the world and it is He who has ordained its laws 
and principles, including those of reason. Consequently God is above reason and 
as such is unknown ... 
In this emphasis on the breakdown of reason when 
confronted by the Divine we can see a very powerful apophatic motif coming to 
the fore. Because reason is incapable of grasping God, God becomes the 
Unknown, a concept that bears a striking resemblance to the hidden God of 
negative theology. '02 
Law is not claiming a direct influence between negative theology and Kierkegaard, 
merely an uncanny similarity, although Kierkegaard was aware of its proponents through 
his theological studies. '°3 Hardin also suggests that Kierkegaard's approach to God is 
similar to the apophatic tradition, although he also suggests that Kierkegaard knew more 
about Western mysticism, which he rejected. 
"" 
Kierkegaard's criticisms of mysticism are few and far between. In Either/Or his 
personification of the ethical lifeview, Judge William, rejects mysticism largely on the 
grounds that mystics become alienated from the rest of society as all relationships other 
than that with God become insignificant. "' This is quite understandable when it is 
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realized that the ethical lifeview depends entirely upon society for verification of its 
value system. Kierkegaard makes some direct criticism in the Journals, for instance in 
1840 he commented that `mysticism does not have the patience to wait for God's 
revelation'. 106 Ten years later, contrasting Hegelian Idealism and mysticism, he stated 
that `The system begins with "nothing"; the mystic always ends with "nothing". 407 
Negative theology lays great stress on the hiddenness and incomprehensibility of God 
and may be found in a diverse collection of theologies. Beginning in the Patristic period 
it is possible to cite figures such as Clement of Alexandria and the Cappadocian Fathers, 
moving on to include Dionysius the Areopagite and then Meister Eckhart in the Middle 
Ages. They cannot be said to constitute a self-conscious `school' of negative theology 
as they were part of very different traditions and range across several centuries. Instead 
they may be seen to share a few common characteristics. It is not difficult to see 
similarities between some of these and Climacus. Clement states that `God is invisible 
and beyond expression by words. 108 From the Eastern tradition, Basil the Great asserts 
that `knowledge of the divine essence involves perception of His incomprehensibility, 
and the object of our worship is not that of which we comprehend the essence, but of 
which we comprehend that the essence exists'. 
109 His brother, Gregory of Nyssa states 
that, `the simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is, viz., 
incapable of being grasped by any term, or any idea, or any other device of our 
apprehension, remaining beyond the reach not only of the human but also of the angelic 
and of all supramundane intelligence, unthinkable, unutterable, above all expression in 
, 11o words. 
However, could it be that the similarity is at best merely superficial? Let us consider the 
following statement made by Climacus in Fragments: `the paradoxical passion of the 
understanding is, then, continually colliding with this unknown, which certainly does 
exist but is also unknown and to that extent does not exist. "" It would seem from this 
and the general tenor of his stance that his `unknown' is more the result of agnosticism 
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than it is a description of God's essential nature. Climacus' `god' is but an impersonal 
concept, a term he has coined to designate an unknown facet of existence. Yet the 
above representatives of negative theology all claimed that God is knowable, albeit to 
the limited extent that He chooses to reveal something of himself to us - through the 
Incarnation, the Bible, the traditions of the Church and so on. It is therefore God's 
essential nature, the extent of his intrinsic `Godness' as it were, which eludes us, and is 
hence unknown. 
Clearly Climacus' use of the term is not the same as found in negative theology, so we 
must look elsewhere for a correct understanding of its use. Evidence for this claim can 
be found in a journal entry of 1847 where Kierkegaard states that, `in paganism God 
was regarded as the unknown. More recently it has been assumed presumptuously that 
to know God is a trifle. 112 There is a clear contrast being made between the claims of 
rationalist and Idealist philosophy with those of pagan antiquity. Through his aesthetic 
lifeview Climacus attempts to maintain a speculative distance from the theological topics 
of his discussion, he is not a believer nor does he seriously pretend to be one. Climacus 
may therefore be understood to represent the `pagan' viewpoint just described, yet I 
have been careful to show that such a view is not shared by Kierkegaard who remains 
within Christian orthodoxy. With regard to `the unknown' it is interesting to observe 
that the same use of terms can be found in Martensen's Christian Dogmatics when he 
states that `the God of theism is known amongst heathens merely as "the unknown 
God". 113 This is a direct reference to Paul's debate in front of the Areopagus in Athens 
as described in Acts 17: 23. Calling attention to one of their altars bearing the inscription 
`To an unknown god', Paul begins his address by saying `what therefore you worship as 
unknown, this I proclaim to you'. As Martensen was not only one of the most 
prominent Danish theologians of Kierkegaard's time, but also, and more importantly, his 
erstwhile tutor during his university studies, it is more than likely that there is a direct 
link between them on this point. 
We can also find descriptions of God as the unknown in Luther's writings. Luther takes 
the concept of the unknown God in a different direction from that of negative theology. 
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In The Bondage of the Will he writes: `To the extent, therefore, that God hides Himself 
and wills to be unknown to us, it is no business of ours, ' and `God must therefore be left 
to himself in his own majesty, for in this regard we have nothing to do with him, nor has 
he willed that we should have anything to do with him. But we have something to do 
with him insofar as he is clothed and set forth in his Word, through which he offers 
himself to us. '114 The emphasis is on the will of God in some way remaining hidden 
from us, being therefore unknown mainly as a result of his choice to conceal himself, 
rather than due to the limitations and finitude of human reason itself. Luther makes an 
important distinction between God as preached (the Word of God) and God hidden 
(God himself). We cannot, indeed we must not, pry into the secrets of the Divine will, 
and so Luther carefully advises all who follow to occupy themselves with the revelation 
of God Incarnate in Jesus. "" As I have already argued, by far the greater part of 
Kierkegaard's theology is highly Christocentric and Kierkegaard owes a great debt to 
Luther's theology of the cross. It would therefore be safe to claim that Kierkegaard was 
strongly influenced by the Lutheran tradition on this point and that the similarities with 
negative theology are noteworthy, but incidental. However, they do help to show that 
his theology may be placed in a broader context than allowed by some of his critics. 
For both Luther and Kierkegaard the process of doing theology was undergirded and 
held together by a specific conception of faith. Both argued that, without such faith, 
theology becomes an impossible undertaking. It is my intention in the next and final 
chapter to examine this claim and explain the details of Kierkegaard's doctrine of faith. 
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6 
KIERKEGAARD'S DOCTRINE OF FAITH AND RATIONALITY 
In this final chapter I will consider certain aspects of Kierkegaard's doctrine of faith. 
This important topic has been left till now as it is the culminating point of his theological 
reflections, although as we have already seen, Kierkegaard's understanding of faith is to 
a certain degree implicit within the other themes discussed in the previous chapters. It is 
important to offer some more specific treatment of it at this point so that it may be seen 
how, just like his doctrine of God and criticisms of natural theology, Kierkegaard 
develops his doctrine of faith from his Christology. Through a careful consideration of 
this subject it is hoped that the argument presented in this chapter will serve to counter 
the frequent charges of fideism that are made against him. For, just as his Christology 
has been the cause of many misunderstandings, so has Kierkegaard's doctrine of faith 
met with a variety of misinterpretations by opponents and supporters alike. 
I will begin with an examination of the relationship between faith and reason. Starting 
with a comparison of some similar ideas from Luther, Hamann and Pascal, it will be 
argued that, contrary to the frequent claims of his radical unconventionality, 
Kierkegaard may instead be understood to stand within a valid and credible theological 
tradition. Second, I will show how Kierkegaard went counter to post-Kantian Idealism 
in his conception of the reason per se, asCoontidistinguished from the understanding, >4 
and of its relation to faith. The third and final 
section considers certain specific aspects 
of Kierkegaard's doctrine of faith in detail. This will be done by focusing on three 
specific areas, discussing the various relationships between faith and knowledge, then 
faith and the will, before concluding with an examination of his famous statement from 
the Postscript that `truth is subjectivity'. 
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1. Faith and Reason 
The influence of classical Lutheranism becomes very 
much, 
apparent in Kierkegaard's » 
treatment of faith and reason. This claim is of course no real surprise to us when we 
remember that, as I attempted to prove in chapter 4, Kierkegaard did actually derive 
many of his most important theological insights from Luther's theology of the cross. 
Although he claimed not to have read much by Luther before writing Fragments' it can 
be seen that there is certainly a level of influence within Kierkegaard's output during the 
early 1840s. This influence becomes more apparent in the Journals and the authorship 
from the late 1840s. Therefore I wish to begin this chapter by outlining some of 
Luther's thoughts on the subject faith and reason. 
However, Luther was not the sole influence upon Kierkegaard's theological 
development. In view of this I will discuss two other figures in the Christian tradition 
who also deserve to be mentioned in this context. First, Johann Hamann, a 
contemporary of Kant whom Kierkegaard very much admired for his critique of 
Enlightenment Rationalism from the perspective of the Lutheran faith. Next the French 
thinker Blaise Pascal will be mentioned for similar reasons, although his critique was 
delivered against rationalist elements within Roman Catholicism. I will then show how 
ideas from all three figures served to influence Kierkegaard's own thoughts on faith and 
reason. The term `fideist' is so often used with reference to all four, assuming a 
negative verdict on their achievements. However, my aim is to deliver a more positive 
evaluation and thereby illustrate how this so-called `fideism' is in fact a valid and 
realistic approach to the problem of religious knowledge. 
Luther on Faith and Reason 
From the beginning Luther is careful to distinguish between those areas in which the 
unaided human reason is valid, as opposed to those in which it is not. He does not 
question the fact that in secular matters, or the `Kingdom of Earth' (regnum mundi), the 
reason is an important if not vital instrument in regulating our lives. It is personified as 
`the inventress and mistress of all the arts, of medicine and law, of whatever wisdom, 
1 J&P 2453, VIII A 465 n. d., 1847 
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power, virtue and glory men possess in this life'. 2 However, although reason is regarded 
as being God-given, it is by no means infallible. So despite its being taken to be the 
highest authority in secular matters, it is certainly not an autonomous faculty. 
It is emphasized that the right use of reason is an essential component in theology, but 
only when operating in conjunction with the testimony of Scripture and the conscience. 3 
So, clearly, Luther is not content to allow human reason to operate entirely on its own 
grounds. God-given it may be, but it does share the fallen nature of its human recipient 
and, like the conscience, it too is bound by the limitations of a sinful will. If Luther 
sounds vitriolic in his criticisms of reason as being blind, or even on the occasions when 
he calls it `the Devil's whore', it is because reason, when dominated by the fallen will, 
negates all claims to neutrality or objectivity and thereby limits itself to operating within 
the narrow confines of a sinful view of existence. 4 Because of this it fails to comprehend 
the nature of its own sin and that of others. In this sense it is merely of the `flesh'. 
However, this is not always to be understood as negatively as might be suggested. 
When Luther talks of the limitations of the `works of natural reason' he implies `what a 
man can do without grace, solely by means of his native capacities'. 
5 Thus, of itself, 
reason or any other natural human ability cannot bring us any closer to God than we 
already are and we stand in need of God's gift of grace. 
There is a fundamental dualism in Luther's thought here between the `Kingdom of 
Earth' and the spiritual `Kingdom of Christ' (regnum Christi). The former is also 
referred to by him as the `Kingdom of Reason' (regnum rations). In the spiritual realm 
the unaided reason is quite impotent, and God's gift of faith is required to transform 
reason in order to allow it some legitimacy in this sphere. Luther does not claim that 
reason becomes perfected in this process but that it becomes more aware of its 
limitations and fallenness. As Gustav Aulen explains, 
Luther speaks of the Christian as simul iustus et peccator, the meaning is not 
that he is at once and at the same sense sinless and sinful. It is that two different 
principles are present together in him, so that he can be regarded from two 
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aspects: on the one hand, he is a child of God, alive unto God, justified; on the 
other, he is not worthy of this Divine vocation. And the more deeply he 
recognizes his Divine vocation, the more he becomes conscious of his own sin: 
as Luther again says, Quo quique magis pious est, eoplus sentit illam pugnam. 6 
In view of this it is important that we understand the different conceptions of reason 
implied. Gerrish detects within Luther's thoughts on reason the following threefold 
distinction: first, the `natural reason', God's gift appropriate for discernment in secular 
matters. Second, the `arrogant reason' which attempts to trespass onto spiritual affairs 
for which it is neither equipped nor properly orientated, this is what is sometimes 
referred to as the `Devil's whore'. Finally, there is the `regenerate reason' subject to the 
Word of God and which is described as the handmaid of faith. This latter concept 
refers to reason in its broadest definition, encompassing human rationality as a whole. 7 
Open to the work of the Holy Spirit this becomes a `new reason' (nova ratio). ' It is not 
perfected by this process, but its perspective becomes altered and corrected. This 
reason then, is not taken as a purely human faculty but is instead defined according to its 
object `the wisdom of the Cross of Christ, that is, faith'. 9 Without such orientation 
reason remains within an inferior state, unable to penetrate beyond the temporal sphere 
and so recognize God or his works as they really are. From this latter standpoint Luther 
contends that God remains unknown and unreachable. 
Hamann and the 'Counter Enlightenment' 
Where Luther had sought to correct the errors of late medieval Catholicism, Hamann 
sought to refute the excesses of the Enlightenment's confidence in the powers of reason. 
He was part of a German `Counter-Enlightenment' against the Aufklärung that arose 
particularly in East Prussia in the eighteenth century, an anti-rationalist in the cause of a 
pietistic Lutheran faith. 10 It is quite ironic that in order to do this he employed methods 
inspired directly by the philosophical scepticism of David Hume. Yet Hamann was to do 
so in staunch defence of the very kind of Christian faith Hume had wished to refute. For 
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instance, consider the following passage from his An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, where Hume puts it that: 
The Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at 
this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason 
is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to 
assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which 
subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to 
believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. " 
This was meant as a rather subtle ironic rejection of Christian faith on the grounds of its 
VJi&A 
alleged irrationality. Referring to this quot, Hamann argues that Hume's statement 
proves that `one can preach the truth in jest and without knowing it or desiring to do 
so'. 12 On the same matter Hamann also quotes the following from Luther: `God has set 
these things in a place which all your oratory will never find, nor your philosophy, nor 
your politics; it is called Faith, containing all things which we can neither see nor grasp. 
To seek to make them visible, evident, and within our reach, as you do, is to reap 
heartache and lamentation. "' What had for Hume made Christianity implausible, in 
Hamann's eyes served to give it greater strength and credibility. Hamann therefore 
turned Hume's critique on its head. Both figures rejected orthodox rationalist 
apologetics, arguing that the allegedly certain foundations of a priori reason were in fact 
uncertain and reason was therefore inadequate to the task. Hume then used this to 
argue against religious belief. Hamann argued that a better foundation lay elsewhere 
than the claims of speculative and theoretical philosophies. Isaiah Berlin offers the 
following description of Hamann's philosophical stance: 
He was by temperament not merely indifferent, but deeply opposed, to those 
who seek to find some intelligible order in the universe, capable of being reduced 
to, and communicated by means of, a theoretical system. He belonged to those 
thinkers ... whose 
hatred of tidy, rational schemes leads them to look for the 
exceptional and the irregular, if only because these serve to undermine reliance 
on general laws, and to confute those who suppose that they can catch and order 
the teeming variety of reality within their artificial constructions. Monist, dualist, 
" Hume 1977,90 
'2 Hamann, in Smith 1960,241 
" Luther, in Zeeden 1957,191 
176 
pluralist systems were, for him, equally delusive chimeras, efforts to confine the 
unconfinable, contain the wildly conflicting, unpredictable, often chaotic, data of 
direct experience, and reduce them to regularities and symmetries by means of 
logical or metaphysical links - he describes them as walls of sand built to hold 
back the waves of an ocean. '4 
Reason might be needed to systematize facts and figures within logic, the natural 
sciences and the general realm of day to day banality, but the depth of reality eludes it. 
Neither rationalism nor empiricism had the ability to furnish anything more than a one- 
sided description of part of the picture. A true philosopher would try to explain, but not 
rationalize, life in all its contradictions, after all says Hamann `God is a poet, not a 
mathematician'. 15 
To Hamann the Aufklärung, like its counterparts in Britain and France, had questioned 
everything save itself. Its self-glorified `objective' reason was the enemy to true faith, 
denying the uniqueness of the individual in his or her particular situation. He questioned 
its authority and opened up the way for a rebirth of things the Aufklärung despised: `the 
non-rational powers of feeling and longing, of the unknown, of tradition and the mystery 
of organic growth. '16 He went so far as to claim that the truths of the Christian faith do, 
and should, appear but folly to anybody who approaches them from a rationalist 
standpoint. Yet this is no reason to deny their validity, nor charge them with 
irrationality, rather it must be accepted that reason cannot pass judgement on what is 
beyond its scope. Anticipating Kierkegaard's critique by nearly one hundred years 
Hamann declared: 
Reason is. inclined to serve an unknown God, but is infinitely remote from 
knowing him. It does not wish to know him - and what is even more 
astonishing, when it does know him it ceases to serve him. This is why God 
discloses so late and so slowly, for he knows that the knowledge of him is a 
stumbling-block and an offense to man, that he is foolishness and a thorn in the 
flesh to him as soon as he wishes to reveal himself and make himself known to 
him. When Jesus said that he was the Son of God, thus disclosing the most 
la Berlin 1981,166 
is Ibid. 168 
16 Zeeden 1957,194 
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comforting, important and new truth, the Jews lifted stones, rent their garments, 
and condemned him as a malefactor. The Athenians were devoutly ready to fall 
down before an unknown God; but immediately this unknown God was 
disclosed to them, they cared no more: they mocked and thought they were, not 
something new, but matters of indifference, not worth investigating and knowing 
in their context, or receiving fresh insight about. '7 
Instead of reason, Hamann saw faith (Glaube) as forming the true basis of our 
knowledge of God. It is possible for all people to experience God directly, for just as all 
knowledge came directly from the senses, so God communicates through the Bible, the 
process of history and nature itself if only we would listen. '8 True religion is the direct 
experience of God's presence as recognized by faith. Ultimately this is Christocentric, 
contained in `the primal message of the Word become flesh. 19 Hamann saw little or no 
difference between faith, belief and revelation, deriving the core of his definition of faith 
from Hume: `I studied Hume even before I wrote my Socratic Memoirs and this is the 
source to which I owe my doctrine of faith ... Our own existence and the existence of 
all things outside us must be believed and cannot be demonstrated in any other 
fashion. i20 According to Hume, belief `is an operation of the soul, when we are so 
situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or 
hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural 
instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able, either 
to produce, or to prevent. '2' Faith is thereby equated with a direct experience of reality, 
including experience of God, the truth of which is grounded not in philosophical 
argument but in instinct. In the Socratic Memorabilia Hamann states that, 
One can believe the proof of a proposition without approving the proposition. 
The reasons of a Hume may be ever so well grounded, and the refutation of them 
just borrowed propositions and doubts; so faith wins and loses just as much with 
the most adept babbler and the most honorable and objective pleader. Faith is 
" Hamann, in Smith 1960,137 
18 Berlin 1981,166f 
19 Hamann, in Smith 1960,259 
20 Berlin 1981,171 
21 Hume 1977,30 
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not a work of reason and therefore cannot succumb to an attack by reason; 
because believing happens as little by means of reasons as tasting and seeing. 22 
Similar thoughts are contained in a letter Hamann wrote in 1787: `Just as all kinds of 
unreason presuppose the existence of reason and its misuse, so must all religions bear a 
relation to the faith in a single, independent and living truth, which, like our existence, 
must be older than our reason, and hence cannot be known from the genesis of reason 
but by a direct revelation of the truth. `23. 
Pascal and the Submission of Reason 
One must know when it is right to doubt, to affirm, to submit. Anyone who 
does otherwise does not understand the force of reason. Some men run counter 
to these three principles, either affirming that everything can be proved, because 
they know nothing about proof, or doubting everything, because they do not 
know when to submit, or always submitting, because they do not know when 
judgement is called for. Sceptic, mathematician, Christian; doubt, affirmation, 
submission. 24 
Pascal's Pensees might not be within the Lutheran tradition, but the critique of reason 
presented within them bears a striking resemblance to those made by Luther and 
Hamann. Writing in the period between those two thinkers, Pascal is like them in that 
he does not reject reason, but instead offers a qualification of its scope and abilities. 
Just as Hamann's `anti-rationalism' is directed against the rationalist philosophy of the 
Aufklärung on behalf of Lutheran pietism, so Pascal's `anti-rationalism' upholds 
Catholicism against the rationalism inspired by Cartesian philosophy. 
In the Pensees he claims that there are `two excesses: to exclude reason, to admit 
nothing but reason'. 26 Pascal felt himself to be confronted with two erroneous 
viewpoints based upon these excesses: rationalism and superstition. Both extremes had 
their consequences: `If we submit everything to reason our religion will be left with 
nothing mysterious or supernatural. If we offend the principles of reason our religion 
22 Hamann, in Smith 1960,182 
23 Ibid. 258 
24 Pascal 1966,83 
u Cf. Byrne 1996,82 
26 Pascal 1966,85 
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will be absurd and ridiculous. v27 It is clear from this that he was adamant in rejecting 
any moves towards irrationalism. But on the other hand, a complete reliance on the 
powers of human reason alone in theological matters, without any openness to 
revelation, was little better. Ultimately such an allegedly `natural' theology could only 
lead to scepticism. 28 Because of this he argued that `reason's last step is the recognition 
that there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it. It is merely feeble if it 
does not go as far as to realize that. If natural things are beyond it, what are we to say 
about supernatural things? '29 Pascal therefore concludes: `Submission and use of 
reason; that is what makes true Christianity. 30 
It could be argued that this amounts to nothing but a cowardly surrender of reason's 
powers in the face of a difficult conflict. However, this was not what Pascal had in mind 
- he did not lack intellectual integrity and he was by deserved reputation one of the most 
eminent scientists of his generation. 31 Without reason where would his scientific 
theories find a basis? In common with most seventeenth century intellectuals he held 
mathematical, geometrical reasoning to be supreme in scientific enquiry, yet he differed 
from them in his belief that in theological matters it fell short of the mark. When 
`reason' (la raison) is mentioned in this context, it is not reason in its widest sense, that 
being the entire human capacity for rational thought and discourse. Instead la raison 
denotes the `presumptive use of a priori and metaphysical reasoning'. 32 In theological 
matters he was far more eager to advocate the use of the `heart' (la coeur), including 
within this broad category instinct, will, feeling and intuition. 33 Here his was not a 
search for mathematical certainty but one in which the whole person is grasped 
existentially, hence his famous statement: `The heart has its reasons of which reason 
knows nothing'; and also, `It is the heart which perceives God and not the reason. That 
is what faith is: God perceive by the heart, not by reason. '34 This leads him to state that 
`faith certainly tells us what the senses do not, but not the contrary of what they see; it is 
27 Ibid. 83 
23 Cassirer 1972,146 
29Pascal 1966,85 
30 Ibid 83, italics mine 
31 Cf. Gay 19 , 314 32 Coleman 19 , 4-5 33 ibid. 
34 Pascal 1966,154 
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above, not against them'. 35 Finally, like Luther in particular, Pascal is unavowedly 
Christocentric in his dealing with the problem of religious knowledge: `Not only do we 
only know God through Jesus Christ, but we only know ourselves through Jesus Christ; 
we only know life and death through Jesus Christ. Apart from Jesus Christ we cannot 
know the meaning of our life or death, of God or ourselves. '36 
Kierkegaard's 'Anti-Rationalism' 
Many commentators have been swift to discern some influence from the above- 
mentioned figures in Kierkegaard's writings. This applies especially to those texts which 
are attributed to Climacus. In the case of Luther and Hamann, evidence may be taken 
straight from the text of Fragments where each is briefly quoted in relation to `the 
paradox'. 37 I will now examine some elements of the discussion of faith and reason in 
Fragments in which these quotations occur, with the purpose of illustrating the extent of 
their influence. Material will, as usual, also be taken from Kierkegaard's Journals and 
some later writings where the influence of these figures becomes more pronounced. In 
doing this, I will offer an interpretation of the text in line with the views of Luther, etc., 
as outlined above, for which the term `anti-rationalist' may be deemed more accurate 
than irrationalist. Through this I wish to claim that for Kierkegaard, the statement that 
the Christian revelation is truly a `paradox', is one made by those outside of faith not by 
those who are transformed by it. 
As explained previously, Kierkegaard holds the Incarnation to be the decisive Christian 
revelation. In Climacus' terminology this is referred to `the moment in time'. 
Let us recapitulate. If we do not assume the moment, then we go back to 
Socrates, and it was precisely from him that we wanted to take leave in order to 
discover something. If the moment is posited, the paradox is there, for in its 
most abbreviated form the paradox can be called the moment. Through the 
moment, the learner becomes untruth; the person who knew himself becomes 
35 Ibid. 85 
36 Ibid. 148 
37 PF 52f. On the early influence of Hamann on Kierkegaard see Lowrie 1990,108f. cf also Gouwens 
1996,46f. It is interesting to note that Gouwens seems far more hesitant than Lowrie in his discussion 
of Hamann's influence on Kierkegaard's philosophical development. Added to this, for some reason 
Gouwens classes Hamann's influence, alongside that of Lessing, as philosophical, as opposed to Luther 
and Pascal whom he discusses under the heading of 'Christian theologians and traditions'. 
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confused about himself and instead of self-knowledge he acquires the 
consciousness of sin etc., for just as soon as we assume the moment, everything 
goes by itself " 
This divine revelation calls into question any previously held notions of self-certainty and 
human autonomy, and so its recipient now stands in awe and confusion at the new 
situation. That humanity is fallen and sinful might not come as too great a shock to the 
worldly wise, but that God in Christ now wants `to annul this absolute difference"" is an 
altogether different matter which constitutes a real stumbling block. 
This point is vividly illustrated by Anti-Climacus through his tale of the day-labourer 
whom a mighty emperor chose to be his son-in-law. Previously this labourer had no 
idea that the emperor even knew he existed. The chance of catching the merest glimpse 
of the great emperor would have been something to relate in pride to his descendants, 
but to be welcomed into the imperial family surpasses even his wildest dreams. Not 
able to believe his good fortune, nor find seemingly logical reasons for it, the labourer. 
finally exclaims, `Such a thing is too high for me, I cannot grasp it; to be perfectly blunt, 
to me it is a piece of folly. i40 Relating this to the Incarnation, Anti-Climacus explains 
the nature of the perceived paradox further. It revolves around the fact that, by virtue of 
God's initiative in and through the Incarnation, each person may enjoy a personal 
relationship with Him on an individual basis. 
Therefore, this human being exists before God, may speak with God any time he 
wants to, assured of being heard by him - in short, this person is invited to live 
on the most intimate terms with God! Furthermore, for this person's sake, also 
for this very person's sake, God comes to the world, allows himself to be born, 
to suffer, to die, and this suffering God - he almost implores and beseeches this 
person to accept the help that is offered to him! Truly if there is anything to lose 
one's mind over, this is it! Everyone lacking the humble courage to dare to 
believe this is offended. But why is he offended? Because it is too high for him, 
because his mind cannot grasp it, because he cannot attain bold confidence in the 
38 Ibid. 51 
39 Ibid. 47 
40 SUD 85 
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face of it and therefore must get rid of it, pass it off as a bagatelle, nonsense, and 
folly, for it seems as if it would choke him. 4L 
It must be remembered that Climacus, unlike Anti-Climacus, is a caricature of a non- 
Christian attitude. He never claims to have faith (the `passion', or `happy passion' in 
his vocabulary) and so appears to stand outside its effects. Is it therefore surprising to 
hear him ask, 
But is a paradox such as this conceivable? ... The understanding certainly 
cannot think it, cannot hit upon it as its own, and if it is proclaimed, the 
understanding cannot understand it and merely detects that this will be its 
downfall. To that extent the understanding has strong objections to it; and yet, 
on the other hand, in its paradoxical passion the understanding does indeed will 
its own downfall. But the paradox too wills the downfall of the understanding, 
and thus the two have a mutual understanding, but this understanding is present 
only in the moment of passion. 42 
So, the learner cannot understand the situation, but at the same time he yet wants to. 
He is thereby put in the predicament of, either, accepting what has been revealed even 
though it seems to conflict with all his expectations; or, rejecting it on the grounds of its 
conflicting with what he previously understood to be possible. Either `the paradox', or 
the `understanding', but not both. As Kierkegaard put it in his Journals, `When a 
person first begins to reflect upon Christianity, it undoubtedly is at first a cause of 
offense before he enters into it; yes, he may have wished that it had never come into the 
world, or at least that the question had never arisen in his concsiousness. '43 This 
statement accords with Hamann's view that the Christian faith appears as folly to those 
outside, especially if they chose to judge it entirely according to reason alone. 44 It is 
also possible. to discern a parallel with Luther's claim that reason is blind when asserting 
its own authority over and against that of the Christian revelation. Reason in this 
context is not an impartial judge but is biased towards its own interests. 4S Because of 
this it is unwilling to allow any apparent surrender of its authority even though it may 
41 Ibid. 85-6 
42PF47 
43J&P 1710, IIA596n. d., 1837 
44 Zeeden 1957,198 
45 Lohse 1987,159 
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feel compelled to do so. We can therefore understand Climacus' earlier statement that, 
`the understanding has strong objections to it; and yet, on the other hand, in its 
paradoxical passion the understanding does will its own downfall. '" Only in faith does 
reason wish to be subordinate to another. Climacus likens this relationship to one of 
`erotic love', in that self love is surrendered in selfless commitment to another with all 
the risk and vulnerability that that may bring. 47 Personal goals and desires are thereafter 
to be passed over as priority is given to the needs and wishes of another. 48 
Without faith, reason rejects Christianity, not only as a paradox, but as an `offense'. Yet 
this is in reality an inversion of the actual situation, for judgements made in this manner 
are themselves the real offense; `for offense is the erroneous accounting, is the 
conclusion of untruth ... offense 
is in its essence a misunderstanding of the moment. '49 
So it is not that Christianity is foolishness, but that in its prior state, reason is judged and 
found to be wrong in its assumptions. 
The expression of offense is that the moment is foolishness, the paradox is 
foolishness - which is the paradox's claim that the understanding is the absurd 
but which now resounds as an echo from the offense.... but since the paradox 
has made the understanding the absurd, what the understanding regards as very 
important is no distinguishing mark. " 
Reason tries to transcend its own limits, but, bound by these limitations and clouded by 
sin it cannot fulfil its self-set aim. Kierkegaard himself was in sharp disagreement with 
any attempts to prove otherwise. His more specific target, usually Hegelian philosophy, 
was sometimes loosely referred to simply as `German philosophy' in contradistinction to 
Kierkegaard's `Danish Philosophy': 
Danish philosophy ... will 
be different from German philosophy in that it 
definitely will not begin with nothing or without any presuppositions whatever 
or explain everything by mediating, because, on the contrary, it begins with the 
proposition that there are many things between heaven and earth which no 
philosophy has explained. By being incorporated in philosophy, this proposition 
'6 PF 47 
47 Ibid. 48 
48 Cf. Evans 1992,93 
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will provide the necessary corrective and will also cast a humorous-edifying 
warmth over the whole. 5' 
This is reminiscent of Pascal's statement that, `Reason's last step is the recognition that 
there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it. '52 It is also possible to hear 
echoes of Luther's claims that unaided reason is unable to operate within the regnum 
Christi but must remain in the regnum mundi, `In this God is seeking only that man may 
have the humility to bring his reason into captivity and be subject to divine truth. iS' The 
problem lies both with the inadequacies of reason, and with the nature of the regnum 
Christi; as the latter is qualitatively different from the regnum mundi and requires faith 
before reason. With this in mind Climacus makes the following indirect reference to 
Luther: `When the understanding cannot get the paradox into its head, this did not have 
its origin in the understanding but in the paradox, which was paradoxical enough to have 
the effrontery to call the understanding a clod and a dunce. '54 Although Luther did not 
use the exact words `a clod and a dunce', it would seem from what has been said so far 
that his theology does at times express this view. " 
Hamann is quoted by Climacus in the same passage: `Once again, it is not the 
understanding that discovers it [i. e. the offense], but the understanding merely parrots 
the paradox, however strange that may seem, for the paradox itself says: Comedies and 
novels and lies must be probable, but how could I be probable? '56 The last sentence is 
taken from Hamann: `Is it not an old notion which you often heard from me: Incredible 
but true? Lies and romances must be probable, hypotheses and fables; but not the truth 
and fundamental doctrine of our faith. '" So, what might seem improbable when viewed 
11 J&P3299, VA46n. d., 1844 
52 Pascal 1966,85. Cf. J&P X3A 609 n. d, 1850 where Kierkegaard approvingly refers to this passage 
in Pascal and supports Pascal's belief that we can only know God when we allow ourselves to be 
transformed by him in faith. 
53 Luther, in Gerrish 1962,19. It is also possible to see parallels with Hamann's thoughts here, 
although Kierkegaard argues that the relationship is not as obvious as is at first apparent. Consider the 
following: 
Hamann rightly declares: Just as 'law' abrogates `grace', so `to comprehend' abrogates 'to 
have faith'. It is in fact, my thesis. But in Hamann it is merely an aphorism; whereas I have 
fought it through or have fought it out of a whole given philosophy and culture into the thesis: 
to comprehend that faith cannot be comprehended or (the more ethical and God-fearing side) 
to comprehend that faith must not be comprehended. (J&P 1559, X2A 225 n. d, 1849). 
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from the standpoint of `reason' is actually proclaimed to be true and believable. 
Climacus quotes him again, `you think that it is an objection, but the truth in the mouth 
of a hypocrite is dearer to me than to hear it from an angel and an apostle. 'S8 This backs 
up his position that the offended person can only see a paradox, but this is no real 
objection and is only to be expected when they are faced with the real Gospel. Climacus 
himself is unable to go further than this position, but now compare what has been said 
with some of Kierkegaard's own words from his Journals, 
For every third party who is not a believer the content of faith is the absurd [i. e. 
the paradox], and that in order to become a believer everyone must be alone with 
the absurd ... What 
is lacking here is the tension of the dialectical. To 
understand that for reason it is the absurd, to talk about it in this way quite 
calmly to a third party, granting that it is the absurd, maintaining the stress that 
the other must regard it as the absurd - and then still believe it. At the same time 
it naturally follows that for the believer it is not the absurd ... This is the 
tension, the tension in the life of faith, in which one is to keep oneself. But 
everywhere the tendency is to present faith directly. An attempt in this direction 
is science or scholarship, which wants to comprehend faith. 59 
According to this and what I have explained beforehand, it would seem that 
Kierkegaard's views on faith and reason have much in common with Pascal and 
Hamann'60 and are also in continuity with those of Luther. He has not posited 
Christianity as being paradoxical in itself, but rather states that that is how it appears to 
one viewing it with human reason and without faith. However it would be unwise to 
leave the discussion there, as his doctrine of faith is more complex than has been shown 
so far. I now wish to illustrate this by discussing Kierkegaard's thought on faith and 
reason with reference to the Idealist philosophy of his contemporaries. 
58 PF 52. Cf. also J&P 1542,11 A2n. d, 1837 
59J&P 8, X2A 592 n. d, 1850 
60 Although, with regard to Kierkegaard's relation to Hamann, it can be seen that Hamann was 
prepared to allow faith a far more direct access to God, where Kierkegaard emphasized the indirect 
nature of religious knowledge. 
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2. Reason and Understanding 
So far I have discussed Kierkegaard's critique of `reason' although most of his material, 
especially that from Fragments, seems instead to refer to the `understanding'. On the 
surface this may appear to be a trivial distinction. However, the importance of whether 
or not to maintain the philosophical distinction between `reason' and `understanding' 
when interpreting Kierkegaard's writings has been hotly debated. In the case of the two 
pioneers of Kierkegaard scholarship in the English language, David Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie, the debate between them on this matter took place over many years and it has 
influenced translations of his works since the 1930s. I wish to examine the nature of the 
debate and its implications for Kierkegaard's criticisms of natural theology. This will be 
done by first outlining the distinction between reason and understanding as made by 
Kant, then as made by Hegel. After this I will provide a brief outline of the distinction 
made by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, whom I wish to argue does adhere to a position 
similar to Kierkegaard and, like Kierkegaard, he sought to preserve a more traditional 
Christian theology in an intellectual climate dominated by post-Kantian Idealism. 
Following this I will illustrate the relationship between the reason/understanding and the 
'paradox' of the Christian faith in Kierkegaard's thought. 
Kant on Pure Reason 
The distinction between reason and understanding is introduced by Kant in the Critique 
ojl'ure Reason. Kant states that: 
All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding 
[Verstank! ], and ends with reason [Vernunft], beyond which nothing higher can 
be discovered in us for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the 
highest unity of thought. At this stage of our enquiry it is my duty to give an 
explanation of this, the highest faculty of knowledge, and I confess I find myself 
here in some difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely 
formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of 
knowledge; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the 
source of certain concepts and principles, which it does not borrow either from 
the senses or from the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined 
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by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusions, in contradistinction to 
immediate ones. 61 
The understanding then is `the faculty of judging' or `the faculty of rules'62 and is based 
upon experience, whereas reason, or rather `pure reason' in this context, is `the faculty 
of principles' 63 The latter is superior, being a higher faculty which unites the former's 
abilities and so transcends them Therefore, 
The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of appearances 
by virtue of rules; reason is a faculty for the production of unity of the rules of 
the understanding under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to 
experience, or to any sensible object; rather it applies to the understanding, in 
order to provide the multiple knowledge of the understanding with a priori unity 
by means of concepts -a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is 
of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding. " 
In view of this it is apparent that Kant's philosophy depends upon the clear distinction 
being made between reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand). If it can be 
claimed that Kierkegaard does follow him in making this distinction, then there are two 
possible interpretations of his stance regarding the paradox: either it requires the 
surrender of the understanding, a lesser faculty and there is no necessary threat to reason 
per se and so the charge of irrationalism may be dismissed. Or, the paradox requires the 
surrender of reason itself, and Kierkegaard holds the Christian revelation to be irrational 
yet believable because that is the casel Once this option is put forward the way is open 
to the by now familiar charges of irrationalism, or even that Christian truth-claims are 
nonsensical. Obviously my argument centres around the fact that the latter is incorrect 
and is the result of a profound misunderstanding of Kierkegaard's terminology. Before 
refuting this misunderstanding directly, it is appropriate to hear about the views he 
wished to refute himself " in which case, let us talk about Hegelian philosophy. 
61 Kane 1996,236 




Hegel and Speculative Reason 
Hegel also makes a distinction between reason (Vernunft) and understanding (Verstand), 
although he sometimes refers to Vernunft as `positive reason' or `speculation'. 6S The 
understanding is, as in Kantian thought, which Hegel adopted and then modified, inferior 
to reason. Yet for Hegel this is not a static relationship as the understanding constituted 
an early phase in the dialectical development of thought itself, with reason as the 
pinnacle. The understanding is analytic and abstract and fails to perceive the full nature 
of reality, and in his view a total reliance upon the understanding was detrimental to 
'real' philosophy. Such a failing characteristic was typified by the Enlightenment which 
he refers to in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion as `that vanity of 
understanding' and hence `the most vehement opponent of philosophy'. 66 With the 
understanding thus relegated to the fields of mathematical and logical enquiry, the 
reason was seen to be applicable to all areas of inquiry, including the religious. 67 
The concept of reason in Hegelian philosophy came to encompass what had previously 
been defined as faith (Glaube) in Hamann's terminology, that is it came to denote a 
direct experience of reality, including God. As faith was thus replaced by reason, the 
debate between faith and reason in theology became the debate between reason and 
understanding. This distinction appears in Hegel, but it had also been developed 
through the writings of Jacobi, Herder, Schelling and Schleiermacher. 6' However, in 
if egel it reaches its most fully developed form as reason is posited as being capable of 
grasping all things. Religious truth becomes `rational' and hence he is led to claim: 
`That to which reason has access is no mystery or secret; in the Christian Religion, one 
knows the mystery. Mysteries exist only for the understanding and for thought based on 
sense experience. "9 In this form of philosophy even the very nature of God himself is 
found to be accessible to reason. " Where understanding can see only limitations and 
contradictions, reason can comprehend the totality of existence, grasping its very 
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structure and so unites all that seemed to be contradictory. 7' Elements of this view 
permeated through to German Romanticism and to Danish intellectuals such as Henrik 
Steffens (the Norwegian born pupil of Schelling) and, of course, Hans Martensen in the 
University of Copenhagen. n With Kierkegaard's vehement animosity towards Hegelian 
thought reaching fame of near mythical proportions, it would be quite unlikely to find 
him adopting this distinction. Therefore, if he does distinguish between reason and 
understanding it cannot be according to the manner here described. 
Coleridge on Reason and Understanding 
A different form of this distinction may be discerned in English philosophy a generation 
before Kierkegaard in the thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Although his philosophy 
was in many ways a conscious development from Kant, it would be wrong to claim that 
Coleridge merely echoed the Kantian project without making his own significant 
contribution. Instead, his theology exhibits greater influence from a variety of sources 
that included Plato, Luther and the Cambridge Platonists, over anything derived from 
German Idealism. " Isis concept of reason was far more subtle, more dynamic than that 
allowed for in Kant's rationalist religion. In his great work on the Christian faith Aids to 
Reflection, Coleridge rejected 'Minimi-fidianism', the term he coined for the dry 
'rational' theologies in circulation which had confined themselves 'to draw religion 
down to the Believer's intellect, instead of raising his intellect up to religion'. 74 He also 
dismissed 'Ultra-fidianism' or religious beliefs "not only above but contrary to Reason, 
and against the evidence of our proper senses'. " For Coleridge, 'Faith elevates the soul 
not only above Sense and sensible things, but above Reason itself. As Reason corrects 
the errors which Sense might occasion, so supernatural Faith corrects the errors of 
natural Reason judging according to Sense. i76 At times the mood of his comments on 
the state of Christian thought closely resembles that of Kierkegaard, 'This was the true 
and first apostasy - when in Council and in Synod the divine Humanities of the Gospel 
gave way to speculative Systems, and Religion became a Science of Shadows under the 
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name of Theology, or at best a bare Skeleton of Truth, without life or interest, alike 
inac[c]essible and unintelligible to the majority of Christians. " 
In fact, the existence of certain parallels in the thought of Coleridge and Kierkegaard has 
long been noticed by scholars of English literature and intellectual history. Some have 
therefore described Coleridge, being the earlier of the two, as the original pioneer of 
existentialism instead of Kierkegaard. ': However, it must be understood that the two 
are parallel, not in conscious succession. Coleridge was one of a few thinkers, who like 
Kierkegaard, 'belonged to that rare class of minds which are prepared to set themselves 
against the master-currents of their time, and to go on fighting the zeitgeist, alone if 
need be, with unremitting courage and determination. "79 It is somewhat surprising that, 
save for some material in one recent study, i° there is a complete lack of theological 
comparisons between the two in Kierkegaard scholarship. 
A full discussion of the distinction between reason and understanding is found in Aids to 
Reflection. There we read that `understanding' is `the Faculty judging according to 
Sense', ' whilst. 
On the contrary, Reason is the Power of universal and necessary Convictions, 
the Source and Substance of Truths above Sense ... Contemplated distinctively 
in reference to formal (or abstract) truth, it is the speculative Reason; but in 
reference to actual (or moral) truth, as the fountain of Ideas and the Light of the 
Conscience, we name it the practical Reason. Whenever by selfsubjection to 
this universal Light, the Will of the Individual, the particular Will, has become a 
Will of Reason, the man is regenerate: and Reason is then the Spirit of the 
regenerated than, whereby the Person is capable of quickening inter-communion 
with the Divine Spirit. t2 
Reason includes not only the intellect, but also the will and the conscience. The reason- 
understanding distinction illustrates `the difference between head-knowledge and heart- 
knowledge - the knowledge which is made up of intellectual abstractions from sense- 
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data, and that which springs from involvement with our whole being'. 83 This existential 
concept of reason is not viewed as an indication of human autonomy but as a gift from 
God, part of the Divine Image imparted to us. =4 A neglect of the true nature and origin 
of reason and the subsequent usurpation of its place by the understanding had led to the 
failings of the previous century. The results of this process had been disastrous: 
`Materialism, determinism, atheism, utilitarianism, the "godless revolution", `moral 
science exploded as mystic jargon", the `mysteries of religion cut and squared for the 
comprehension of the understanding". "s The general tenor of this criticism seems to put 
him in line with, not only those great `anti-rationalists' Luther, Pascal and Hamann, but 
also Kierkegaard. The extent of this latter similarity shall now be discussed. 
Kierkegaard and Faith, ful Reason 
Turning now to Kierkegaard's writings, it remains to be seen whether a similar 
terminology really is to be encountered. In the 1966 edition of Fragments, translated by 
David Swenson, the Danish term Forstand which Kierkegaard uses (the cognate for the 
Kantian or i legelian Verstand or understanding) is translated as reason. There are no 
instances of Fornuft (Vernunft) in the Danish text. " It would therefore seem that the 
argument against the Socratic hypothesis relates to the limits of rationality itself 
Swenson gives his reasons for this choice in a letter to Walter Lowrie dated September 
14,1937. First, he argues that Kierkegaard is not employing the Kantian distinction 
(which in his opinion is 'foreign' and 'irrelevant' to his thought), neither is he referring 
to the Iiegclian distinction. Also, he claims that by using 'understanding' the way would 
be open for interpreters to claim that 'the Absolute Paradox' is not objectively a paradox 
in the proper sense, and that it is thereby within the sphere of some higher principle of 
human reason. Ile therefore explains, 
A paradox which merely offends my private understanding is subject to being 
resolved through a better understanding within the limits of what it is possible to 
understand as a human being; such a paradox is relatively and transitorily a 
paradox, a paradox for a limited and imperfect understanding, a paradox for 
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some imperfect individual, but not a paradox for the race. Hence it is not the 
Absolute Paradox in Kierkegaard's sense. [So] if I use the word Understanding. 
.. I am aware that I will evoke the suggestion that human nature contains a 
higher principle, the Reason, which does not need to be set aside, and for which 
the Absolute Paradox is not paradoxical. I am convinced that such a thought is 
flatly contradictory of the entire spirit, purpose and letter of Kierkegaard's work. 
If there is such a principle in me, then there is no Absolute Paradox, then the 
Teacher is not God, then the entire virile Christian terminology of the new birth, 
of the believer being a new creature, etc., falls down like a house of cards, and 
becomes a mere rhetorical exaggeration, an immature and irrelevant adornment 
of what is essentially the Socratic position.: ' 
Finally, he puts it that Forstcord is a concrete rather than abstract concept. Thus it may 
be held to refer to: 
the entire rational self-consciousness of man as man, and includes of course a 
sense of values. If it did not, it could have no bearing upon the apprehension of 
the divine. Thus the Reason ... stands 
for the essential and reflective common 
sense of mankind, in which each individual participates, though of course, with 
respect to his actual as opposed to his ideally potential grasp, at any one time, 
only impcrfcctly. u 
Is this in accord with what Kierkegaard puts forward? In a journal entry in 1850 he 
rejects abstract concepts of reason, specifically Kant's `pure reason': `people have a 
rattle-brained, conceited notion about human reason, especially in our age, when one 
never thinks of a thinker, a reasoning man, but thinks of pure reason and the like, which 
simply does not exist, since no one, be he a professor or what he will, is pure reason. 
Pure reason is something fantastical. '`9 
There is however an objection to certain aspects of this interpretation. Whilst not 
denying that Forsttau! refcrs to more than the abstractions of Kant's pure reason, it does 
seem a little perturbing to allege, as Swenson appears to do, that the Christian revelation 
is paradoxical to the extent that it defies any hope of rational explanation; even if we do 
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allow for the ironic, partly rhetorical style of the aesthetic works (which Swenson does 
not). It could therefore be more appropriate to use the term `understanding' instead, as 
is done in the 1985 Princeton translation of Fragments. Yet even though there is this 
change of term, the basic concept beneath still remains largely the same. This is 
illustrated in Evans' Passionate Reason where he chooses to use both terms 
interchangeably in order to discourage interpretations defending reason's ability to 
comprehend the paradox of the Incarnation. 90 The majority of scholars appear to agree 
with the contents of this view, and at the same time reject the thesis that Kierkegaard 
conceives that this revelation is nonsensical. For instance Stephen Emmanuel claims 
`revelation is not absurd or paradoxical in that it violates fundamental principles of logic, 
but in the sense that it disturbs our common sense view of ourselves and our values'. 9' 
This point returns us to Kierkegaard's rejection of complete human autonomy and his 
affirmation of our intrinsic need for God's help and revelation. When this is borne in 
mind it can be argued that he `is not against reason as such but rather against the 
absolute claims of reason, a reason that poses itself as the supreme power, capable of 
explaining everything and solving all contradictions with its own dialectics. Thus the 
first task of faith is that of unmasking the totalising claims of reason' 92 
Kierkegaard's polemic is directed against more than Kant's concept of the 
understanding, but it should not be alleged that he is advocating a leap into irrationalism. 
I lowcvcr, I must admit that I am reluctant to embrace entirely the interpretations offered 
by Swenson and his followers. Clearly his use ofForstard differs from Kant's Vorstand 
as employed in lire Critique of Pure Reason. Ile is not referring to abstract reasoning. 
But the view that revelation is paradoxical to reason because it 'disturbs our common- 
sense view of ourselves and our values' 93 fails to deliver the full weight of Climacus' or 
Kierkegaard's own arguments. Also the persistent use of the term 'reason' in 
translations, even in some of the most recent publications, leads to the assertion that for 
Kierkegaard 'faith is always non-rational'. " In order to prevent this frequent charge of 
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irrationalism, even by those well disposed to Kierkegaard's thought, something further 
needs to be said with regard to the concepts employed. 
To argue that revelation, specifically the Incarnation, is against the understanding as 
defined by for instance Coleridge, is not to say that it "merely offends my private 
understanding'. " Instead, `the Understanding then (considered exclusively as an organ 
of human intelligence, ) is the Faculty by which we reflect and generalize. '96 It is not a 
private, subjective matter but rather, this-worldly reasoning, `the mind of the flesh', 97 or 
more precisely: 
the `scientific' reasoning of the eighteenth century, of Bentham and Paley, the 
kind of reasoning that separates, analyses, measures, classifies, knows in terms of 
cause and effect, is concerned with means rather than ends. It gives accuracy, it 
eliminates error. Within its proper limits this is an indispensable kind of thinking 
- for science, for much of the routine of life, for knowledge of the finite. " 
In his Journals Kierkegaard criticizes the understanding for its constant enquiring and 
deliberating in religion without ever reaching a valid conclusion, turning theology into `a 
chaos of reflections and deliberations'. 99 The understanding's thirst for knowledge fails 
to take its human limitations into account and therefore takes on a task that remains 
forever incomplete. 
Iiege!, although joining these two in their criticisms of the Enlightenment and the 
understanding, posits reason as being able to comprehend the essence of existence itself, 
and on this point he dit%rs dramatically from them. Consider these two statements, the 
first from Coleridge's Aids to Reflection, the second from Kierkegaard's Journals of 
1843: 
Many things may be paradoxical, (that is contrary to the common notion) and 
nevertheless true: nay, paradoxical, because they are true. How should it be 
otherwise, as long as the imagination of the Worldling is wholly occupied by 
surfaces, while the Christian's thoughts are fixed on the substance, that which is 
and abides, and which, because it is the substance, the outward senses cannot 
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recognize. Tertullian had good reason for his assertion, that the simplest 
Christian (if indeed a Christian) knows more than the most accomplished 
irreligious philosopher. 10° 
Faith has hopes for this life also, but, note well, by virtue of the absurd, not by 
virtue of human understanding, otherwise it is only common sense, not faith. '°' 
There is a clear distinction being made between worldly understanding and a different 
God-centred reasoning. The difference is absolute and, in both cases may be equated 
with Luther's distinction between the regenerate reason (nova ratio) and unregenerate 
reason ('the flesh'). 102 In this case it can be argued that Kierkegaard is not claiming that 
the paradox, or absurd, is to be conquered by any higher human reason. Instead, 'he 
sets out to show that both the man in the street's hovel of common sense and the 
speculative philosopher's palace of thought are both built in the sand. 103 Each and 
every human project designed to meet God on our own terms can only fail, for God 
meets us on his terms through the paradox of the Incarnation. Yet he does not impart to 
us some higher reason that can resolve the paradox. In another journal entry 
Kierkegaard writes: 
Ilugo de St Victore states a correct thesis (Helfferich, Mystik, Vol. I, p. 368): 
'Faith is really not supported by the things which go beyond reason, by any 
reason, because reason does not comprehend what faith believes; but 
nevertheless there is something here by which reason becomes determined or is 
conditioned to honor faith which it still does not perfectly succeed in grasping. ' 
This is what I have developed (for example, in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript) - that not every absurdity is the absurd or the paradox. The activity 
of reason is to distinguish the paradox negatively - but no more. 
104 
Kierkegaard puts similar words into the mouth of Climacus: 
Ilow then does the learner come to an understanding with this paradox, for we 
do not say that he is supposed to understand the paradox but is only to 
understand that this is the paradox. We have already shown how this occurs. It 
occurs when the understanding and the paradox happily encounter each other in 
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the moment, when the understanding steps aside and the paradox gives itself and 
the third something, the something in which this occurs (for it does not occur 
through the understanding, which is discharged, or through the paradox, which 
gives itself - consequently in something), is that happy passion to which we shall 
now give a name. We shall call it faith. 'os 
Reason remains limited, unable to transcend the paradox and must now submit to faith. 
`Christianity ... always turns the concepts of the natural man upside down and gets the 
opposite meaning out of them. "°6 Paradoxically, the autonomous, worldly reason has to 
`die' in order to function correctly in the new life of the believer. As Stephen Dunning 
argues, it is at this point Kierkegaard's theology of the cross really comes to the fore: 
The obvious meaning of the cross is, of course, death. Theologically, Christ died 
to redeem the world from sin and thereby makes it possible for believers to `die' 
to the sin of their own fives. The epistemological death is the need to know, the 
compulsion to understand God's revelation ... This 
is the crucifixion of 
knowledge. It is not a sacrifice of the intellect, for it presupposes the passion of 
thought that leads to the collision with the paradox. But it does force the 
intellect to choose between its own claim to sovereignty and that of God. And 
the result of such a dilemma is offense - or a yielding that is tantamount to death. 
Of course, even this death is not the final word. A final parallel emerges 
between the theological resurrection to a new identity and eternal life, on the one 
hand, and a new cpistcmic state of faith, a faith that is `by virtue of the absurd'. 
Just as death has lost its sting (i Cor. 15: 55), so also the paradox is no longer an 
offense to one who believes. 107 
The issue is one of autonomy. Kierkegaard criticizes, under the broad title of Forstand, 
both faculties describable as reason and understanding. Although he does not always 
make it directly obvious which of the two he implies, it is possible to discern the object 
of his polemic according to the nature of the specific argument at the time. At times he 
dismisses the view that Forstcyxl as an analytic or abstract faculty is capable of operating 
successfully in theological enquiry. This criticism refers to Verstand and the hollow 
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rationalism of the previous century. He also rejects the Hegelian concept of reason, or 
Vernunft, which was claimed to be able to rationalize all contradictions. In their place 
Kierkegaard defends a reason that is defined by its object, the paradox. Like Luther, 
and Coleridge, this reason is fundamentally linked to God-given faith and all its 
successes are attributable to this vital link. However, although it can accept things that 
appear paradoxical to the secular mind, it does not follow that these now become 
rationalized. Instead it recognizes that some things are destined to remain beyond its 
reach, being above, but not against it. The standpoint of faith allows for this willing, yet 
careful subordination to divine authority where the rationalist or Hegelian would wish to 
assert his own powers of reason. However, if Kierkegaard is suggesting that, what may 
be called this 'faithful reason' is defined by its object, and therefore relates to the God of 
traditional Christianity, is it not rational that this very God who by nature defies our 
comprehension will operate in ways that are at times above reason? In which case, 
although it seems absurd to the atheist and agnostic, Kierkegaard's surrender of 
Forstwut becomes 'reasonable'. To conclude in Kierkegaard's own words from the 
Gospel of Sufferings: 
For indeed it is not required of anybody that he should be able to comprehend 
the working of God's love, but this is required, that one shall be able to believe, 
and believing to comprehend, that He is lovel It is no terrible thing that thou 
cant not comprehend the purposes of God, of still He is indeed eternal love, but 
it is a terrible thing if thou canst not comprehend them because He is 
unfathomable subterfuge. 101 
3. Kierkegaard's Doctrine of Faith 
I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all 
useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life. ) It 
says that wisdom is all cold; that you can no more use it for setting your life to 
rights than you can forge iron when it is cold. The point is that a sound doctrine 
need not take hold of you; you can follow it as you would a doctor's 
I'$ GOS 70 
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prescription. - But here you need something to move you and turn you in a new 
direction. - (Le. this is how I understand it. ) Once you have turned around, you 
must stay turned around. Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what 
Kierkegaard calls a passion. 109 
Wittgenstein presents us here with a typical interpretation of Kierkegaard's doctrine of 
faith. We find in this interpretation a clear stress upon the effects of faith over what it is 
that faith believes. "" This, added to Kierkegaard's frequent statements that Christianity 
is not a doctrine, "' lead some to claim that he places no importance on what is believed, 
preferring instead to focus on the strength of the faith itself and its effects on the 
believer. 112 I wish to challenge this and similar interpretations, and to propose an 
alternative. Whilst by no means undermining the importance of the strength of the 
believer's faith, and the transforming effects of that faith upon him, it will be shown that 
there is a vital propositional content to Kierkegaard's understanding of faith: if Christian 
faith is not based firmly on belief in the actual fact of the Incarnation, it is not Christian 
faith at all. On this point, like many others, we can easily form a comparison between 
him and Luther as both of them are concerned primarily with soteriology rather than 
epistemology. I have chosen to examine his doctrine of faith under three headings. 
First, `Faith and Knowledge', in which the relationship between faith, belief and doctrine 
is discussed. Second, in `Faith and Volition' I will explain the role of the will in coming 
to faith and the resultant importance Kierkegaard gives to human freedom in this 
context. Finally, `Faith and Subjectivity' tackles the meaning of that well-known 
quotation from Kierkegaard that `truth is subjectivitys113 and shows how this is to be 
related to his doctrine of faith. 
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Faith and Knowledge 
In 1849 Kierkegaard put down in his journal that `A dogmatic system ought not to be 
erected on the basis: to comprehend faith, but on the basis: to comprehend that faith 
cannot be comprehended'. "4 This claim is closely linked with the assertions discussed in 
the previous section, in Kierkegaard's own words, that `reason's activity is to 
recognize the paradox negatively - precisely no more than that', 115 or alternatively 
through Climacus, `we do not say that he [the learner] is supposed to understand the 
paradox but is only to understand that this is. the paradox. ' 116 He stands in blatant 
opposition to the Hegelian claim that reason can penetrate all the mysteries of 
Christianity and thereby replace faith with direct, immediate knowledge. In Practice in 
Christianity we read, 
The whole of modern philosophy has done everything to delude us into thinking 
that faith is an immediate qualification, that it is the immediate - which in turn is 
linked up with having abolished the possibility of offense, having made 
Christianity into a teaching, having abolished the God-man and the situation of 
contemporaneity. What modem philosophy understands by faith is really what is 
called having an opinion or what in everyday language some people call `to 
believe'. Christianity is made into a teaching; this teaching is then proclaimed to 
a person, and he believes that it is as the teaching says. Then the next stage is to 
`comprehend' this teaching, and this philosophy does. All of this would be 
entirely proper if Christianity were a teaching, but since it is not, all this is totally 
wrong. 117 
In the above passage Kierkegaard uses his pseudonym Anti-Climacus to make the basic 
distinction between belief-that and belief-in, or to put it differently, belief and faith. As 
seems to be usual with Kierkegaard's terminology, it is possible to run into some 
difficulty with interpretation. The Danish word used is Tro, which can be translated as 
either belief or faith. '18 However, for once Kierkegaard uses a pseudonym to clarify his 
position and Climacus explains the two senses: `faith ... 
in its direct and ordinary 
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meaning" 119 or faith `sensu laxiori', 120 that is merely belief-that and not the matter of 
concern here; `but secondly, faith must be taken in the wholly eminent sense, ' 121 or 
`sensu strictissimo'. 'u This two-fold distinction is not by any means confined to 
Kierkegaard, and Alistair Hannay attributes it to 123 More recently, Basil 
Mitchell distinguishes between `faith in the sense of "believing that"', and '"faith" in 
which it means "trusting reliance upon God"' ; 124 and C. S. Lewis compares `faith' as 
`simply belief - accepting or regarding as true the doctrines of Christianity', with `Faith 
in the second or higher sense'. 125 I can believe for certain that God has chosen to reveal 
Himself to the world through Christ, but I can choose to ignore this fact or reject it. But 
if I believe in him, then I move on to include a level of trust and commitment in addition 
to intellectual acceptance, in which case I have faith. Hence we hear Climacus saying 
`one does not have faith that the god exists ... That 
is improper use of language'. 126 
Faith at this level does not just refer to intellectual assent, but must include as well a 
person's response to it, therefore `Christianity is not a doctrine but an existence- 
communication'. 127 
So, why is it that Kierkegaard seems to go to such great lengths to stress the response 
nature of faith over that of its content? I have already indicated something of the answer 
in the above paragraph, namely that he was aware of those who equated having faith in 
Christ with the intellectual act of comprehending a proposition about him. '23 
Kierkegaard usually had Hegel in mind, with such statements as `faith is essentially the 
consciousness of absolute truth', and `faith comprehends', '29 lending themselves quite 
freely to this interpretation. This fails to understand what Christianity really requires, 
therefore `Christianity itself must indeed regard as false Christians those who merely 
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know what Christianity is. 130 As Julia Watkin explains `Belief in propositions, however, 
is distinct from the existential faith-commitment to an ethical-religious lifestyle [i. e. 
Christianity], and the propositional form of belief can distract from the existential 
commitment in a number of ways that can seriously blinker the individual in the 
endeavour to enter into and deepen the God-relationship'. 131 We must not assume from 
this that Kierkegaard held the propositional content of faith to be unimportant, instead 
he rejects the view that Christianity is concerned with propositions about God rather 
than God Himself. 132 The interpretation quoted from Wittgenstein at the beginning of 
this section, `that sound doctrines are all useless' 133 is therefore an incorrect 
interpretation of Kierkegaard's position. 
It is quite false to attribute to Kierkegaard the view that, `it does not ultimately matter 
what is the content of belief so long as it is adhered to with sufficient intensity', but 
instead recognize it as stemming from a misunderstanding amongst his would be 
disciples. " Swinburne refers to this erroneous definition of faith as `trust without the 
belief-that', or the `Pragmatist View of Faith', attributing it to the influence of both 
Kierkegaard and William James. 135 Yet Kierkegaard's theology is quite orthodox in that 
it holds that not only is there an intellectual content to faith, a belief-that, or beliefs-that 
expressible in propositions, but this content is openly discernible to Christian and non- 
Christian alike (compare with Luther's `simple Gospel' which all can understand, yet 
none expected). 136 Consider the following extract from the Postscript: 
That one can know what Christianity is without being a Christian must, then, be 
answered in the affirmative. Whether one can know what it is to be a Christian 
without being one is something else, and it must be answered in the negative. 
On the other hand, the Christian must indeed also know what Christianity is and 
be able to tell us - provided he himself has become one ... 
In other words, a 
person who actually has become a Christian must certainly have had a period 
when he was not a Christian; he must in turn have had a period when he found 
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out what Christianity is; then, in turn, if he has not totally forgotten how he 
himself existed before he became a Christian, he must be able for his part to say 
what Christianity is by comparing his earlier life with his Christian life. 137 
All the warnings that `Christianity is not a doctrine', 138 or that `faith is not a 
knowledge' 139 are put into the mouths of his pseudonyms in order to prevent the 
readership from assuming that `belief-that' is synonymous with 'belief-in', as derivable 
from Hegel ('for faith is also knowledge"40). As already explained, the latter includes 
the former, but the former alone is inadequate. When such assertions are made they are 
done so in the context of spelling out that `faith does not result from straightforward 
scholarly deliberation', 14' but is instead the result of a gift from God. 142 So then, when 
Hegel claims, 
In faith the true content is certainly already found, but it still lacks the form of 
thinking. As we observed earlier, all forms - those of feeling, representation, etc. 
- can indeed have the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true 
form, 
which makes the true content necessary. Thinking is the absolute judge, before 
which the content must verify and attest its claims. Philosophy has been 
criticized for placing itself above religion. But as a matter of fact this is false 
because philosophy has only this and no other content, although it gives it in the 
form of thinking; it places itself only above the form of faith, while the content is 
the same in both cases. 143 
To this Kierkegaard retorts: `Is knowledge higher than faith? By no means. ' 144 We 
cannot attain perfect knowledge of God, and even if we could that would not necessarily 
lead directly to faith. Nor is thinking about faith to be substituted for faith itself 
Precisely because Christianity is not a doctrine, it holds true, as developed 
previously, that there is an enormous difference between knowing what 
Christianity is and being a Christian. With regard to a doctrine, this distinction is 
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unthinkable, because the doctrine is not related to existing. I cannot help it that 
our age has reversed the relation and changed Christianity into a philosophical 
theory that is to be comprehended and being a Christian into something 
negligible. Furthermore, to say that Christianity is empty of content because it is 
not a doctrine is only chicanery. When a believer exists in faith, his existence has 
enormous content, but not in the sense of a yield of paragraphs. lu 
Kierkegaard's thoughts on the relationship between faith and knowledge can be 
illustrated further by his comments on that between intellect and action. 
Certainly Christianity has never been a mystery, has in fact abhorred mystery, in 
the sense of being only for a few superlative people who have been initiated. 
No, God has chosen the poor and the despised - but the initiation was not 
lacking. It is not an intellectual initiation but an ethical initiation, personality's 
enormous respect for being admitted into the Christian community, a respect 
expressed not in assurances and frills but existentially in action. 146 
There is an indispensable practical element to faith that differentiates it from mere 
knowledge or belief. Kierkegaard's words bring to mind James' warning that faith and 
action must go together if faith is to have any meaning at all. 
147 "But is it not of 
absolute importance, then, first of all to understand? " No, ethically, the important thing 
is that you do it, that which is so infinitely easy to understand that you understand it 
immediately. ' 148 Whatever we can understand we must act upon, however little that 
may seem at first, because it is the action arising from trust which helps make the 
transition from knowledge to faith. This point is made by Kierkegaard's comparison 
between the `witness', who demonstrates what he believes by the conduct of his own 
life, and the `teacher' or `professor', who understands all the details yet keeps his 
distance. 149 There is a qualitative difference between the person who speculates about 
the nature of from the outside, and the person who experiences the content of faith as a 
reality in their own life. 
145 CUP 1: 380 
146 J&P 2793, X2A 341 n. d., 1850 
14' James 2: 14-26 (NRSV) 
143 J&P2874, X3 A169n. d., 1850 
149 Ibid. 4967, X3A5n. d., 1850 
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A similar illustration may be found in his essay `Of the Difference between a Genius and 
an Apostle' published in 1848. Read for instance what he says regarding the minister 
who approaches Christianity from the wrong angle: 
The pernicious thing is when the whole train of his thought is affected, when the 
price of his orthodoxy is an emphasis in an entirely wrong place, when he calls 
for faith in Christ, when he preaches faith in Him on grounds which simply 
cannot be the object of faith. If a son were to say, `I obey my father, not 
because he is my father but because he is a genius, or because his orders are 
profoundly intelligent, ' then that filial obedience is affected. The son accentuates 
something entirely wrong, he emphasizes the intellectual aspect, the profundity in 
a command, whereas a command is, of course, indifferent to that qualification. 
The son wishes to obey by virtue of the father's intellectual profundity; and to 
obey by virtue thereof is just not possible, for his critical attitude as to whether 
the command is profound undermines the obedience. And so, too, it is 
affectation to speak of adopting Christianity and believing Christ because of the 
great profundity of the doctrine. By putting the accent in entirely the wrong 
place one only makes a show of orthodoxy. The whole of modern philosophy is 
therefore affected, because it has done away with obedience on the one hand, 
and authority on the other, and then, in spite of everything claims to be 
orthodox. lso 
For Kierkegaard Christianity is to be embraced first and foremost on the grounds of its 
divine authority, not necessarily for its intellectual content, as this will come over time - 
the very opposite to Hegel ('the faith of the community rests solely on reason itself, i. e. 
on its philosophical coherence'") 
Like Luther before him, he stresses the importance of not confusing philosophy with 
theology, or reason with faith. '52 Faith is the obedient response to a divine call and once 
the believer has faith it shapes that believer's life in all respects. Here again we may 
draw parallels with Luther's concept of a nova ratio, in that `reason must first be 
illuminated by faith, before it issues in works'. 153 In a certain sense, Kierkegaard follows 
"'PA 103-4 
'51 Hegel 1979,258 
'52 Cf. Gerrish 1962,42 
153 Luther, in Gerrish 19 , 82 
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the theological approach of `fides quaerens intellectum' attributed to Anselm: `I do not 
try, Lord, to attain your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way equal to it. 
But I do desire to understand Your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and 
loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may 
understand. "54 As Trevor Hart succintly puts it, this may be described as `faith 
thinking I, " 
155 
This is not to say that faith becomes "a sort of provisional form of higher knowledge' as 
Price claims, "" but is an example of `fides caritate formata, faith quickened and warmed 
by love of God above all'. 157 Although the believer must have accepted certain 
propositions about God as valid in order to come to believe in the first place, such 
knowledge is only the starting point and by far the greater amount of learning is done 
within the framework of faith. In this respect his position on theological enquiry 
parallels that of enquiry within other fields. 158 For instance, in order to carry out a 
scientific experiment successfully, the persons involved must accept certain scientific 
theories as being valid before they can begin. Without doing so they have no credible 
basis to work from, nor could they have any way of calculating the validity of the 
experiment if they chose to proceed. So it is with faith and knowledge, there has to be 
something known about God as a starting point upon which that faith is grounded. This 
then becomes the basis of all further knowledge about God that is gained as faith 
develops. Kierkegaard's main concern is with justifying faith, rather than a purely 
epistemological faculty. Therefore, what he says on faith must be interpreted within the 
context of soteriology rather than being an open question on the validity of faith's 
content. He sought, not so much to question the doctrinal content of Lutheran 
Christianity as to call others to humble themselves before God. In which case this leads 
us on to consider what Kierkegaard has to say regarding the importance of the will. 
Yet, before departing from the question of faith and knowledge, it would seem that 
some of Kierkegaard's thoughts are well expressed by the following quotation from 
Thomas a Kempis: 
154 Anselm, in Hyman and Walsh (eds) 1973,150 
Iss Hart 1995,1 
156 price 1984,129 
'" Collins 1983,267 
158 Cf. Hart 1995,21 
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All perfection in this life is accompanied by a measure of imperfection, and all 
our knowledge contains an element of obscurity. A humble knowledge of 
oneself is a surer road to God than a deep searching of the sciences. Yet 
learning itself is not to be blamed, nor is the simple knowledge of anything 
whatsoever to be despised, for true learning is good in itself and ordained by 
God; but a good conscience and a holy life are always to be preferred. ls9 
Faith and Volition 
With his alleged downplay of the intellectual element of faith and assertion of the value 
of personal commitment, some have asked whether Kierkegaard is proposing a 
volitionist doctrine of faith. Certain passages in his writings do lend themselves to such 
an interpretation. Defining the Christian concept of faith Kierkegaard writes: `What is it 
to believe? It is to will ... 
God-fearingly and unconditionally obediently, to defend 
oneself against the vain thought of wanting to comprehend and against the vain 
imagination of being able to comprehend. ' 160 It might seem to follow that if faith cannot 
be reached by the mere intellectual assent to propositions, the transition must be 
attributed to some other human ability, possibly the will for instance. However, despite 
his often overtly critical attitude towards it, Kierkegaard still remains a conscious 
product of the Lutheran tradition. To claim that faith could be gained by force of will- 
power is to go so far as to claim that faith could be gained by human effort rather than 
Divine initiative. 
If Kierkegaard held to such a voluntarist position he would, in effect, be affirming 
justification by works, in which case he would be going against both the spirit and the 
letter of the Lutheran creed. This he does not do: `One becomes a Christian only by the 
grace of God in Christ. Luther's confession lives on in Kierkegaard: salvation is by 
divine grace in Jesus Christ. '161 However, it is possible to go to the opposite pole and 
derive from the Lutheran doctrine of sola fide a position which places so much emphasis 
1s9 Thomas ä Kempis 1983,31 
160 J&P 1130, XA 368 n. d., 1849 
161 Hartshorne 1990,27. We find several references to this topic within Kierkegaard's direct work 
Judge For Yourself7, for instance `there appeared a man from God and with faith, Martin Luther; with 
faith (for truly this required faith) or by faith he established faith in its rights. His life expressed works 
- let us never forget that - 
but he said: a person is saved by faith alone' (JFY. 1 16). 
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upon God's grace that humanity becomes purely passive in its own salvation. Luther's 
assertion that God takes us `just as we are' 162 was made in order to accentuate his love 
and grace, not to encourage inaction on he side of the believer. Likewise, Luther's 
doctrine of predestination, despite its harshness to many contemporary ears, stressed the 
sovereignty of God over and against the theologies of his time which attributed salvation 
to human initiative and works; it did not seek to promote complacency. 
The theologically trained Kierkegaard was well aware of his Lutheran heritage. He was 
also unhappily aware of the `prodigious illusion' of `Christendom' which surrounded 
him at the time of writing: `All these people, even those who assert that no God exists, 
are all of them Christians, call themselves Christians, are recognized as Christians by the 
State, are buried as Christians by the Church, are certified as Christians for eternityl'163 
As far as a fair proportion of his society was concerned, being a loyal Dane involved 
being a baptized and confirmed Lutheran, regardless of personal belief (or lack of it). 
164 
Thus Christianity in `Christendom' was in reality little more than conforming to civic 
virtue, a hangover from Enlightenment moral religion; as he ironically observes: `The 
thing of becoming and of being a Christian is now a triviality. 
"" Yet Christianity is not 
the passive acceptance of the social status quo, nor can it be reduced to secular ethics. 
Therefore `faith is a choice', either we choose, individually, personally, to become a 
Christian, or we reject Christianity as something we do not wish to associate ourselves 
with. 166 But we cannot become part of it by association, nor by accident of birth. 
The importance of the will is emphasized for another reason. Some believers could well 
claim that, as God has already predestined all events, we have no responsibility for our 
" Cf. Gerrish 1962,115 
163 POV 22-3 
164 Watkin 1996,13. Cf. the following criticism from Judge For Yourself7: 
What Christ required as a condition for coming into the situation in which there can be any 
question of becoming a Christian, a decisive action - that is not needed any more. A person's 
life is essentially homogenous with the secular mentality and this world. So one perhaps hears 
a little about something that perhaps is Christianity, one reads a little, thinks a little about 
Christianity, experiences a mood once in a while - and then one is a believer and a Christian. 
Indeed, one is already that in advance; one is born a Christian, oddly enough, and what makes 
it even more odd, one is born a Lutheran. It is undeniably a very dubious way to become a 
believer and a Christian. Indeed, it has very little resemblance to Luther's way. (JFY1194). 
'0 POV74 
166 PC 141 
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own actions - whatever happens happens by virtue of his will and causation, whatever I 
appear to choose has already been chosen for me. 
It is deceitful to talk like this ...: `Whatever happens to me that I cannot 
prevent it, wherever way I am led I cannot go another other way - this is God's 
will. ' Well, thanks for that! It certainly leaves out the difficulty, the difficulty 
that a man shall himself choose. It appears to be so geschwindt [quick] and easy, 
this statement which sounds so Lutheran, and yet when it is supposed to be true 
in the highest sense it is rarely seen: I cannot do otherwise; God help me, Amen. 
In this we hear immediately that the person who is speaking is someone who 
knows what it is to choose. 167 
If choice and responsibility are taken away entirely then all that is left is fatalism. 
However harsh our situation, however much life seems to be beyond our control, we 
cannot renounce the freedom and responsibility of our own actions. Some of 
Kierkegaard's harshest criticism in this area is reserved, not for Hegel, but for Augustine 
and Luther for not giving enough attention to the need to `strive' for salvation before 
God. 168 The stress upon grace, designed to combat justification by works doctrines, 
seemed to reduce the imitation of Christ to something of no consequence. 
Kierkegaard's criticism is extreme, similar to that made by the Council of Trent. 169 
However, Luther really believed that faith must produce good works as a necessary 
consequence, thereby distancing his theology from the apparent misunderstandings 
above. 170 Yet, we must allow for Kierkegaard's strongly polemical and satirical style 
and interpret his words accordingly. His real objects of attack were those who 
misunderstood Luther's teachings, using arguments against monasticism, penances and 
indulgences in favour of embracing worldly living and secularized values. 171 What he 
attacks is `Christendom's' perversion of cola fide as a gross misunderstanding of the 
original Augustinian-Lutheran position. 
Kierkegaard insisted that faith is not produced by means of an intellectual conclusion 
regarding the truth of doctrine. 
172 In the context of faith `the conclusion of belief is no 
167 J&P 1256, IX A 109 n. d., 1848 
169 Ibid. 2551, X11 A 297 n. d, 1854 
169 Cf. Swinburne 1981,111 
1'0 Gerrish 1962,123; Swinburne 1981,115 
171 J&P 2521, X3A 217 n. d, 1850; 2528, X3A 510 n. d, 1850 
172 PF 93; CUP 1: 29 
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conclusion but a resolution'. 17' If it were blatantly obvious to all that all the details of 
Christianity were true, how could we be free to accept or reject it? Just as he held the 
traditional proofs of God's existence to be useful in a limited capacity, not as proofs but 
as bringing someone a little closer to faith; so Kierkegaard felt that there would always 
be a gap between intellectual conclusion and faith's resolution. The former cannot go so 
far as to make the `paradox' of the Christian revelation seem so probable that accepting 
it would follow as a matter of course. From the learner outside of faith its contents 
appear improbable. 174 Therefore human freedom is maintained and `belief is not a 
knowledge but an act of freedom, an expression of will'. 173 This is why the 
understanding cannot make the final move from knowledge to faith, from seen to 
unseen, if it could we would be faced with some form of an intellectual categorical 
imperative. There always remains an element of risk and uncertainty. 176 But, our will 
cannot make the final move unaided, we are not autonomous and in the final analysis 
faith is God-given. 177 In this sense therefore `faith is not an act of will, for it is always 
the case that all human willing is efficacious only within the condition [of faith] ... But 
if I do not possess the condition ... then all my willing 
is of no avail. ' 178 This is very 
similar to the view of `faith seeking understanding' with regard to faith and knowledge. 
As Kierkegaard explained in his Journals: 
Two wills in the world cannot be tolerated. God is the only one. To be sure, 
God has given man and the human world the power of having a will. But as 
punishment for willing its own will the world must take the consequence of its 
not really existing for God of his handing it over. However, as soon as a will 
wills to become involved with God, this will must go. That is the meaning of 
dying to the world. That a will wills to involve itself with him is precisely what 
God wants, but the next comes as a matter of course if God and this will are to 
be bound together. 179 
The human will is not annihilated but transformed as the believer is brought into a right 
relationship with God. It is not a matter of voluntarism, but of obedience: `If the fear of 
13 PF 84 
174 J&P 7, X2A 354 n. d., 1850; cf. PF 94 
175PF83 
176 CUP 1: 209 
'77 PF 103 
1711 Ibid. 623 
179 J&P 5038, XI A 239 n. d, 1854 
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God be the beginning of wisdom, then the learning of obedience is the perfecting of 
wisdom. "80 In contradistinction to Kant, Kierkegaard holds that it is only when the 
believer recognizes his need for God and realizes that he cannot grasp autonomy, that, 
paradoxically, he can become himself. 
Just as knowing oneself in one's own nothingness is the condition for knowing 
God, so knowing God is the condition for the sanctification of a human being by 
God's assistance and according to His intention. Wherever God is in truth, there 
He is always creating. He does not want a person to be spiritually soft and to 
bathe in the contemplation of His glory, but in becoming known by a person He 
wants to create in him a new human being. '8' 
Faith and Subjectivity 
Kierkegaard made the frequent assertion that `subjectivity is truth'. 182 He did so as a 
means to draw his readers' attention away from objective speculation on doctrines and 
towards an active life of personal devotion. This was done in the context of 
distinguishing between (justifying) faith and mere belief-that. However it is debated 
what is implied by subjectivity in this context, and it is possible to hear many objections 
voiced against Kierkegaard's position. 
Truth, they would want to say, has nothing to do with subjectivity; it has an 
objectivity found in the Scriptures, in history, and in the teachings of the Church. 
To say that subjectivity is truth is to tread the most dangerous of paths: to found 
eternal truth on individual emotion and conjecture. Such emotionalism and 
individualism must be avoided at all costs. Man's salvation is to be found, not in 
his own conjectures, but in the objective truth presented by the Church. 18' 
If the interpretation of Kierkegaard's theology which I have presented so far is true, then 
these accusations are incorrect, and what Kierkegaard meant by subjectivity stands in 
need of careful interpretation. I have not argued that he denies the possibility for those 
outside of faith to make philosophical observations about it (such a position would result 
in the `wittgensteinian Fideism' that I mentioned earlier). Nor have I denied that they, 
"'G0S58 
181 EUD 325 
182 E. g. CUP 1: 343 
183 Phillips 1970,205 
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like the believer, may know its contents in the form of propositional knowledge 
(although unlike the believer, they have not experienced the non-propositional self- 
revelation of God in Christ to which it refers). 
What has been argued throughout is that knowledge does not equal faith, and that 
talking about faith is very different from having it. The full force of Kierkegaard's 
criticism is levied against `this woeful preaching of Christianity - objectively quite 
correct - by men who really have no intimation of Christianity. Nothing, nothing has to 
such a degree confused, yes, abolished Christianity as the unchristian way in which it is 
preached'. 194 The living truth of Christianity is not so much determined by attention to 
doctrinal detail, but proclaimed by the reality of personal witness. 
Whether speculative thought is in the right is a different question. What is asked 
here is only how its explanation of Christianity is related to the Christianity that it 
explains. And how should they be related? Speculative thought is objective, and 
objectively there is no truth for an existing individual but only an approximation, 
since by existing he is prevented from becoming entirely objective. Christianity, 
on the other hand, is subjective; the inwardness of faith in the believer is the 
truth's eternal decision. Objectively there is no truth; an objective knowledge 
about truth or the truths of Christianity is precisely untruth. lss 
This point is related to the difference Kierkegaard makes between the teacher and the 
witness, to which I referred earlier. The teacher, or rather a caricature of a speculative 
thinker, approaches faith from a distance as a matter of objective enquiry, something 
distinct from the truth of his own personal existence. This is the view of an observer, 
yet the believer is not an observer but a participant. The objective truth of Christianity is 
not denied by Kierkegaard, but he realizes that anybody can examine the truth of a set of 
doctrines. In the Postcript we hear that `Objectively the emphasis is on what is said, 
subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said. ' Regarding the `how' in this context, 
, this is not to be understood as manner, modulation of voice, oral delivery, etc., but it is 
to be understood as the relation of the existence of the existing person, in his very 
184 J&P 2793, XA 341 n. d., 1850 
185 CUP 1: 224 
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existence, to what is said'. 186 There is therefore an intrinsic link between the 
commitment and the content of faith. Aware of the misinterpretations of this topic in 
circulation even then, Kierkegaard explains in his Journals that, 
In all the usual talk that Johannes Climacus is mere subjectivity etc., it has been 
completely overlooked that in addition to all his other concretions he points out 
in one of the last sections that the remarkable thing is that there is a How with 
the characteristic that when the How is scrupulously rendered the What is also 
given, that this is the How of 'faith'. 187 
So Christianity is subjective because in the life of the believer its doctrines spring from 
the page and into existence: `What is truth but to live for an idea? '188 If Christianity 
remains just objective, then it might be because we are offended by it and reject it. Or, 
we are not really interested and wish to maintain a speculative distance from it. 189 If we 
are not offended by it then we accept it as the truth and in this way it becomes for us 
`subjective'. 
Faith is described as being `a sphere by itself'. 19° The real proof of Christianity to one 
who believes is provided by the existence of this faith within him: `the inner proof, 
argumentum spiritus sancti, ' and `It is not reasons which justify the faith in God's son, 
but just the opposite - faith in God's son is the testimony'. '9' Because it is upon faith 
that every other detail of the believer's life depends, `Faith, is quite correctly, "the point 
outside the world" which therefore also moves the whole world. '192 It is also `the point 
outside the world' because there can be no objectively verifiable evidence to prove the 
truths of its content conclusively. There always remains the freedom to choose. 
Otherwise faith becomes synonymous with the conclusion of knowledge. For the 
believer, `an objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most 
passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person. At 
186 Ibid. 1: 202-3 
187 J&P 4550, X2A 299 n. d., 1849. cf. CUP 1: 610-11 
188 Ibid. 5100, IA 75 August 1,1835 
189 Cf. [bid 4567, X4A 667 n. d, 1852 
190 Ibid. 10, XB 79 n. d., 1850; cf. CUP 1: 327 
19' Ibid. 3608, XA 481 n. d., 1849 
192 Ibid. 2803, XA 529 n. d., 1850 
213 
the point where the road swings off (and where that is cannot be stated objectively, since 
it is precisely subjectivity), objective knowledge is suspended. 1193 As Climacus explains, 
But the definition of truth stated above is a paraphrasing of faith. Without risk, 
no faith. Faith is the contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness 
and the objective uncertainty. If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do 
not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith. If I want to keep 
myself in faith, I must continually see to it that I hold fast the objective 
uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty I am `out on 70,000 
fathoms of water' and still have faith. 194 
Faith cannot avoid the element of risk, and it is through an exercise of will that the gift 
of faith must be embraced despite the objective uncertainty. `Objectively the emphasis is 
on what is said; subjectively the emphasis is on how it is said. i195 Willing to undertake 
the risk and whatever may result from it constitutes the `passion' of faith, it is `the 
relation of the existing person, in his very existence, to what is said'. '96 To explain this 
further let us turn to Anti-Climacus' definition of faith as: `that the self in being itself and 
in willing to be itself rests transparently in God. 
"97 Faith is understood as being wholly 
open to the will of God, not through passive resignation but by actively choosing to 
accept what is given. For Kierkegaard the believer is one who truly becomes himself in 
this Divine-human relationship. 
And it is as a two-way relationship that his doctrine of faith is best described. I now 
wish to end this chapter with a brief summary of this doctrine. Kierkegaard, either 
directly, or through his pseudonyms, declares that faith is not a knowledge; because 
although the believer knows what is believed in the form of doctrinal statements, the real 
importance is that he relates to the object of belief Christ, the God-man. Hence he 
places the very experience of God's self-revelation over the ability to elucidate it in the 
form of propositions, though the latter should result from the latter. Otherwise there is 
the danger `that he becomes learned instead of becoming a Christian'. 198 We are told 
that faith is an act of will, but it is not brought about by mere will-power. Through 
"3 CUP 1: 203 
11" Ibid. 1: 204 
`95 Ibid. 1: 202 
191 Ibid. 1: 203 
197 SUD 82 
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grace faith is given, and out of grace we are permitted to respond freely whether to 
believe, or be offended. l99 In this sense faith may be understood both as a gift and a 
task. 200 Finally, in the life of faith, truth is subjectivity because the believer is not an 
impartial observer but a concerned witness. If Christianity is true it follows that he 
stakes his life on it, but to the observer might be intellectually intriguing, but it is kept at 
an objective distance. As John Mullen puts it, in Kierkegaard's eyes, `chessboards and 
logic problems are for sharpening one's wit, but one's relationship to God is not. 201 In 
the last year of his life Kierkegaard wrote the following comments on faith in his journal: 
In the New Testament faith is presented as having not an intellectual but an 
ethical character, it signifies the relationship of personality between God and 
man. Therefore faith is demanded (as an expression of devotedness), believing 
against [worldly] reason, believing although one cannot see (wholly a 
qualification of personality, and ethical). The apostle speaks of the obedience of 
faith. Faith is set to a test, is tested, etc. 202 
Kierkegaard's doctrine of faith, if examined closely, can be seen to be well within the 
orthodox Lutheran tradition and hence within the mainstream of Protestant Christianity. 
Beneath the rhetoric we can find him accepting the traditional three elements of faith: 
knowledge (notilla), assent (assensus), and trust (fiducia). Yet in true Lutheran style he 
subordinates the first two to trust in a Living God. 
203 To the atheist, or agnostic, this 
act of total commitment to an objective uncertainty may well seem to be a paradox. 
Where is the proof? The only real proof, replies Kierkegaard, is faith, if you have it. It 
must be revealed and believed. Yet ultimately this is the point to which all apologetics 
arrives, the reasoning comes to an end and a choice must be made whether to reject or 
accept the God who comes to us in Christ. 
'99 Cf. PC141ff 
200 Barrett, in Perkins (ed. ) 1994,284 
201 Mullen 1995,148 
202 J&P 1154, XI A 380 n. d., 1854-55 
203 Cf. Swinburne 1981,111; cf. also Owen 1984,3. I must emphasize that, although both Swinburne 
and Owen clarify this 3-fold distinction within Christian faith, and, that they provide useful descriptions 




I have attempted to show that Kierkegaard is a theologian in his own right and that he 
stands firmly within the orthodox Christian tradition. However, as his works are 
difficult to read many misinterpretations of his thought have arisen, largely from his 
frequent use of pseudonyms and irony. I have argued that such misinterpretations can 
be avoided if two central factors are taken into account. First, the literary forms of his 
pseudonymous works, written between 1843 and 1848. Second, the devout Christian 
faith expressed in the nonpseudonymous, or `signed' works that were written 
throughout most of his adult life. 
I showed how Kierkegaard offers one of his most important contributions to the classic 
reason-revelation debate in the early pseudonymous work Philosophical Fragments. In 
this short classic of philosophical theology, he rejects the immanentist theological 
epistemologies of Enlightenment Rationalism and Hegelian Idealism. For Kierkegaard, 
knowledge of God is- dependant upon the revelatory and redemptive activity of God in 
Christ. Yet, it is ironic that the pseudonymous author of Fragments, Johannes 
Climacus, is not a Christian and he professes not to understand the matter. God is 
therefore `the unknown' to him, whilst Christ is `the Absolute Paradox'. 
The later pseudonymous works The Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Christianity 
are attributed to the Christian pseudonym Anti-Climacus. Both these works and 
Kierkegaard's `signed' works develop the argument presented in Fragments. In these 
works Kierkegaard illustrates his Christocentric theology of revelation. Christ is our 
`Redeemer and Prototype' and Kierkegaard rejects any natural theology that seeks to 
operate apart from faith in him. Christ is also portrayed as `the Sign of Contradiction' 
who, reminiscient of Luther's Theology of the Cross, reveals the glory and love of God 
in lowliness and suffering. Theology is therefore an enterprise of `faith seeking 
understanding' as the believer, through grace, struggles to understand the difficulties of 
a revelation that runs counter to the world's perspectives. 
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